

Journal

news from behind the IRON CURTAIN

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FEATURES

- "Socialist Competition"
- Soviet Trade Offensive: West Europe
- The Farm Problem
- Crisis in the Youth Leagues
- The Girls They Left Behind



News from behind the IRON CURTAIN

June 1955 — Vol. 4 — No. 6

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NEWS FROM BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN, published monthly by the Free Europe Press of the Free Europe Committee, Inc., is addressed to those with a specific interest in events and developments in Communist-dominated Europe. This publication is sold, by subscription at an annual rate of \$3.00, to representatives of the press and other media, to universities, churches, libraries, and research centers, and to other groups of citizens, as well as to individuals who are interested in a serious, fully-documented account of "Communism-in-action." The Committee believes that accurate information contributes to an understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of Communism, and hence to the ability of the free nations to combat this system.

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The Month in Review



IN A SPRINGTIME gambit Soviet bloc foreign policy seemed to move towards a series of relaxing pressures while internal policies continued to grow firmer. In rapid succession, the Soviet Union signed an Austrian peace treaty, announced the official visit of Premier Bulganin, Party Secretary Khrushchev, and Deputy Premier Mikoyan to Yugoslavia, and offered a world disarmament plan in the United Nations. The combination of offerings was presumably intended to demonstrate to the world a Soviet willingness to negotiate and "to normalize relations"; in effect, to stabilize—at least temporarily—the present balance of power. In addition, the increasingly repressive internal measures, particularly in Hungary, were intended to prepare that country for "exposure to the West" after the Austrian treaty negotiations.

Both internal and external policies for the area were probably considered at the recently convoked "Warsaw Conference for Insuring Peace and Security in Europe," which gave formal and public recognition to the long-established fact of Communist bloc military coordination, and the policies were probably explained in greater detail by a series of visits by top Soviet leaders to various Satellites. The Warsaw Conference brought together the heads of all the Communist states of East Europe (and an "observer" from Communist China), and at the same time Kaganovich visited Czechoslovakia, Pervukhin East Germany, Voroshilov Hungary, Tarasov Albania, and Ponomarenko was appointed Soviet Ambassador to Poland. There seems little doubt that both Conference and visits were designed to clarify the post-Malenkov policies in the area.

The stiffening of internal policy did become more apparent, although the basic Party line remained middle-of-the-road, between the extremes of "Stalinist" repression and consequent complete alienation of the captive peoples, and the runaway "liberalizations" of the Malenkov period, most sharply manifest in the Nagy era in Hungary, which permitted decollectivization, infiltration of the Patriotic People's Front and the local councils, and other such demonstrations of popular resistance.

The hardening of policy was chiefly notable in agriculture, and in Hungary. More stringent delivery collections were called for; tighter restrictions on kolkhoz farmers' private plot activities were put into effect; and a mounting series of "kulak" trials with heavy sentences for minor offenses were publicized. Intentions to maintain production by continuing aid to independent farmers were reiterated, but the rising tide of collectivization propaganda, insistence on farmers fulfilling delivery obligations, and "legal" measures against "kulaks," all seemed designed to frighten peasants into collectives, or at least into compliance with regime plans for the agrarian sector.

There was also a new stringency in Hungary concerning the position of independent artisans, whose encouragement was an important feature of the early New Course. New regulatory decrees and new tax laws tightened control over independent artisans, restricted any marked expansion in their numbers, and placed difficulties in the way of their hiring added employees.

Throughout the area, there was also growing emphasis on increasing industrial productivity and reducing industrial costs. In Czechoslovakia, new trade union statutes reorganized the structure of the trade union movement to bring it into line with those of the other Satellites, and to make the unions more effective instruments for increasing production and productivity.

At the same time, the Hungarian 1955 budget, announced this month, showed no marked increase in allotments to heavy industry despite continued propaganda stress on its basic importance. The most notable investment increase went to agriculture, almost twice as large a share of total investments as in 1953, and slightly larger than last year. Regime speakers pointed out that the present lag in agriculture necessitated increasing that sector of the economy more rapidly, but it was also stressed that this is an extraordinary practice arising out of extraordinary conditions.

Also, three more Satellites—Poland, Romania and Bulgaria—promulgated price decreases for a variety of consumer goods. As in the Czechoslovak price cut of last month, manufactured goods—particularly textiles—were much better represented than foodstuffs. With a few exceptions, no staple foods were reduced in price, although many luxury and semi-luxury foods were included. The decrease in clothing and household furnishings prices, on the other hand, was very inclusive. In general, the price cuts were considerably more modest than those of previous years. (The Soviet Union, Albania and Hungary have thus far given no intimations of new price cuts this year.)

Some causal relationship between the external "softening" and the internal "hardening" must be postulated. If past Soviet history is any guide, the Soviet Union was diminishing cold war tensions to devote itself chiefly to its internal difficulties: consolidating the new Bulganin government and implementing its policies; counteracting in those areas where New Course policies have gone beyond regime intention and control; and attempting to rectify the balance of industry and agriculture, with particular attention to solving the chronic agricultural crisis.

"Socialist Competition"

"When guests come to our country from the West, they often ask what we mean by work competitions. How is it possible, they ask, for people to vie with each other for higher production?"

Radio Budapest, January 10, 1955

"The great founder of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, V. I. Lenin, proved that Socialist competition is the most characteristic feature of the economic and cultural growth of the [Communist] State, arising from the very nature of the Socialist system, and that it constitutes a permanent method of bringing the working masses to the task of building a Communist society."

Przegląd Związkowy (Warsaw), July 1954

It is indeed at first difficult for a Westerner to take seriously a productive system involving the award of little red flags, and titles like "ace worker," with solemn oaths by workers to overfulfill the Plan, and production contests between workers, shifts and factories. There is about the matter an aura reminiscent of Boy Scout camps, merit badges, scout oaths, and shrill Scout-masterly cries of "All right, fellows, let's see which tent will be the cleanest."

This impression is erroneous. The matter is serious, both in the effect it has on the lives of workers, and in its important place in Communist economic planning. It is a major weapon in the Communist campaign for industrialization and increased production, a campaign being waged largely in areas where Western traditions of industrialization are lacking, and where Communist methods have a greater chance for success than is immediately apparent. It is an important factor in the daily lives of 100 million Europeans outside the USSR.

Definition

There are two major varieties of work competition. In one, an individual, a shift or a factory pledges to exceed the norm by a certain amount for production, quality, or saving of cost or material, or for all of these. In the other, two or more individuals, shifts or factories compete against each other for results. In either variety the rewards for the successful may be money premiums, or such non-monetary indications of social prestige as flags, titles and lapel badges.



Caption: "Foreman, I've just finished today's work. Where do I throw it away?"

Dikobraz (Prague), March 3, 1955

Organization

Trade unions, in their capacity as the leading regime tool for maintaining and increasing production, are charged with major responsibility for the organization, promotion and encouragement of competition. "It is clear to everyone that the main task of the factory trade union committee is to organize work competitions." (*Nepszava* [Budapest], October 3, 1951). In some countries the union factory committees handle the competitions directly, in others they delegate sub-committees for that purpose. The duties of these committees are to induce as many workers as possible to join the competitions, to emphasize that component of the competition (e.g., production, cost reduction) most needed by the factory for Plan fulfillment, to spread "Stakhanovite methods" and suggest new practices for training Stakhanovites, to induce management to analyze the Plan into its most detailed components down to the work-bench level so that each worker will know exactly his norm for Plan fulfillment in all categories, to make suggestions to management on awards to leading workers, Stakhanovites and innovators, to check management's official record on competition results, to organize meetings to discuss and foster competitions, to keep records of day-to-day Plan fulfillment so that workers will know exactly how they stand. The committee, or a sub-committee appointed by it, also works to bring "technical intelligentsia"—engineers, draughtsmen, etc.—into the competitions and suggests awards for the leading workers among them.

Within the trade union committees, Party members lead the competition movement:

"The decisive factor for ensuring widespread development of Socialist competition is the Party organization's leadership of the trade unions. Without taking the place of the trade union organizations, which are directly charged with organizing and leading the Socialist competition, the Party organization must be the flag-bearers, the promoters of Socialist competition in each enterprise. It is up to

the Party organization to carry out sustained political effort among the workers, technicians, engineers and functionaries, so as to make every worker understand clearly that the improvement of his material situation depends upon his own and his team's work." (*Lupta de Clasa* [Bucharest], February 1954)

In organizing and supervising the competitions, the trade unions have frequently come into conflict with the factory management, and have been accused of pre-empting management's authority and interfering in production. The Third Romanian Trade Union Congress, in January 1953, found it necessary to issue a resolution warning the unions:

"The Congress condemns the practice of some trade union bodies which supplant the administration by going over its head in the field of production. Such trade unions forget that by such practices the principle of united leadership is destroyed. They also destroy the principle of united responsibility and make it easy for some factory directors to escape responsibility and throw the blame for shortcomings onto the unions. By their activities the unions must contribute to the strengthening of the authority of the enterprise management . . . and the foremen. . . . It is the trade unions that must organize the Socialist competition, but it is the enterprise administration that is charged with judging and scoring the results." (*Munca* [Bucharest], March 17, 1953)

It is uncertain to what degree the complaints made by factory managers about such union interference are true, or are simply useful excuses for failures in production.

In addition to the steady year-round pressure for competition there are certain special occasions and anniversaries when a special effort is called for. Among these are the various "Liberation Days" and the anniversaries of the birth of various Communist leaders, native and Soviet. Such events as the death of Stalin are, perhaps somewhat naively, seized upon as excellent moments for work competi-

tion propaganda. As *Rude Pravo* (Prague), March 8, 1953, put it at the time, "What must we do, Comrades? Wipe the tears from our eyes, clench our fists, and work, work to fulfill and exceed the Plan."

There are two types of incentives and rewards for work competition: financial and prestige. In general, the financial reward is that built into the wage system; the worker gets a premium for fulfilling and a higher premium for overfulfilling the Plan. Since most work is on piece work rates, it is possible to earn wages far higher than average by greatly overfulfilling the norm, although the norms are such that this is possible only for the strongest. Within "Socialist competition" itself there are some monetary rewards; in certain countries the enterprise director has at his disposal a prize fund from which he may give extra rewards to leading workers and competition winners. Certain countries also give money awards to competition winning factories, to be distributed by the management.

In addition, leading workers are given special privileges. They are sent on free vacations to State resorts; if ill they are given priority in special State rest homes; they are permitted to purchase scarce goods. *Nova Svoboda* [Ostrava], September 15, 1954, reported that:

"It was gratifying to see those 70 meritorious miners receiving motorcycles on the eve of Miners' Day in People's Militia Square, Ostrava. Now they are satisfied, those miners who struggled for a year to fulfill and exceed the coal output Plan in the Ostrava-Karvina region. . . . As compensation for their efforts, they were privileged to purchase motorcycles."

There are a number of kinds of prestige awards. The red "transfer flag" goes each day or week to the best worker in each shop. Outstanding factories are awarded permanent Red Banners, either by the government, the highest such award, or by ministries and trade unions. In Czecho-



Title: Socialist Competition Leaders.

Caption: (From left to right)—Zamfir Maria, leading weaver at the "Suveica" manufacturing company, pledged to produce daily four meters of cloth above her plan quota; she proudly made good her promise. Lapusa Gheorghe, wire-producing Stakhanovite at the metallurgical plant "Grivita," has scored beautiful successes in his work. David Florentina, Stakhanovite worker at the Number 1 Medical Drugs Company, has overfulfilled her daily quota by 70 percent. Flora C. Nicolae, Stakhanovite lathe worker at the "Grivita Rosie" plant, by applying Soviet methods, succeeded in meeting his September quota by August 14.

Photograph from front page of *Munca* (Bucharest), the official organ of the Central Council of the Workers' Union, August 20, 1953.



Caption: Driller Frantisek Janeba repairing locomotive wheels. He improved the procedure of working on the brake, doubled his output and considerably increased the quality of the work.

Svet v Obrazech (Prague), October 14, 1954

slovakia, for example, "1,661 enterprises appealed for evaluation in the State-wide Socialist competition for the first quarter of 1954; a total of 111 Red Banners was awarded, of which 25 were granted by the government, 86 by ministries and central committees of trade unions." (*Prace* [Prague], May 9, 1954.) These Red Banners are often presented by high regime officials at elaborate ceremonies where the entire enterprise is privileged to hear speeches combining "sound doctrine with wholesome entertainment."

Individual workers with outstanding records of high production and quality, or who have innovated more efficient production methods, are awarded such titles as "ace worker," "Stakhanovite," or "best in the business," and are decorated by the State. The major Czechoslovak decorations may be taken as typical: the Order of Hero of Work, with the right to wear the Gold Star of the Hero of Work; the Order of Socialism; the Order of the Republic; the Order of Work; the Order of Building Our Socialist Country.

The winning of such decorations and titles frequently brings further honors. As a matter of policy the regime is careful to include a few leading decorated workers on Commissions and Committees which are meant to represent a broad spectrum of the national life; the Executive Committee of the Hungarian Popular People's Front (PPF), for example, has several such workers, along with prominent writers, doctors, professors and politicians. Leading workers are also likely to get elected to the national as-

sembly of their country; the body has no power but the position is eminent.

Work competitions, therefore, present a means by which a few workers of extraordinary energy or particular skill may strive for social differentiation, and may attain, through their work, prestige and position. There is in this—in the regime insistence on putting such workers on ornamental committees with leading intellectual and political figures, in the awarding of national prizes such as the Hungarian Kossuth Prize to leading workers as well as to prominent poets and scientists—an echo of the pre-revolutionary Socialist idealism which celebrated the equal worth and dignity of all forms of labor, manual or mental.

Such rewards and prestige, however, can fall only to a handful of workers. This handful, by its striving for extremely high results, makes work more difficult for the great mass of workers, since the tendency is to raise norms toward the highest recorded level. For the majority, Socialist competition brings only greater pressure, economic and social, to work harder despite already long hours, high norms, and devitalizing living conditions.

A great effort is made by the union committees to get the workers to sign competition pledges. A typical pledge runs:

I, the undersigned, Damianov Ivan Kotzov, IV category worker at the Mitko Zhehtinkov State factory, solemnly promise, in honor of the VI regular Congress of the glorious Bulgarian Communist Party, in the presence of Comrade Vulko Chervenkov, that I will

1. Surpass my individual production plan for the first quarter of 1954 by 25 percent;
2. Improve the quality of production by 5 percent;
3. Save two percent of the raw material used in my work;
4. Consider the machines entrusted to me as 'machines on Socialist consignment';
5. Create a civilized place of work for myself and keep it in such condition;
6. Regularly attend requalification courses;
7. Study the life history of Comrade Vulko Chervenkov during the present scholastic year of the Party;
8. Regularly attend the DUPY [Communist Youth League] meetings, regularly receive and read the newspapers *Rabotnicheskoe Delo* and *Narodna Mladez*;
9. Enlist a new member for the DUPY;
10. Read the works of Comrade Stalin, volumes 1 and 2, and the book *Chaika* by Nikolai Biriuzov;
11. Help my comrades who lag behind in their production and in political instruction;
12. Compete with all the comrades of my section in the above points.

Sofia, January 1954

[signed] Damianov Iv. Kotzov

Why do workers, only a few of whom can win the top awards and decorations, sign these pledges and enter into "Socialist competition?" To a large degree, of course, the competitions are irrelevant to fulfillment of the production norm, since economic incentives are built into the piece-work wage system. However, norms are high and economic reward, except for the strongest, is small. What the competition system adds to this incentive are some addi-

tional premiums and, much more important, organized social pressure. This pressure both drives and leads; the worker is immersed in a social situation which bestows approval for entering competitions, disapproval for refraining. For the successful competitor, below the level of the highest awards, there is local press recognition, his name posted on the factory bulletin board and wall newspaper, and the seductive consciousness of the official approval of society. For the worker who refrains, or who competes badly, there is the "Board of Shame" on the factory bulletin board, and the weight of social disapproval. It is doubtless true that many workers are aware that the whole competition system is designed to drive them harder. Nevertheless, as a social animal man is subject to pressures, and the saturation of the worker with the idea that prestige may be gained by successful competition will almost inevitably have some effect. Furthermore, it is probably true that the *elan* of competition, particularly team competition with its group identification and group loyalties, is an incentive, particularly in lives so drab and so largely committed to work as those of East European workers.

Stakhanovism

The highest form of individual competition produces the Stakhanovite. Deriving its name from the Russian coal miner Alexei Stakhanov who on August 31, 1935, led his crew to an enormous overfulfillment of the norm, the Stakhanovite system selects the elite among workers.

In the area there is some variation in the meaning of the term. In Czechoslovakia and Poland the term "Stakhanovite" is simply a general term for an outstanding worker and "Socialist competitor," synonymous with but perhaps stronger than the term "shock-worker." In the other countries of the area it is an official title, awarded for specific achievement in competition. In Bulgaria, the title "shock-worker" is awarded for fulfillment of production norms above 100 percent, that of Stakhanovite for fulfillment above the average percentage for similar tasks in the same plant, that of "best in the trade" to Stakhanovites who win that title for three consecutive months. No exact information on the system in Romania is available, but it is probable that the standard is higher than in Bulgaria; that reported for one textile factory is 200 percent norm fulfillment for three months to win the title of Stakhanovite. In Hungary, before the New Course, the standard was also 200 percent "regularly." In January, 1954, however, this was changed. Standards are now determined by each enterprise individually, and are based on fulfillments slightly higher than the average shop production for one month, much as in the Bulgarian system. A Hungarian worker who maintains Stakhanovite standards for one year is given the further title of "best in the trade." This relaxation of standards was followed by a sharp increase in the number of Hungarian Stakhanovites, from 63,000 at the beginning of 1953 (*Nepszava* [Budapest], February 28, 1953) to more than 100,000 by April 3, 1954 (Radio Budapest of that date).

One of the features of the Stakhanovite movement is the system of "Stakhanovite Schools," classes held at the fac-

tory in which Stakhanovites instruct other workers in the methods that permitted them to attain their own eminence, and which furnish "comradely assistance . . . by the outstanding to those lagging behind." (*Stakhanovite Schools*, Nepszava Publishing Company, Budapest, 1951; p. 4).

There are a number of types of these schools. Using the Hungarian terminology, there is the "School of Reciprocal Training," also called schools of collective Stakhanovite experience or, more humbly, schools of high productivity. These attempt to raise the productivity of average workers to the Stakhanovite level. The "ace workers" give instruction in improved methods and procedures, particularly in their own innovations or novelties of technique. Such innovations, after being approved by the chief factory engineer, are explained to a few skilled workers, who in turn introduce them to the others in the classes.

Workers who have low-quality production are enrolled in "Schools of Outstanding Quality Production." There are also "Raw Material and Material Saving Schools," "Rapid-Processing Methods Schools," teaching advanced machine tool work, and "Schools for Increasing Profitableness." "Inter-Factory Stakhanovite Schools" spread innovations and advanced methods between enterprises.

There are a large number of Stakhanovite "methods," specific techniques of work organization and production, which workers are urged to adopt. Most of these were originated by and named for Soviet workers, but the terminology varies somewhat from country to country. In Czechoslovakia, for example, two of these "methods" are the Bridkov Method and the Boriskin Method, both used in coal mining and of Soviet origin. In discussing the use of the Boriskin Method, *Rude Pravo* (Prague), March 27, 1954, said:

"The record performance of Szafarczyk's team of shock-workers in the Czechoslovak Army Mines, who in February extracted 507.5 meters of shafts, lasted no more than a month. On March 26, five days before the end of the month, at the same mine another shock-worker team under the direction of the foreman E. Ovczarzy equaled the performance in a working time of only three hours. . . ."

It is typical of the competition movement that such reports, in great quantity, should be published in the national press.

The Bykov Method of lathe operation was developed by the Russian worker Pavel Borisovic Bykov, Stalin Prize winner and delegate to the Supreme Soviet, who toured Czechoslovakia in 1951, speaking on his method. The Kolesov Method, also for lathe operation and of Soviet origin, was discussed in *Prace* (Bratislava), April 21, 1953:

"The basis of the new working method is in the new way of sharpening the blade, by which the material can be worked at several times greater speed. The significance of the new work method is that with it the worker can increase the productivity of his work and the quality of his product without greater output of physical effort."

There are also numerous "movements" to which workers can pledge themselves. In Hungary, for example, there is the Gazda Movement to save raw material by reducing

rejects. A worker tries to cut down his rejects enough each month to provide material for a whole working day. The Loy Movement, named for the Hungarian shockworker Arpad Loy, has for its slogan, "Produce more today than yesterday," and aims at a continuous increase of production, presumably to infinity. In the Ten Minute Movement workers pledge themselves to arrive at the workshop ten minutes early, without compensation. There is also a Five Minute Movement, for workers who promise to stay five minutes after quitting time. The Deak Movement among foremen strives for tightened labor discipline. "The movement has produced an improvement; the foremen are stricter with late-comers and loafers." (*Szabad Nep* [Budapest], February 23, 1954).

Numbers

The regime figures on numbers of workers participating in "Socialist competition" are, of course, of no great significance. They indicate neither the degree to which workers cooperate in the competitions nor the success of the attempts to raise productivity. Nevertheless, they do show the extent to which regime social pressure and propaganda has forced the workers at least to a nominal enlistment in the competitions. According to the latest figures, the following percentages of all industrial workers are engaged in work competition: Hungary, 75-80 percent (*Nepszava*, February 28, 1953); Poland, 70 percent (*Zycie Gospodarcze* [Warsaw], May 2, 1954); Romania, 70 percent (*Munca*, March 17, 1953).


There are no figures available for Bulgaria or Czechoslovakia. There are indications, however, that the percentage of participation in Czechoslovakia is sensibly lower than in the other countries of the area. In the machine industry, for example, where we would expect a great deal of regime pressure for competition, participation was only 45 percent in 1954 (*Prace*, December 18, 1954). There are a number of reasons why there should be this apparent marked discrepancy between the percentage of competing workers in Czechoslovakia and in the rest of the area, among them Czechoslovakia's much greater experience in Western industrialization, and the residual traditions of her once strong trade union movement. The workers of such a country would be more likely to resist Communist pressures for work competition than would industrially unsophisticated labor.

New Course Changes

With the shift in economic emphasis in the middle of 1953, "Socialist competition" became increasingly important to the success of the regimes' plans. A central object of that shift was to increase productivity and reduce costs by enlisting the cooperation of the workers. It was to attain this cooperation in production that the political and social "liberalizations" were granted. Regime pressures for work competition increased. The Bulgarian Trade Union Council, for example, published decisions on the increase of competition early in 1954:

"It is necessary to expand more widely the Socialist competition for fulfillment and overfulfillment of the Plan in all indices and in every enterprise. . . . The Plenum requires the trade union organizations to intensify their work for the strengthening of work productivity and State discipline, to wage a struggle against absenteeism and labor turnover." (*Rabotnichesko Delo* [Sofia], March 26, 1954)

The effect of the New Course on "Socialist competition," then, was simply to increase its importance and the emphasis placed upon it. The effect on the Stakhanovite movement was somewhat more complex. There was a general tendency whenever possible to shift emphasis from individual forms of competition to team and group forms, in an effort to enlist as many as possible, and to minimize the hatred felt by many workers for those Stakhanovites who by extreme effort cause the already high norms to be raised. This shift away from individual competition was



Caption: Tractor driver Tadeusz Piatkowski, best in the Slupsk MTS, fulfilled last year's plan by 184 percent. Piatkowski has distinguished himself not only by his good and productive work in the field. Assigned to a collective farm of Bierkowo, he helps kolkhoz members by giving them advice, explaining things to them, and teaching them to respect the statutes. We need many more such Piatkowskis.

From front page of *Spoldzielnia Produkcyjna* (Warsaw), February 10, 1955



Title: Meeting of the Club of Innovators and Technicians of Railway Shops.

Caption: Members listen to a lecture by innovator mechanic Comrade Josef Uvizl on improvement suggestions for the production of tachometers.

Svet v Obrazech (Prague), October 14, 1954

sharpest in Romania, where after mid-1953 the press ceased almost completely to mention Stakhanovites, probably because raising of norms to Stakhanovite levels was carried out more viciously in Romania than elsewhere, and Stakhanovism had earned the universal detestation of the people.

Failings

In many cases workers in the Satellites are already working at, or close to, the full extent of their energy. It is not surprising, therefore, that the answer given by union organizations and factory administrations to the steady official pressure for more and more "Socialist competition" is very often simple deception. The degree of participation, the results, the whole competition process is often merely faked, and a parade of meaningless and impressive figures are fed into the central bureaucratic maw. There is much complaint in the press about this kind of thing; this typical example is from *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), February 4, 1955:

"In the report for the fourth quarter of 1954 submitted to the Central Statistical Office by the lighting equipment factories T-11, the following item was included: number of competitors—1,195 persons. When Comrade Kwiatkowski,

secretary of the union factory committee, was asked how the matter really was, he pulled out a folder (on which someone had written in huge letters: WORK COMPETITION), looked through its many pages, forms, reports, etc., and said, 'Altogether, there will be about 700 persons taking part in the competition.' A Party economic conference on December 11 supplied us with still another new figure—just over 600. This last figure (and we shall see that even this has been grossly exaggerated) is for internal consumption only. To the Central Statistical Office the factory submitted the imposing figure of 1,195."

A mere doubling of the number of competitors is relatively mild. *Glos Pracy* (Warsaw), April 2-3, 1955, carried a speech by one Comrade Siedlecki, representative of a machine factory, delivered to a regional conference of metal workers at Wroclow:

"I have heard from the conference report that in our district there are 13,000 metalworkers who applied the new [competition] Methods. This means that every third metalworker is working according to some Method. Among these 13,000 . . . there are workers from our factory allegedly applying these Methods. But do you know how many there actually are? One. And this one man, who applies new Methods, is the Socialist Competition Chairman. He applied them, of course, on paper only, in his



It took Ota Vlach a long time to work out his method of levelling metal sheets by welding flame. . . . Today he sees to it that metal sheet workers no longer suffer from inhuman drudgery in engineering shops, that they work under better conditions and reach higher productivity.

Svet v Odrazech (Prague), December 18, 1954

reports to the higher authorities, and we must frankly admit that he applied them well; thanks to his figures . . . we achieved fifth place among 19 enterprises of our branch who competed for the title of best in the field in the last quarter of 1954."

The article was entitled "Let's Stop Cheating Ourselves."

There are frequent complaints that the selection of "ace workers" is not based on any actual competition successes, but is done at random to satisfy higher authorities with a list of names, or is a matter of self-selection by those responsible who wish to get whatever premiums and rewards there may be. *Prace* (Prague), March 27, 1953, said:

"The chairman of the shop committee, the head foreman and the manager simply decided. They did it the quick way: you will be best finisher, I will be the top foreman and that's that. And the shop committee remained entirely out of the picture."

Even where competition actually is carried out, it seems to be very common practice to stress volume of production at the expense of quality, with the result that the number of rejects increases more rapidly than does production. *Prace* (Prague), January 8, 1953, for example, complained, that in many factories no effort is made to fulfill the Plan until late in the Plan period, when a sudden competition is mounted to make up the lag:

"The consideration for quality as practiced in certain factories is best described by the case of the Klement Gottwald Foundry in Kuncice; of 80 vents produced for a coke battery, 70 were rejects. . . . The leadership of Socialist competition requires a knowledge of all tasks and goals of the competition in all production sections, and the accomplishment of them in all time periods. . . ."

Indeed, there are reports of factories which win competitions by means of their poor quality production and high reject rates:



Ota Vlach, mechanic of the CKD Sokolovo, holder of the Order of the Republic, was elected Member of Parliament, where—as he does in his workshop—he will endeavor to overcome all obstacles blocking the building of Socialism in our beautiful fatherland.

"To be sure, the factory competed last year against other factories from the same district, Ochota, in collecting metal scrap, and it won. How did it win? Huge quantities of rejects went for scrap. Thanks to such waste the plant exceeded the scrap delivery plan by 65 tons of iron and steel scrap and by about 10 tons of non-ferrous metal scrap. What can one say about this kind of competition?" (*Trybuna Ludu* [Warsaw], February 4, 1955.)

Current Trends

The present emphasis on increasing agricultural production throughout the area has led to a corresponding rise in the attention paid to competition on farms and MTS. Radio Budapest, April 12, 1955, for example, reported that:

"The DISZ [Communist Youth Association] Hajdu County Committee proclaimed a competition for youth in order to raise the crop output. Already 50 competing youth groups have started their work in the countryside. The best groups will receive awards on May Day, on August 20, and on December 21, awards amounting to a total of 35,000 forints."

There has been a growing stream of such announcements, including reports of competitions between counties, between MTS, and among women agricultural workers.

This is not to say that competition in industry is currently being neglected. Indeed, higher productivity and reduced costs are among the major aims for this year throughout the area, and "Socialist competition" is constantly being stressed as the main weapon in that fight.

It would be easy to conclude that "Socialist competition" is merely a device for forcing higher production; it is that, of course, but it is more. It is also an attempt, unique in the annals of industrialization, to establish a system in which, to a degree, there is a shortcut between successful endeavor and social approbation without intervening and concomitant financial rewards. It is difficult to say how successful the experiment has been, since we do not know what would have been the effectiveness of Communist industrialization without the "Socialist competition" system. The guess may be hazarded, however, that the system will become increasingly less effective—and perhaps already has—with the passage of time. Whatever success it has had was



Inscription on board reads: Socialist competition and pledges of the rolling mills.

Caption: The Youth Shift at the Vitkovice Rolling Mills has been the best team of the plant for the past two years. Young workers follow the results of individual shifts as marked on the board.

Svet v Obrazech (Prague), July 17, 1954

to a great degree dependent on the fact that the workers had no industrial tradition. This meant both that to some extent they could be induced to accept prestige (which costs the economy nothing) as a partial substitute for monetary reward, and that the regime could use the *mystique* of the machine, always strong among pre-industrialized peasants, to give glamour to industrial endeavor. As the workers of Eastern Europe become increasingly acclimated to industrialization, and increasingly aware of the contrast between their efforts and their standard of living, "Socialist competition" will probably become increasingly ineffective as a system of industrial organization and incentive.

By Request

A "popular" song that praises conditions in Czechoslovakia since the Communist coup now has a parody ridiculing these same conditions, according to a refugee report. The original song is called "Now We Have What We Wanted" and is often played in cafes. The parody (in part) goes as follows: "Now we have what we wanted. . . . A lump of sugar for Sunday, a grain of coffee for Friday. We are going backward indeed. . . ." Workers are said to use the title words of the song, "Now We Have What We Wanted," whenever they are disgusted with something or unsuccessful in some undertaking.

Soviet Trade Offensive: West Europe

*This is the first of a two-part article on East-West trade, which is part of a larger series on the foreign trade pattern of the Soviet orbit. The following analysis of Communist trade policy throws light on both foreign and domestic policies of the Soviet bloc countries.**

THE SOVIET bloc's trade tentacles have in the past year reached out in many directions and into almost every corner of the non-Communist world. The actual trade, although substantial, does not compare to the propaganda from the USSR and the Satellites about what has been done and what will be done. However, if the genuine trade accomplishments as reflected in the statistics are only moderately successful, the psychological effects of the Soviet bloc's trade offensive have been somewhat more successful.

The West is certainly not averse to East-West trade: what is hindering it is that the Soviet bloc is not prepared to meet the West half way. Deterrents to increased trade are first of all the inability of Soviet bloc countries to compete with the West European market on either price or quality. This is particularly evident in the case of Polish coal which is slowly being priced out of the market. A second factor, no less important than the first, is that the Communist countries do not actually have products available to trade. Prior to World War II, trade between East and West Europe was primarily in Eastern agricultural products in return for Western manufactured goods. The Eastern demand for manufactured products and industrial equipment persists, but the agricultural surpluses to ship in return no longer exist. Countries like Poland,

* All trade statistics in this article are derived from official Western sources, the United Nations, and the U.S. Department of Commerce.



Final inspection of the Warsaw M-20 at the FSO Motor Works.
Polish Foreign Trade, Warsaw, March 1954

once grain surplus areas, are now grain deficit areas. In recent agreements Bulgaria and Romania have been forced to pledge grain and oil cake deliveries in lieu of other products more suitable for trade with the West, and because of domestic food shortages both these countries, and Bulgaria in particular, have deleted mention of these products from their internal announcements of these trade treaties. A third factor is the reluctance of Satellite countries to compensate West European countries for trade deficits incurred during previous years' trade, and to settle accounts for Communist expropriations of West European properties.

Several West European nations have suggested (at the October 1954 meeting of the East-West trade committee of the UN Economic Commission for Europe) that the USSR pay the debts Satellites have incurred in the West. It was further suggested that surpluses earned in one Western country by a Communist country be freely transferable to another to meet debts there. The trade committee was in favor of setting up an East European payments or clearance union similar to EPU. The Soviets, however, rejected this proposal, and the emergence of an East European clearance union or of a ruble bloc seems as remote as ever. An internal East European clearance union evidently does exist and has for a number of years been in operation within the framework of Komekon and under Moscow's supervision.

At this point, it is certainly not to the USSR's advantage to assume the Satellites' financial responsibilities, or to sponsor such a trade payments union. In current fashion, through a system of separate swing-credit agreements, the Communist countries have been able to extract millions of dollars worth of credits which otherwise would be denied them under unified bloc trading.* Moreover, a clearance or payment union would cramp Soviet tripartite arrangements, particularly with Finland, where trade deficits are made up by the USSR using shipments from the Satellites. If, how, when and where the Soviet Union reimburses the Satellites for such transactions is not open to outside scrutiny while freely transferable trade arrangements might publicly embarrass the Soviet Union. Probably these surpluses would go a long way toward meeting Satellite deficits presently incurred in the West.

What follows will attempt to trace the present status of Soviet bloc trade with each of the thirteen West European countries, the tactics being employed, and recently completed trade agreements.**

Austria

Austria's East-West trade differs substantially from that of other Western states. Up to now, Austria has been the only Western country under partial Soviet occupation. This occupation has had a drastic effect on the country's economy, because the area occupied contains the only known petroleum deposits, a major natural resource. These, the Zisterdorf oil fields, were awarded to the USSR as former German property under the Potsdam agreement. Early in 1946, the USSR announced it was prepared to renounce exclusive claim to these deposits, and proposed giving Austria 50 percent of the yield, but this offer was rejected by the Austrians because it called for establishment of a joint Soviet-Austrian company similar to those established in the Satellites, which would have bound Austrian economy more closely to the Soviet Union. Estimates are that the Soviets currently take 60 percent of the output of these fields,*** and up to now, have refused to allocate Austria enough oil to satisfy even its minimum needs.**** Negotiations between Austrian authorities and the Soviet-run petroleum administration, OROP, at the beginning of 1955 provided for OROP deliveries to Austria of 730,000 tons of

* A swing credit is a limit established in a clearing agreement by trading countries beyond which the trade deficit of one party may not go without settlement in merchandise, gold or hard currencies. For example, if the swing credit agreed upon by countries X and Y is \$250,000, and X ships Y \$2,000,000 worth of goods and has received only \$1,750,000, in return, X can refuse to ship Y further goods until Y makes up the deficit either in cash or merchandise.

** Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey will be included in a subsequent article which covers non-Soviet Eastern Europe and the Middle East.

*** Austria's Petroleum production is approximately 3 million tons annually.

**** In 1949 an agreement was reached for a draft treaty, by which the USSR would operate the oil fields for 30 years and the Austrians receive 40% of the output.

fuel oil, while Austrian industrial consumption is placed at about 900,000 tons. Soviet refusal to supply Austria with sufficient quantities of oil to fulfill its minimum requirements directly contradicted the USSR's December 1953 announcement that Austria could have unlimited quantities. On the basis of this promise many Austrian enterprises converted from coal, but owing to recent shortages, many of them were forced to reconvert back to coal.

Another one of the principal differences between Austria and the USSR is the price to be paid OROP. During the past six months a virtual gasoline price war has developed. To make foreign gasoline more competitive with the domestic OROP product, the Austrian Ministry of Trade temporarily abolished the customs duty on petroleum imports, while the Federal Railroad management cut petroleum transportation costs.

During 1954, imported gasoline reached a level below that of the OROP product. In the face of this the Soviets agreed to negotiate for gasoline sales at lower prices, but only on condition that the Austrian government abolish the import liberalization for foreign gasoline. No agreement was reached because Austria knew that such abolition would mean closing off gasoline imports and would place Austria once more at the mercy of the Soviets and OROP's sporadic deliveries. The situation was further complicated in February 1955, when the Soviet fuel administration raised its price and Hungary unilaterally raised crude oil prices to Austria without prior consultation and in violation of the existing Austro-Hungarian treaty.

In April, the picture took on a different complexion when the USSR announced she was finally ready to pull out of Austria, and agreed to return the Zisterdorf fields. In return, Austria will have to deliver annually one million tons of oil to the Soviets for the next 10 years.

Austro-Soviet relations are additionally complicated by Soviet operation of 186 (USIA) retail outlets in the Communist-occupied zone, plus 300 large industrial plants confiscated by them. The stores sell such staples and luxury goods as: food, wines, liquor, textiles, cigarettes, radio sets, bicycles, shoes, furniture, watches, musical instruments, typewriters, sewing machines, toys, etc. The major part of this merchandise is manufactured in the Satellite countries, smuggled into Austria as property of the Soviet Occupation Authority evading Austrian customs inspection. Consistent reports indicate that these stores dispose of large amounts of Hungarian sugar and cigarettes which are sold below the Austrian market price. In this way the Soviet bloc countries are able to dispose of, and have disposed of, large amounts of non-competitive merchandise. The proceeds are then utilized for purchasing Austrian equipment or for triangular agreements.*

Present Austro-Soviet negotiations state that the USSR will transfer all USIA enterprises to Austria for \$150 million payable in Austrian merchandise over a six-year period.

* A recent triangular transaction was between the Soviet Oil Administration in Austria, Czechoslovakia and a West German enterprise. It provides for Czechoslovak delivery of 10,000 tons (subsequently increased to 25,000 tons) of Austrian oil to West Germany in return for machinery. The Czechoslovaks are to pay for the oil in Austrian currency.

One of the major trade difficulties with Austria is the fact that almost every Satellite has accrued huge debits there. During the past year many of these debits have been somewhat reduced (see chart below), but they are still substantial.

Austrian-Satellite Clearing Accounts*

	December 31, 1953	December 31, 1954	Swing Credit
Bulgaria	+1,029	+1,055	1,000
Czechoslovakia	— 515	—1,397	3,500
Hungary	—1,302	— 341	2,000
Poland	—1,807	—1,473	2,500
Romania	—1,382	— 970	1,500

In value terms, Austrian trade with the Soviet bloc in 1954 was about the same as in 1953. Exports in 1954 were approximately \$58.8 million compared to \$58.4 million in 1953, while 1954 imports were some \$60.3 million as compared to \$60.4 million for 1953. Although the overall volume of Austrian trade increased in 1954, Soviet bloc trade during the year remained at 1953 levels. 1954 Soviet bloc exports amounted to 9.6% of total exports compared to 11% in 1953. 1954 imports amounted to 9.5% of the total compared to 11.2% in 1953.** Austrian-bloc trade is still below the 1952 level, when exports were approximately \$64.4 million or 12.7% of total exports, and imports were \$73.6 million or 11.3% of total. Austrian trade with the Soviet bloc is slowly diminishing and substantially below the prewar (1938) level when the same countries accounted for some 30% of Austrian foreign trade turnover.

* + = sum owed Satellite, — = sum owed Austria. All figures in thousands of \$ US.

** US Department of Commerce, East-West trade statistics.

Austria signed a new trade agreement for 1955 with Bulgaria on November 30, 1954, differing from the previous one, which expired on October 31, 1954, in that the amount of trade called for was somewhat lower. The previous agreement called for Bulgarian and Austrian exports of \$10.5 million and \$11 million respectively; the current agreement calls for \$8.5 million from both countries. The trade decrease is due principally to decreased Bulgarian needs for soda and other chemical products since the recent openings of the Karl Marx Soda and Dimitrograd nitrogen plants.

Austria will export steel bars, rods and sheets; power, electrical and mining machinery and replacement parts; tools, ball bearings, railway rolling stock, paper and paper products, cellulose, etc. in return for Bulgarian tobacco, corn, rice, rye, wheat, barley, lard, sunflower seed, eggs, fruit, vegetables and vegetable oils, grapes, hemp and flax waste, spices, etc. The Bulgarians, significantly, have pledged export of many products in short supply domestically, particularly eggs, lard, corn, vegetable oil and fodder.

A new Austro-Czechoslovak trade agreement for 1955 was signed on January 20, 1955 according to which trade volume is again set at \$12 million in each direction. Czechoslovakia fulfilled her obligations by the previous agreement by only 56% and failed, principally, to supply 20,000 tons of coal she had contracted for. Czechoslovakia has had a severe coal crisis in the past year and could not even meet domestic requirements.

Principal differences between the 1954 and 1955 treaties are: Austrian ball bearing exports increased from \$500,000 to \$550,000, industrial ovens from \$170,000 to \$360,000, ignition equipment from \$80,000 to \$120,000, white lead from \$70,000 to \$360,000, electromagnetic couplings from \$30,000 to \$50,000, and various types of pumps from

Western Europe's Trade With the Soviet Bloc in Europe¹

	Exports			Imports		
	1952	1953	1954	1952	1953	1954
Austria	64.1	58.4	57.5	73.6	59.4	59.5
Belgium-Luxembourg	59.5	64.7	66.3	32.7	40.2	49.1
Denmark	33.7	44.0	61.5	39.1	38.5	44.3
Finland	176.9	173.9	183.7	153.3	180.8	187.2
France	38.8	51.0	74.1	58.6	45.9	66.8
German Fed. Rep.	85.4	114.4	182.8	76.4	134.7	187.4
Iceland	2.8	8.6	12.9	3.7	6.3	12.7
Italy	55.1	57.9	56.5	84.2	46.4	62.9
Netherlands	36.4	56.8	84.8	54.4	53.4	52.4
Norway	28.2	32.0	45.0	32.1	40.3	41.7
Sweden	118.3	66.9	66.4	107.6	59.9	70.3
Switzerland	42.4	34.3	35.9	35.5	34.6	38.4
United Kingdom	142.8	75.1	95.9	234.9	206.7	206.4
Total	884.4	838.0	1,023.3	986.1	947.1	1,079.1

1. Sources for all tables: *Direction of International Trade*, UN, (New York); US Dept. of Commerce Tables on East-West trade; *Bulletin Mensuel du Commerce Extérieur*, (Brussels), December 1954, *Statistical Bulletin of the National Bank of Iceland*, January

1955; *Wirtschaft und Statistik* (Stuttgart), 1955. Charts all in millions of \$US.

2. China trade includes Formosa.

3. China trade includes Formosa and Hong Kong.

\$20,000 to \$50,000. Significant changes in Czechoslovak exports are increases in exports of egg products from \$230,000 to \$280,000, machine tools from \$100,000 to \$250,000, and of xylene mixtures and wood alcohol from 100 tons each to 500 tons each.

Among other important products to be delivered by Austria are: high grade steel and steel products (\$2,900,000), rolled metals including 2,000 tons of sheet metal (\$500,000), valves and armatures (\$120,000), machinery replacement parts (\$250,000), industrial and mining machinery (\$500,000), electrical machinery and equipment, including transformers and electric motors (\$140,000), and diverse chemical products. In addition, Czechoslovak products of importance include miscellaneous agricultural products (\$500,000), hops (200 tons), specialized machinery including agricultural, lumbering, textile manufacture, and the leather industry machinery (\$255,000), automotive vehicles and replacement parts (\$550,000), motorcycles and replacement parts (\$180,000), industrial and non-industrial porcelain, glassware, and diverse chemical products.

The agreement also provides for Czechoslovak delivery of \$1 million worth of various types of coal, coke, and lignite. Unless internal conditions in this industry show substantial improvement, it is doubtful whether these commitments can be met. A special provision in the agreement pledged delivery of 40,000 tons of Austrian iron ore from the Alpine Mining Trust in return for 500,000 tons of hot-compressed coal tar from Czechoslovakia. Another special provision called for the contractual processing into wire by Austria of Czechoslovak molybdenum ore. Moreover, Austria has also met Czechoslovak demand for 1,100 tons of beef.

On December 15, 1954, a 1955 trade and payments agreement for exchange of goods amounting to \$14 million in each direction was concluded between Austria and East-Germany. Because there is no official contract between the two governments, the agreement was signed by the Austrian Chamber of Commerce in behalf of Austria and the Chamber for External Trade in behalf of the GDR. Austria pledged delivery of iron, steel, textiles, food, hides, and leather goods in return for GDR delivery of mineral products, machinery, precision instruments, and chemicals.

One of the main obstacles to increased Austrian-GDR trade is lack of a credit framework for clearing, and the need to make compensation deals which, by their nature, are very slow. East German authorities, recognizing the difficulty, have recently relaxed export restrictions to promote export of goods from small enterprises. From September 1, 1954, these smaller enterprises or craftsmen are entitled to permits for trade with Austria valid for six months provided that the value of the goods does not exceed \$5,000. These provisions enable GDR producers to circumvent the State export monopoly and to make direct contact with Austrian firms.

A March 1, 1955 Austrian announcement concerned a three year, \$1 million dollar credit grant to the Hungarian regime to further export of Austrian consumer goods. Recent reports indicate that difficulties have arisen concern-

ing Austrian timber exports to Hungary: Austria is attempting to limit them and Hungary is pressing the Soviet forces to further export timber illegally from the Soviet-occupied zone through the USIA trade organization.

The present Austro-Hungarian trade agreement runs through August 31, 1955. Renewed automatically in 1954, it provides for a one year period of Austrian exports of \$15 million and Hungarian exports of \$17 million. The difference is to go towards liquidating Hungarian debts in Austria. Among the more important Austrian exports are: machinery (\$400,000), electrical machinery (\$200,000), technical felt (\$300,000), paper and paper products (\$250,000), replacement parts for automotive vehicles and tractors (\$150,000), forged metals (1,000 tons), high-grade steel (4,500 tons), magnesite bricks (3,000 tons), lumber, etc. In return, Hungary agreed to deliver: sugar (7,000 tons), bread grain (35,000 tons), oil seeds (5,000 tons), edible oils (2,000 tons), rice (3,000 tons), eggs (1,000 tons), poultry (500 tons), lard (1,000 tons), fruit and vegetables (\$500,000), internal animal organs (\$500,000), machinery (\$300,000), various chemical and pharmaceutical products, etc.

On April 1, 1954, a trade and payments agreement for mutual exchange of \$20 million worth of goods, valid through March 31, 1955, was concluded between Austria and Poland. Austria pledged to export steel products (\$500,000), rolled metal, ball bearings (\$800,000), machinery (\$3,000,000), shoes (\$700,000), watches (\$300,000), photographic and mining equipment (\$200,000), paper industry equipment (\$330,000), communications equipment, replacement parts for automobiles (\$150,000), veneers, magnesite bricks, etc., in return for Polish delivery of 1.1 million tons of coal, dyes (\$100,000-\$150,000), liquor, fish, eggs (15 million units), seeds (\$150,000), and miscellaneous agricultural products. Poland stipulated that she will import Austrian consumer goods only on condition that Austria grants long-term credits for these purchases.

Poland failed to fulfill its 1954 coal commitments to Austria. At the end of the year, she was 40,000 tons in arrears of her pledged deliveries, still another indication of the severe coal crisis in the Soviet bloc.

Vienna indicated that the 1954 Austro-Polish treaty was renewed on April 25, 1955, for another year without major trade quota changes. Under this new agreement, Poland has pledged to deliver 1 million tons of coal (100,000 tons less than called for in the 1954 agreement), 10% of which is to be paid for in pounds sterling. Poland, however, has raised its coal price \$1-3 per ton. No agreement has yet been reached on Poland's request for a loan to purchase Austrian consumer goods but the request is still under consideration.

An Austro-Romanian trade and payments agreement was concluded on April 19, 1955, valid from April 1, 1955, through March 31, 1956, which provided for mutual exchange of \$14 million worth of goods and equipment. Following are principal products to be exchanged, with quantities provided by previous agreement, if different, in parenthesis. Austria is to export: magnesite bricks,

Western Europe's China Trade¹

	China Mainland				Hong Kong			
	Exports		Imports		Exports		Imports	
	1953	1954	1953	1954	1953	1954	1953	1954
Austria	—	1.3	1.0	0.8	—	—	—	—
Belgium-Luxembourg	1.4	4.9	7.3	2.2	10.3	17.1	1.0	1.3
Denmark ²	0.3	0.4	2.1	0.3	—	2.4	—	1.4
Finland	5.4	6.6	1.6	2.8	0.3	—	—	—
France ²	12.4	8.7	11.0	9.4	7.5	5.3	0.4	0.6
German Fed. Rep.	25.0	21.5	33.3	36.1	31.2	22.2	0.2	0.5
Italy	4.7	6.1	7.4	2.1	8.7	5.5	2.8	0.4
Netherlands	4.0	1.0	15.1	6.2	12.6	13.1	2.9	1.6
Norway	0.9	—	3.6	2.4	1.4	1.1	1.2	1.3
Sweden	2.7	0.7	1.6	1.6	3.2	3.7	0.8	1.0
Switzerland ³	26.5	23.3	16.1	11.0	—	—	—	—
United Kingdom	17.5	19.4	28.8	25.2	76.4	67.4	23.2	31.1

\$700,000 (\$1,000,000); paper, paper products, \$500,000; rayon staple fiber, \$400,000 (\$250,000); textiles, yarns, \$1,300,000 (\$100,000); steel, \$2,000,000; rolled metals, \$1,000,000; structural iron, \$500,000 (\$2,400,000); ball bearings, \$250,000; agricultural implements, \$300,000 (\$400,000); electrical equipment, \$570,000 (\$550,000); trucks, busses, etc., \$300,000; armatures, valves, etc., \$300,000; machinery, \$500,000 (\$300,000). Romania is to export: grain, \$7,500,000 (\$7,050,000); rice, \$300,000 (\$1,000,000); oleaginous seeds and products, \$600,000 (\$700,000); eggs, \$100,000 (\$200,000); technical charcoal, \$200,000 (\$100,000); chemicals, pharmaceuticals, \$200,000 (\$100,000); fuel oil, \$750,000 (\$500,000, in annex to previous agreement); cotton, \$400,000 (\$60,000); paraffine, \$250,000.

Belgium

Belgian trade with the Soviet bloc has shown a slight increase during the past year. Its 1954 Soviet bloc exports were \$66.8 million or 2.9 percent of total exports, compared to \$66.1 million and also 2.9 percent of the 1953 total. Imports from the bloc increased from \$47.4 million or 2.0 percent of total imports in 1953 to \$51.3 million, also 2.0 percent of the total, in 1954*.

On March 8, 1955, a new trade agreement between Belgium and Czechoslovakia—which also provides for exchange of goods between Czechoslovakia and the Belgian Congo—and calls for mutual exchange of some \$15 million worth of goods, or more than 15% increase over the previous agreement.

The agreement, valid from April 1, 1955 to March 31, 1956, calls for Belgian deliveries of dyes and paint (\$70,000), chemical and pharmaceutical products (\$320,000), photographic and radio equipment and supplies (\$520,000), wool waste and rags (\$800,000), semifinished and finished textile products (\$150,000), flax (\$1,800,000), steel products (\$300,000), tools and machinery (\$900,000),

rayon staple fiber (500 tons), lead and semi-finished lead products (1,250 tons), cadmium (50 tons), copper wire (500 tons), tin, zinc, fish, meat, agricultural products, and \$1,720,000 worth of goods from the Belgian Congo. In return, Czechoslovakia has agreed to ship barley, malt, hops, seeds, lumber, furniture, paper, toys, tobacco products, radios, Christmas tree decorations, pharmaceutical and chemical products (\$310,000), textiles (\$340,000), china, ceramic, glass and crystal products (more than \$500,000), machinery and equipment (\$440,000), sewing and business machines (\$40,000 each), automotive vehicles, tractors, and motorcycles (\$1,680,000), optical and precision instruments (\$100,000).

A new 1955 trade agreement between Belgium and East Germany was signed on February 21, 1955, providing for mutual exchange of goods valued at approximately \$9.5 million, or about the same as under the 1954 agreement. Belgium is to export fertilizer, rolled metal products, electrical equipment, chemicals, timber, textiles, and agricultural produce in return for East German exports of potash, machinery, automotive vehicles, precision and optical instruments, chemical and pharmaceutical products, and textiles.

A new agreement due to run until February 1, 1956 regulating trade between Belgium and Hungary was signed in Budapest on February 1, 1955, which includes an exchange of \$2 million worth of goods with the Belgian Congo. Some of the more important products to be supplied by Belgium are: photographic products (\$300,000), copper sulphate (\$300,000), miscellaneous chemical and pharmaceutical products (\$280,000), wool (\$800,000), flax and flax tow (\$1,400,000) rayon yarn (\$400,000), textiles and clothing (\$300,000), iron and steel products (\$1,600,000), non-ferrous metals and manufactures thereof (\$400,000), tools, machinery, and equipment (\$1,200,000), and various agricultural products. In return, Hungary is to export vegetable oils (\$800,000), rice (\$280,000), eggs (150 tons), hog bristles (\$400,000), casings and bladders (\$400,000), meat and meat products (\$360,000), feathers (\$200,000), tobacco (\$400,000), textiles and clothing

* US Department of Commerce; *Bulletin Mensuel du Commerce Extérieur* (Brussels), December 1954.

(\$660,000) leather and fur products (\$360,000), tools, machinery and equipment (\$1,000,000), and various other agricultural products. Hungary has agreed to deliver large quantities of rice and tobacco, both crops which she is attempting to develop as export products. Included in the list of products the Belgian Congo is to supply Hungary are palm oil, cocoa and coffee.

The first added protocol to the Belgian-Polish trade agreement of April 13, 1950 was signed in Brussels on January 11, 1954, to be valid until January 1, 1955. It provided for Belgian deliveries of iron and steel products, and other industrial and consumer goods and also called for \$2 million of Congo goods including coffee (\$360,000), palm oil (\$800,000) palm kernels, palm kernel oil, cotton seed oil and sesame oil (\$200,000), cocoa, rubber, cotton, copal oil cake, etc. In return, Poland was to supply Belgium with brewing barley (50,000 tons), oats (20,000 tons), etc., and the Congo with: meats and meat products (\$100,000), textile yarns and fabrics (\$300,000), tools and implements (\$300,000), machinery (\$300,000), sanitary articles (\$300,000), etc.

Trade conducted under the Belgian-Polish protocol consists principally in exchanging Belgian Congo products for Polish ones. In the fall of 1954 reports from Brussels indicated that Belgium had agreed to deliver consumer goods outside of the existing trade agreement to the value of some \$10 million, and that Poland would be granted special credit advantages. Subsequent reports revealed that Poland had provided the Belgian Foreign Trade Ministry with a list of imports desired in the near future amounting to some \$5 million. These goods are to be exported to Poland in the framework of a three-year agreement outside of existing trade arrangements. Moreover, Poland has agreed to satisfactory settlement of nationalized Belgian property, estimated at about \$40 million. Included in the list of goods to be exported by Belgium are textiles (\$1.6 million), shoes (\$900,000), refrigerators (\$500,000), washing machines (\$400,000), other household appliances, bicycles, leather goods, plastic articles, etc. No list of Polish goods to be provided in exchange is available.

The most recent Belgian-Soviet trade agreement concluded was signed on January 29, 1954, providing for a mutual exchange of goods of approximately \$70 million each way. It calls for Belgian exports of 20 ships, including 3,000 to 5,000 ton class freighters, 10 refrigerator ships, and 4 floating cranes, rolled steel (20,000 tons), fats and oils (8,000 tons), meat (2,000 tons), herrings (5,000 tons), steel wire (5,000 tons), transformers and electrical cable (\$3.8 million), light industrial equipment (\$2.5 million), chemicals, leather and hides, rayon staple fiber (5,000 tons), woolen textiles (more than one million yards), raw wool, dyestuffs, etc. In return, the USSR pledged delivery of grain (200,000 tons), oil cakes (20,000 tons), manganese and ferro-manganese ores (100,000 tons), anthracite coal (60,000 tons), gas-oil (100,000 tons), coal-tar pitch (30,000 tons), apatite (50,000 tons), lumber, cellulose, automotive vehicles, furs, bristles, etc. The Soviets also pledged delivery of 30,000 tons of pig iron. During the past year, there have been several unfavorable reports on Soviet pig iron dumping in Antwerp at prices 25%

below the prevailing Schuman Union level. This iron is generally brought in as ballast in the holds of Soviet, Satellite or chartered vessels.

Denmark

Denmark's trade with the Soviet bloc has expanded somewhat during the past year. Exports in particular showed a substantial rise, from \$44.3 million or 5% of total 1953 exports to \$61.9 million or 6.5% of total 1954 exports. Imports from the Soviet bloc also increased slightly, from \$40.6 million or 4.1% of total 1953 imports to \$44.6 million or 3.8% of total 1954 imports.*


A trade agreement between Denmark and Czechoslovakia was signed on June 25, 1954, calling for Danish exports of \$3.3 million and Czechoslovak exports of \$3.6 million, valid from June 1, 1954 through May 31, 1955. The trade differential between the two countries is to be utilized in amortizing Czechoslovak debts to Denmark incurred during previous years' trade. Denmark agreed to deliver butter, cheese, milk powder, lard, meat, fish, machinery, pharmaceuticals, and ship repairs in return for Czechoslovak exports of kaolin (a white clay), refractory clay, iron and steel, machinery, tractors, automotive vehicles, beer bottles, crystal, porcelain, textiles, etc. A *Neue Zuercher Zeitung* report (February 24, 1955) revealed that an amendment to the treaty had been signed providing for shipping approximately \$1.9 million of additional meat from Denmark to Czechoslovakia.

Trade between Denmark and East Germany is conducted exclusively in the form of private compensation arrangements. The December 13, 1954 *Foreign Crops and Markets* (Washington) revealed that Denmark had signed a contract for delivering butter to East Germany. A subsequent issue disclosed that 15 million pounds of butter were exported to East Germany during 1954, 4.8 percent of Denmark's total butter export.

The most recent trade agreement between Denmark and Hungary was signed on February 9, 1954, valid from March 1, 1954 through February 28, 1955, and providing for Danish shipments of \$2.5 million and Hungarian shipments of \$3.0 million. The trade differential was to be utilized for liquidating Hungarian debts to Denmark incurred in previous trade exchanges, and in the payment of shipping charges to Denmark. Following are the principal products pledged by Denmark: seeds (\$232,000), fish and fish products (\$145,000), lard (\$275,000), agricultural foodstuffs (\$362,000), pharmaceutical products (\$145,000), textile rags (\$290,000), marine and vegetable oils (\$87,000), machinery and machine tools (\$434,000), electrical and radio parts and apparatus (\$109,000). In return, Hungary agreed to deliver seeds (\$80,000), foodstuffs (\$217,000), medicinal plants (\$87,000), essential oils (\$73,000), electrical and radio parts and equipment (\$210,000), machinery and machine tools (\$145,000), motorcycles and replacement parts (\$72,000), textiles (\$391,000), clothing and handicraft wear (\$450,000), rice,

* US Department of Commerce.

GLASS EXPORT



The picture above is from a Czechoslovak propaganda brochure. The caption reads: "The day of marriage has arrived, as usually happens in the majority of love stories. The wedding was festive, the bride in white, and moreover there were plenty of precious gifts, of which the most beautiful were the Bohemian glass: a liquor set of overlaid glass, specially-designed cup with gilded blossoms, and a lovely little basket made of lead-glass with a sumptuous hand-cut decoration."

etc. A December 1954 report from Copenhagen indicated that negotiations were underway for a private exchange of goods outside the existing agreement. The Hungarians were endeavoring to arrange for an exchange of excavation machinery, machine tools, paprika, rice and other foodstuffs, and semi-finished gloves, in return for Danish machine tools, refrigerated railway cars, wool yarn, and textiles. The Hungarians were asking for a three-year credit from Denmark to effect this exchange.

A new Danish-Polish trade agreement was signed in Copenhagen on March 7, 1955, valid until March 31, 1956, and calling for an exchange of goods of \$8-\$8.7 mil-

lion in each direction. Denmark has agreed to deliver seeds, fish, boilers, motors, machinery, chemical and pharmaceutical products. Further, approximately \$2 million of Denmark's exports are to be utilized in ocean freight traffic charges to Poland. It is quite significant that Poland's coal exports to Denmark will amount to only 420,000 tons, 150,000 of which were already furnished during the first quarter of this year. The previous agreement, which expired on February 28, 1954, called for Polish deliveries of 1,000,000 tons of coal. However, Polish coal deliveries to Denmark during 1953 and 1954 amounted to only 790,000 and 515,000 tons respectively. The decline in Pol-

ish coal shipments is explained by the Poles having demanded higher prices for their coal. The final prices agreed upon were reported as: \$18.20 per ton for large steam coal, \$17.20 for small steam coal, and \$12.60 for coal dust, the highest prices demanded since 1952 and more than \$1 per ton over the 1954 prices. Among the other products Poland has agreed to deliver are machinery and industrial equipment, textiles, chemicals, glassware, and rolling mill products. Simultaneous with the trade agreement, a new Danish-Polish payments agreement was concluded under which all future payments are to be made in pounds sterling. Denmark has hitherto paid for Polish coal with 7 percent dollars and 20 percent sterling.

On April 1, 1954 a new trade and payments agreement between Denmark and Romania was signed, valid until March 31, 1955, and providing for an exchange of approximately \$2.9 million in each direction. Under this agreement, recently extended for a year, Denmark pledged to deliver fish, powdered and canned milk, lard, tallow, cheese, margarine, hides, seeds, pharmaceutical products, textile yarns, machinery, and sisal twine in return for Romanian deliveries of grain (\$500,000), oil cake (10,000 tons), bran, medicinal plants, chemical and pharmaceutical products, petroleum products, tractors, timber, glassware, feathers, etc.

The last Soviet-Danish trade agreement expired on June 30, 1954. Negotiations since then have been at a virtual standstill because the Russians have insisted on delivery of two tankers in fulfillment of the agreement.* Since tankers are on the list of strategic goods which Western countries have agreed not to ship to the Soviet orbit, Denmark has refused. The Soviets, in retaliation, cancelled the entire agreement.

A January 13, 1955 Copenhagen report revealed that a Danish-Soviet contract had been signed for sale of 300 Jersey cattle to be delivered over a period of three months, beginning in March. This is the first big delivery of Danish Jersey cattle to the Soviet Union, and if both parties are satisfied, further contracts are expected.

Finland

As a result of its geographical proximity to the Soviet Union and of a complicated historical situation, Finland more than any other non-Communist country is subject to political and economic pressure to do business with the Communist countries, and in many respects owes its continued existence to the fact that it has proved more valuable to the Soviets as an independent state producing for the orbit than she would have as a satellite.

Consequently, Finland's trade pattern with the Soviet bloc differs from that of any other country in that its exports to the USSR are always substantially in excess of its imports. In 1953, for example, USSR exports to Finland were only 61.4% of Finland's exports to the USSR, and in 1954 60.3%. Formerly this trade deficit was balanced as Finnish reparations payments, but in recent years the deficit has been made up principally by shipments from the Satellites.

* Of Denmark's 311 million pounds of butter exported in 1954, 23 million pounds or 7.3% went to the USSR.

Almost every agreement concluded between Finland and the Satellites is tripartite, with the Soviet Union as a third party. In 1954 the balance of trade between Finland and every Satellite was in deficit, which in turn was made up by Finnish shipments to the Soviet Union of more than \$58 million worth of goods in excess of the sum total received from the USSR.

Finland's trade with the bloc increased slightly during 1954 although its overall importance declined somewhat. 1954 exports to the bloc were \$190.3 million, or 27.9% of total exports compared to \$179.3 million or 31.4% of the 1953 total. 1954 bloc imports amounted to \$190.1 million or 28.7% of total Finnish imports compared to \$182.3 million or 34.4% of the 1953 total.*

A new 1955 Finnish-Bulgarian trade and payments agreement was signed on January 19, 1955 providing for exchange of goods of some \$1.9 million in each direction. Goods to be traded are much the same as under the 1954 agreement. Finland is to export industrial equipment such as machinery, apparatus, etc. (\$400,000), miscellaneous metal products (\$100,000), electrical engineering and communications equipment (\$150,000), various types of paper, cardboard, pulp, and cellulose (\$250,000) and special type steel (150 tons) in return for Bulgarian exports of agricultural products, such as dried fruit (\$400,000), spices (\$200,000), fresh fruit and vegetables (\$200,000), lard (\$200,000) (for re-export), vetch, peas, rice, tobacco, tomato pulp, nuts, medicinal plants, essential oils, handicraft goods, carpets, etc. The principal difference between this agreement and 1954's is that the amount of staple agricultural products pledged by Bulgaria is somewhat lower. For example, in the 1954 agreement Bulgaria pledged 3,000 tons of wheat and 300 tons of vetch, while in the 1955 agreement no wheat and only 100 tons of vetch was pledged. On the other hand, the amount of some agricultural products promised was substantially increased: fresh fruit and vegetables was increased \$50,000, dried fruit \$140,000, spices \$170,000. Rice was increased from 200 to 300 tons. Bulgaria is apparently short of grains and fodder and is encouraging production of fruit, vegetables, rice, and spices for export.

On February 14, 1955, a new trade and payments agreement was concluded between Finland and Czechoslovakia, a tripartite arrangement in which Finland balances off its trade deficit with Czechoslovakia by shipments to the USSR. The estimated amount to be traded is approximately \$38.5 million, somewhat more than 1954. Finland has also increased 1955 cheese shipments from 1,200 to 2,000 tons, rayon staple fiber from 1,000 to 6,500 tons, and pledged delivery of 1,500 tons of pork and wild fowl. Among other major Finnish exports are: paper, paper products, and machinery and equipment for the wood and paper industry. Significant changes in Czechoslovakia's planned exports are: (a) the amount of automotive vehicles, motorcycles, tractors, and replacement parts pledged has been increased—automotive vehicles from \$1.4 million to \$2.8 million, motorcycles from \$0.5 million to

* US Department of Commerce.

\$1.1 million, and tractors from \$1.1 million to \$1.9 million; (b) the amount of rolled and drawn steel tubing is increased from \$0.8 million to \$2.1 million. Some traditional Czechoslovak exports are being increased, hops, for example, from 50 to 100 tons. Other exports pledged are machinery, machine tools, electrical equipment and instruments, textiles, lubricating oils, bicycle components, metal products, etc.

A 1955 trade and payments agreement was recently concluded between Finland and East Germany. The exact amount of goods to be traded is not known but it is probably about the same as the 1954 agreement in which Finland agreed to supply approximately \$1.3 million worth of goods compared to \$1.65 million from East Germany. Among Finland's principal exports are paper, cardboard, seeds, pyrites, metal products, hides, etc. Finland was also supposed to supply butter and cheese though no quantities are stipulated.* In return, East Germany will primarily supply chemical and pharmaceutical products such as sodium sulphate (61,000 tons), potassium salt 50% (50,000 tons), solvents and plasticisers (\$450,000), plastic raw materials (\$200,000), photographic paper and chemicals (\$350,000), pharmaceutical products (\$200,000), lignite briquettes (30,000 tons).

No new Finnish-Hungarian trade negotiations have taken place. The 1954 agreement signed on December 2, 1953 is valid through March 31, 1955, and provided for Finnish exports of nearly \$6 million and Hungarian exports of more than \$7 million. Trade balance was equalized through tripartite arrangements providing for Finnish shipments to the Soviet Union. Finland's principal exports to Hungary consisted of paper, paper products, cellulose, rayon staple fibers, wood and wood products, machinery and metal products in return for Hungarian exports of medicines and medicinal herbs (\$500,000), lubricating oils and other petroleum products (\$275,000), chemicals and dyes (\$275,000), sensitized photographic material (\$150,000), bulbs and parts of incandescent lamps (\$300,000), radio equipment and parts (\$150,000), electrical equipment (\$350,000), optical and medical instruments (\$250,000), machinery and machine tools (\$450,000), cotton textiles (\$400,000), other textiles and textile products (\$515,000), leather goods and furs (\$200,000), miscellaneous metal products (\$280,000), motorcycles and automotive parts (\$250,000).

On December 17, 1954, a new Finnish-Polish tripartite trade and payments agreement was concluded for 1955. Finnish exports to Poland will amount to some \$16 million, while Polish exports to Finland will be some \$30 million. This compares to Finnish and Polish exports of \$14 million and \$26 million respectively under the 1954 agreement. As in the previous agreement, Finland is to export paper, products, cellulose, cardboard, electrolytic copper (910 tons), semi-manufactured copper (910 tons). Significant changes in Finnish exports are increasing its iron ore exports to Poland from 30,000 to 150,000 tons,

and machinery, appliance, and equipment exports from \$1.5 million to \$1.7 million. On the other hand, felspar exports have been reduced from 4,000 to 1,000 tons, and radio products cut from \$75,000 to \$35,000. This year, Poland has once again pledged the export of 1,350,000 tons of coal. Among its other products are sugar (12,000 tons), tractors, trucks, automotive vehicles and spare parts (\$500,000), machinery, appliances, etc. (\$700,000), textiles (\$2,000,000), chemical products (\$150,000), pharmaceuticals (\$100,000), etc.

A 1955 Finnish-Romanian trade and payments agreement was signed in Helsinki on October 29, 1954. Finnish exports to Romania will be approximately \$5.6 million and Romanian exports to Finland will be some \$10 million, the difference to be adjusted by a triangular agreement including the USSR. Finland's principal exports are paper, paper products, cellulose (\$375,000), rayon staple fibers (\$1,875,000), machinery, equipment and replacement parts (\$1,000,000), copper semi-manufactures (\$100,000), electric cable (\$50,000), special steels (\$100,000), asbestos, centrifugal casting tubes, etc. In return, Romania is to supply: fuel oil (300,000 tons), gasoline (60,000 tons), gas-oil (50,000 tons), bitumen (5,000 tons), other petroleum products, miscellaneous chemicals (\$300,000), organic dyestuffs (\$250,000), machinery, equipment and replacement parts (\$300,000), small amounts of agricultural products and handicraft items, etc.

The 1955 Finnish-Soviet trade agreement was signed on January 24, 1955, providing for approximately \$140 million of shipments to the USSR and \$102 million of Soviet exports to Finland. Finnish exports to the USSR will decrease slightly in 1955, but imports will increase substantially. The trade deficit will be met by triangular deals involving shipments from various satellites. This year, however, the Soviets have made special concessions to the Finns by settling a part of their trade deficit (\$10 million) in gold or in Western currencies. This year's trade deficit will be substantially less than previous years*.

It is estimated that 1955 Soviet ship orders in Finland will be about \$50 million compared to \$47.5 million last year, including two 4,000 ton tankers, five 1,100 ton tankers, one 8,500 motor vessel, one 10,500 h.p. icebreaker, and other ships including tugs, barges, fishing trawlers and floating cranes.

Among other important items to be delivered by Finland are: water turbines, steam boilers, transformers, machinery and equipment for the woodworking and paper industry, hoisting and transportation equipment, pumps, copper and copper products, cables, rayon staple fiber (4,000 tons), prefabricated wooden houses, wood and paper products, paper of all types, sewing machines. The USSR will deliver grain (313,000 tons), rice (14,000 tons), sugar (110,000 tons), oil cakes (45,000 tons), gasoline (290,000 tons),

* Finland exported 10,767,000 pounds of cheese to East Germany and 4,159,000 to Czechoslovakia in 1954. These two accounted for some 60% of Finnish cheese exports by volume.

* Another concession was a Soviet loan in 1954 of two \$10 million long-term credits to Finland. One was announced in February 1954; the other was a rider attached to the Finnish-Soviet trade agreement for 1955. Both loans are repayable over ten years and have 2.5% interest. The Finns will use the money to retool and generally modernize their industrial equipment by imports from the West.

Western Europe's Exports to the Soviet Bloc¹

	Bulgaria		Czechoslovakia		East Germany		Hungary		Poland		Romania		U.S.S.R.	
	1953	1954	1953	1954	1953	1954	1953	1954	1953	1954	1953	1954	1953	1954
Austria	7.4	3.1	9.3	7.5	9.2	10.0	6.8	11.7	17.0	17.9	7.1	5.7	1.5	1.5
Belgium-Luxembourg	2.5	1.1	3.9	8.0	7.0	6.7	6.1	9.7	17.3	15.0	11.2	1.5	16.5	24.3
Denmark	0.1	0.2	2.3	11.4	14.3	23.9	2.0	2.1	3.9	4.9	0.4	0.7	20.9	18.3
Finland	0.8	0.5	3.6	4.5	8.0	11.7	3.0	3.5	12.3	14.6	0.7	2.3	145.5	146.6
France	2.0	0.7	2.1	6.5	2.8	5.8	3.2	12.3	16.3	16.8	8.6	1.0	16.0	30.9
German Fed. Rep.....	2.7	4.3	7.7	10.2	60.6	101.7	16.2	23.6	15.3	18.6	9.8	11.8	1.6	12.6
Iceland	—	—	0.8	2.8	1.6	1.0	—	0.1	0.7	1.1	—	—	5.0	7.9
Italy	0.7	0.8	10.2	7.2	3.4	6.0	6.2	3.7	10.4	9.7	3.8	3.7	23.1	25.3
Netherlands	0.7	0.4	9.4	15.6	15.3	25.4	5.2	3.2	1.9	3.6	1.7	3.8	22.7	32.8
Norway	0.1	0.1	3.5	5.5	6.3	7.9	1.0	0.8	4.5	4.9	1.5	1.5	15.1	24.3
Sweden	0.1	0.5	5.4	2.9	12.2	17.9	1.8	7.9	25.3	14.6	0.1	—	21.7	22.6
Switzerland	0.7	1.0	7.5	9.3	6.8	9.0	5.0	5.5	6.6	5.0	4.8	2.4	2.9	3.6
United Kingdom	2.2	3.3	5.7	8.5	1.9	5.9	3.5	5.8	19.6	25.5	7.8	7.3	34.3	39.5
Total	20.0	16.0	71.4	99.9	149.4	232.9	60.0	89.9	151.1	152.2	57.5	41.7	326.8	390.2

diesel fuel oil (220,000 tons), other miscellaneous petroleum products (33,000 tons), anthracite coal (100,000 tons), coking coal (50,000 tons), coal—unspecified (250,000 tons), coke, chemicals and chemical products, metallic ores and products, cotton (9,000 tons), and automotive vehicles and replacement parts (\$7,500,000).*

An interesting sidelight of the treaty was a Finnish agreement, as part of balance of payments, to provide part of the construction of the Rajakoski electric power plant in the Petsamo area, in the northeast section of Finland, at a cost of \$5 million. An April 13, 1955 Radio Helsinki broadcast announced this station currently in construction and stated that negotiations have been held with the USSR concerning construction of the Koltakosi power station on the Paatajoki River near Niskakosi in the USSR, but no settlement had as yet been reached.

The Finns were disappointed by the fact that the Russians had agreed to import only 250,000 square meters of prefabricated housing instead of the 750,000 previously arranged for. If the 1955 reduction is a sign of future trends, it might mean serious difficulty for this item of Finnish manufacture since 90% of Finland's prefabs go to the USSR. The Finnish press has pointed out three reasons for Soviet reneging on this deal: 1. Finnish prices are too high; 2. the Soviets now have their own industry going since the Finns delivered 17 complete prefabricated house factories, complete with power stations, as part of their war reparations; 3. the Soviets want to show the Finns that they are and can be tough.

On July 17, 1954, an agreement was signed in Moscow governing trade from 1956-1960.** Finland will export to the USSR \$148 million worth of goods in 1956 gradually increasing to \$164 million in 1960. USSR exports to Fin-

land are scheduled to advance from \$108 million in 1956 to some \$120 million in 1960. Finnish exports in shipbuilding and engineering will jointly account for 58% of the total. Among the ships pledged are one 10,500 h.p. icebreaker, two 20,000 h.p. icebreakers, eight 7,800 ton motor vessels, 15-3,100 ton cargo steamers, 12-4,000 ton tankers, eight 1,100 ton tankers, 15-1,000 h.p. salvage tugs, 60-800 h.p. ocean-going tugs, 20-400 h.p. river tugs, 95 fishing trawlers and vessels, 300-1,000 ton barges, five floating docks, and 25 floating cranes. In addition, the treaty calls for Finnish deliveries of power station machinery and equipment, machinery for the wood-working and paper-processing industries, hoisting and transport equipment, pumps and fittings, cables, rayon staple fiber, products of the paper and wood-working industries and sewing machines (40,000 units annually). The treaty provided for Finnish shipments of 750,000 square meters of prefabricated housing in 1956 declining to 670,000 square meters in 1960. Doubts exist concerning the status of this commitment since the Soviets drastically reduced their 1955 quota.

The Soviets have pledged to deliver grain (250,000 tons the first year, dropping to 220,000 by 1960), rice (10,000 tons annually), sugar (80,000 tons annually), oil cake (45,000 tons annually), petroleum products (advancing from \$20.5 million in 1956 to \$23 million in 1960)*, coal and coke (200,000 tons annually), fertilizers, minerals, chemical products (\$2.5 million annually), scrap iron (120,000 tons annually), cotton (9,000 tons annually), lumber, and automotive vehicles and replacement parts (\$10,000,000 annually).

* Finland now gets 50 percent of the oil for its domestic needs from the USSR and 40 percent from Romania. In November 1954, reports from Helsinki indicated that the Soviets had offered to construct an oil refinery in Finland to refine USSR crude oil. It turned out that the Russians had visualized a considerably smaller refinery than the Finns had contemplated. So the offer was finally rejected on technical grounds. The Finns are currently negotiating with Germany and France for construction of this refinery, to cost an estimated \$18 million.

* Eight Finnish automotive distributors have set up a joint company for importing and servicing East-European cars.

** The USSR has contracted to pay part of these Finnish exports in freely-converted currencies. This will amount to some \$10 million annually.

Western Europe's Imports from the Soviet Bloc¹

	Bulgaria		Czechoslovakia		East Germany		Hungary		Poland		Romania		U.S.S.R.	
	1953	1954	1953	1954	1953	1954	1953	1954	1953	1954	1953	1954	1953	1954
Austria	6.3	5.1	10.3	8.6	8.0	7.4	5.0	14.0	21.4	20.5	8.3	2.5	0.1	1.4
Belgium-Luxembourg	2.7	1.8	6.2	5.7	5.9	5.8	2.6	1.4	5.3	4.5	0.7	1.9	16.7	28.0
Denmark	—	—	1.9	3.1	12.6	13.5	1.5	1.7	13.5	9.6	0.6	0.7	8.4	15.7
Finland	0.3	1.2	17.2	18.1	13.1	19.9	3.7	5.0	36.6	28.1	20.2	26.5	89.6	88.4
France	1.1	0.7	9.4	5.9	2.3	2.3	2.4	2.4	12.2	11.2	1.7	4.2	16.9	40.2
German Fed. Rep.	5.0	8.4	15.6	14.7	68.3	101.9	10.8	15.8	17.7	13.8	1.7	10.6	15.6	22.2
Iceland	—	—	1.5	1.9	1.4	1.4	0.1	—	1.7	1.3	—	—	1.6	8.1
Italy	1.4	2.0	8.5	9.1	2.7	4.5	3.5	5.4	17.0	12.0	4.1	6.1	9.3	23.7
Netherlands	0.2	0.2	8.1	13.6	10.0	11.6	1.5	1.4	2.2	2.3	0.2	0.3	31.3	23.0
Norway	0.2	0.1	6.4	7.5	7.1	11.1	1.0	0.9	7.1	6.6	1.5	2.1	17.0	13.3
Sweden	0.2	0.3	9.7	6.0	10.0	14.4	2.2	2.5	25.2	18.5	2.5	1.6	10.1	27.0
Switzerland	1.0	1.0	11.0	12.0	5.3	4.0	3.3	5.9	7.3	7.2	2.7	3.4	4.1	2.7
United Kingdom	2.1	1.6	21.4	18.5	3.3	4.7	0.1	1.1	64.2	57.5	4.0	6.1	111.7	116.9
Total	20.5	22.4	127.2	124.7	150.0	202.5	37.7	57.5	231.4	193.1	48.2	66.0	332.4	410.6

France

In the past year France's trade with the Soviet bloc has increased substantially, from \$63.3 million or 1.6% of the 1953 total to \$82.8 million or 2% of the 1954 total. Imports from the bloc have increased from \$56.9 million or 1.4% of total 1953 imports to \$76.2 million or 1.8% of the 1954 total.*

On March 18, 1954, France and Bulgaria signed a trade agreement calling for exchange of \$8.6 million worth of goods in each direction, the implementation of which was contingent upon satisfactory settlement of Bulgarian debts to France, both prewar and postwar, from the nationalization of French property. The agreement has not yet been ratified because no satisfactory financial settlement could be agreed on. Under the agreement, France was scheduled to deliver breeding cattle, seeds, tropical agricultural products, metals, textiles, chemicals, pharmaceutical products, machinery and electrical products in return for Bulgarian deliveries of tobacco, rose essence, corn, and other farm products.

A 1954 Franco-Czechoslovak trade agreement was signed on May 7, 1954, valid from April 1, 1954 to March 31, 1955, and calling for French exports of \$10.8 million and Czechoslovak exports of \$13.2 million. Part of the trade differential will probably be used to liquidate Czechoslovak debts in France. On February 7, 1955, this treaty was extended through June 30, 1955, with an increase in volume of goods to be exchanged, though no specific figures were given. Under the original agreement, France was to export raw textile materials, cocoa beans, meat, phosphates, iron ore, and industrial products, while Czechoslovakia was to supply wood pulp, coal tar, lumber, and industrial products.

A 1955 trade agreement between France and East Germany was signed at the Leipzig Fair on March 6, 1955, calling for exchange of goods of \$6 million in each direc-

tion, substantially more than the \$4.2 million provided for in the previous agreement. France is to deliver fertilizer, phosphates, dyestuffs, textiles, fruit, foodstuffs, watches, wine and spices in return for East German machinery, chemicals, motorcycles, toys, porcelain, and Christmas tree decorations.

On November 25, 1954, France (including North Africa) signed another trade agreement with Poland. This protocol, valid from December 1, 1954 through November 30, 1955, provided for an exchange of about \$11.5 million worth of goods in each direction, approximately the same sum called for under the previous agreement. The following principal products are to be supplied by France (1955 quantities given outside of parenthesis; 1954 quantities, if different, are inside of parenthesis): dyes, \$171,000 (\$229,000); essential oils, \$71,000 (\$114,000); pharmaceutical products, \$200,000 (\$343,000); high-quality steel, \$57,000; tabulating machines, \$214,000 (\$114,000); radio parts, \$57,000 (\$157,000); tractors and automotive vehicles, \$286,000; replacement parts for automotive vehicles, \$714,000; miscellaneous tools and machinery, \$1,143,000 (\$630,000); phosphates, 225,000 tons (150,000 tons); iron ore, 30,000 tons (50,000 tons). Principal Polish exports are feathers and down, \$286,000; beet-root seeds (\$286,000); canned ham, \$200,000 (\$86,000); coal, 290,000 tons (200,000 tons); coal tar, 10,000 tons (0); petroleum products, 10,000 tons (0); other chemicals, \$186,000 (\$129,000); cotton textiles, \$229,000 (\$114,000); machine tools, mining machinery and refrigeration equipment, \$857,000 (0); wood pulp, 30,000 tons; matches, \$286,000. Significant differences between this exchange and the previous one are: (a) increase in machinery exports from France and incorporation of machinery as an item in Poland's proposed exports; (b) increase in France's phosphate exports to Poland and the 20,000 ton decrease in its iron ore exports; (c) 90,000 ton increase in Poland's coal exports and the addition of coal tar and petroleum products as exports; (d) doubling of Poland's cotton textile exports; (e)

* US Department of Commerce.

elimination of hides as a Polish item (the previous agreement provided for Polish exports of 150 tons of hides, now a rare item throughout the Soviet bloc), and exclusion by Poland of 20,000 tons of soya beans; (f) elimination from the French list of 4,000 tons of rolling mill products.

Franco-Romanian trade negotiations culminated in a trade and payments agreement signed on December 24, 1954, scheduled to run for three years from January 1, 1955. During the first year, French exports were planned at \$13.4 million, those from Romania at \$14.3 million. The financial arrangements have not been finally made and additional negotiations will take place in Bucharest in June. France's exports include sulphur, fish (\$193,000), sugar (\$429,000), cocoa (\$286,000), pharmaceutical products (\$643,000), essential oils (\$286,000), dyes (\$171,000), cork and cork products (\$343,000), miscellaneous chemical products (\$286,000), yarns (\$843,000), textiles (\$571,000), rolled and drawn steel products (\$2,830,000), tools, machinery and equipment (\$800,000), electrical measuring instruments (\$143,000), etc. In return, Romania agreed to deliver: carbon black (\$429,000), aviation gasoline (3,000 tons), gasoline (110,000 tons), fuel oil with low sulphur content (80,000 tons), petroleum coke unrefined and calcined (5,000 tons each), oil cake (10,000 tons), and miscellaneous agricultural products.

A Franco-Soviet trade protocol, valid from July 1, 1954, through December 31, 1955, was signed on November 10, 1954, calling for a 60% increase in trade between the two countries, and providing for an exchange of goods of \$82.9 million each way. French exports included 10 ships

of 5,000 tons (for delivery in 1956-7), 20 steam boilers (20-35 tons of steam per hour), motion picture equipment (\$257,000), equipment for finishing velvet materials (\$257,000), equipment for making sparkling wines (\$500,000), rolled iron and steel products (80,000 tons), electric cable (\$2,743,000), lead (3,000 tons), cork, ground and prepared (7,000 tons), woolen textiles (500,000 meters), synthetic fiber textiles (1,000,000 meters), synthetic fiber yarns (1,000 tons), rayon staple yarns (1,000 tons), meat (15,000 tons), cocoa beans (56,000 tons), citrus fruits (3,000 tons), essential oils (\$1,257,000), spices (\$1,257,000), dyes (\$500,000), chemical products (\$743,000), paper (\$629,000), sole leather (\$329,000), etc. Among the more important Soviet exports were corn (65-100,000 tons), coal (600,000 tons) coal tar pitch (140,000 tons), asbestos (9,000 tons), manganese ore (90,000 tons), chrome ore (15,000 tons), crude oil (700,000 tons), gasoline (100,000 tons), benzol (20,000 tons), sawed timber (120,000 cu.m.), chemical paper pulp (25,000 tons), cotton (15,000 tons), furs (\$5,000,000), platinum (600 kg.), canned salmon and crab meat (\$1,800,000), silver (200 tons), metallic ores including palladium (\$425,000), hog bristles (\$250,000), essential oils and medicinal plants (\$175,000), toluol (1,500 tons), chemical products (\$225,000), unrefined glycerine (500 tons), films, automotive vehicles, etc. Significantly, the Soviets have agreed to deliver large quantities of corn, currently needed at home to implement their livestock program.

(To be continued in July)

Welcome Wagon

IT SAYS "on paper" that deported persons in Hungary may now leave the outlying districts to which they had been sent by the Communist regime. But to do this is not a simple matter, according to letters received in the United States. In one of these, a deported family wrote that although they had tried to move to another country village where they had friends, the council of this town had refused them a residence permit. The unfortunate family had spent all their savings to make the trip, and were now desperate for money to buy the bare necessities.

A refugee from Hungary revealed that deported families returning to the town of Rakospalota last autumn encountered great difficulty in enrolling their children in the local schools. The schools were unwilling to admit the children of deportees who came home after the school year had started. The refugee characterized as "typical" this comment made by the principal of the Bocskai-ut Trade School: "It is not worth our while to enroll them for the short time for which they have been set free."

The Farm Problem

The following article, published in Poland's leading paper, *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw) February 26, 1955, exposes some Communist methods in the countryside. Chiefly it depicts the various regime techniques for harassing private farmers under the "persuasion" and "voluntary adherence to the collectives" policy presently in vogue. The stupidity and venality of these policies are matched only by the neglect and mismanagement that accompany them, so that the self-defeating mechanism of this persecution—driving the good farmers from the land—is even, at this juncture, apparent to the regime and criticized in its publications.

LAST YEAR about 100 of the 3,000 or so farmers from the district of Nidzica submitted petitions giving up the land allotted to them. I found their petitions filed away in several thick folders. Covered with dust, taken from the darkest corner of some squeaky cupboard of the District Agricultural Management, they lie before me. Dusting the papers, I search for the motives which compelled the peasants of Nidzica to request that the very tool of their work be taken from them. I look through one petition after another.

"It is hard for me to believe in all these illnesses, 'loss of health,' 'percentage of disability.' The arguments are too much like one another to be true. What then are the real reasons?

"The man in charge of settlement matters cannot explain why there are so many petitions and why their number doesn't decrease. It is also interesting that besides those who disclaim their rights to their land in writing, last year nearly as many peasants deserted their land without submitting petitions.

"I can learn nothing from the District Agricultural Management or the presidium of the district national council except some rather disquieting information about the method of dealing with the petitions—apparently more of a mess than a method. Bazyli Mular's petition was submitted in January of last year, Jan Sadza's in February, Anna Szymanowska's in March, etc., etc. . . . From their receipt until December of last year, these petitions were kept in a filing cabinet of the presidium of the Kozlow rural national council. In December they were transferred to a cabinet at the district national council. They are still there, unanswered; no interest has been shown in the people hidden behind the date and the 'received' stamp.



Caption: "If the kolkhoz doesn't take better care of us, we'll end up that way too."
(Pig is reading "The Last of the Mohicans").

Dikobraz (Prague), March 3, 1955

"Let us then find the authors of these petitions and learn from them what we have not found on the pages marked 'for application only.'

The First of the Hundred

"Three years ago Wladyslaw Pawlowski had three cows, two calves and eight to ten pigs. Today he has one cow and one horse, and can hardly get enough fodder for his three pigs. Pawlowski was once the kind of man whom his neighbors and the administrators called 'a good farmer.' This 'good farmer,' in the past tense, has for the last two years been applying for permission to give up his farm. In his petition he writes of his old age, his illness and his desire to live a 'peaceful life' with his sons. But when we ask him how it is that he was so much younger, healthier and less inclined to live with his sons three years ago, Pawlowski explodes, and tells this story:

"In 1951, without previous consultation or agreement, three hectares of his pasture were allocated to the collective farm *Jagorzewo*, then being organized. In his futile efforts to get back his pasture, Pawlowski climbed the steps of the presidium's office so often he almost wore them out. After a year of this pilgrimage to the presidium, he was advised to 'look for his pasture on the moon.' He gave up in despair.

"At his home, three years after the day he woke up poorer by three hectares of pasture, Pawlowski shows us a surveyor's document, his hands trembling with emotion. The document states that he owns 6.79 hectares of land. However, his tax forms and his grain, milk and meat de-

livery quotas, show something entirely different. According to all these documents, Pawlowski is still the happy owner of the long lost pasture. He must pay taxes on it, and make deliveries. To work seven hectares and fulfill delivery obligations for ten is not as simple as it looks on the tax forms. In trying to meet the tax demands Pawlowski sold all he had, and still finally found himself in jail as a recalcitrant peasant. His son-in-law finally secured his release by paying Pawlowski's taxes.

"A man in charge of settlement matters, who was at my interview, wrote Pawlowski's name in his notebook. Perhaps now the local administrators will try to redress his wrongs. At last—three years too late.

And the Second

"Until recently, Andrzej Urbanowicz managed nicely on his farm. His wife worked, his children helped, and all went well. His downfall began quite recently; to be exact, on the day he was forced to move from his legally-owned house to an attic where, with his wife and six children, he took over two tiny, crowded rooms. His wife fell down the stairs and had a miscarriage; one child sprained its ankle. Everything went to pieces on his farm.

"Urbanowicz moved up to the attic because of the urgent demands of a vice-chairman of the local presidium of the district national council, who had decided to make Urbanowicz's house the headquarters of the Pielgrzymow rural national council. Urbanowicz vacated his house because of his respect for authority and the vice-chairman of the presidium left with the deed to the land in his pocket, as well as the petition he had demanded, in which Urbanowicz requested that he be relieved of his land. Since then Urbanowicz has never seen him again, and has heard nothing of any decision to pay him for his loss.

"The whole commune has followed the case closely. The vice-chairman who deprived Urbanowicz of his home and then took the man's deed has not only undermined the peasants' trust in the local national council by his illegal action, but also in the people's rule.

And the Rest

"Our meetings with Pawlowski and Urbanowicz do not, however, give us a 'full picture' of the Nidzica district. We met with other peasants, and slowly we came to know more and more about the real reasons for the petitions. Their real reason was not that the peasants had lost the ability to farm their land because of sickness or disability, but that the local administrators had lost the ability to maintain daily, sincere ties with the peasants.

"In the Kozlowo rural commune, where the largest number of petitions have been submitted, it was accepted practice to take the deeds to the land from the farmers and file them with the petitions to cancel the deeds, thus leaving

the farmers with no evidence of ownership. These documents—of enormous legal and moral significance—are kept in a District Agricultural Management cupboard along with the petitions. It has occurred to no one, either in the presidium of the Nidzica national council or in the district committee, that this procedure violates the most elementary principles of our legality. The administrators have apparently isolated themselves completely from the vital problems of the village.

"Several peasants from Slawski told me that taxes are higher than one would suppose from the bills received from the tax office. How is this possible? Simply because, for example, supplying transportation for removing timber from the forests costs them an extra 1,000 *zloty* per year. They are told to remove timber from forests 30 kilometers from their village, which is, of course, not only ridiculous, but impossible. The peasants therefore hire somebody on the spot, and pay him for each cubic meter of timber removed from the forest.

"One of the peasants, Gutowski, says: 'Last year, just before May first, they came from the district management and encouraged us to cultivate fallow land, assuring us that there would be no taxes levied on it. . . .' Gutowski went ahead and sowed three hectares of fallow land, and others joined him. Everything was quiet until after the harvest, when they all received tax forms from the commune office. Gutowski was ordered to pay not for three, but for five hectares. As a result, he wants to give up his farm, although only a few years ago he was one of the best farmers in the village.

"Stanislaw Szymanski is the owner of a brick pigsty and one half of a barn, at least on paper (the paper, however, has been taken away from him). Actually, the buildings are used by someone else. How can he work his farm without these buildings? So he has decided to give up the whole thing.

"Then there is the case of Aldas from Olszewo. After the war he worked one farm, then another, and finally, three years ago, moved to his present farm. He had to vacate the first farm because its rightful owner, a former resident, returned to the village. His second farm was liked too much by the State Agricultural Farm, and he was forced to leave. His third farm, at Olszewo, was deserted, and Aldas took it over with all the formality of such occasions. At the end of his second year of work on the previously deserted farm, he received a tax form for the entire year. Soon afterwards, a tax collector appeared, and when he could not pay, took his radio. Aldas' neighbor, Kruzewski, has not yet received the deed to his land, although he has been working it for three years now. Because he could not pay his taxes, he was threatened with the illegal auctioning of his belongings. The auction was prevented at the last moment thanks to the direct intervention of the Ministry of Agriculture. . . ."

Witold Kilczynski



Crisis in the Youth Leagues



THE CHIEF instruments for political domination and economic exploitation of youth in the Soviet bloc are the Communist youth organizations, Satellite counterparts of the Soviet Union's Komsomol. In each country the Youth League is encompassed within the theoretically a-political National Front framework and is simultaneously an active arm of the Communist Party, serving as the training school for future Party leadership and also as a manpower pool for economic projects of the State. Thus, the youth organizations play a leading role in the organizational control of Communist society.

This winter, two Youth Leagues in the Soviet bloc held their Second Congresses: Poland's ZMP met in Warsaw from January 28-February 1; Czechoslovakia's CSM from February 3-6 in Prague. The Congresses were addressed by high State and Party officials, and were preceded by numerous regional conferences in connection with the elections of delegates. They provided the occasion for a general stocktaking of the aims and accomplishments of the Youth Leagues. From the speeches and debates emerged a picture of widespread dissatisfaction with the work of the Leagues. Salvos of charges and counter-charges between regimists and young people were exchanged. The regimes charged the Youth Leagues with inadequate membership enrollment, loss of influence and effectiveness, inertia and inactivity. The members were accused of demoralization, apathy toward their tasks, and indulging in "hooliganism." Youth spokesmen both in and out of the League countered with the complaint that the League was boring, cheerless, rigid and dry. The gist of the regimes' complaint seemed to be that the League had not succeeded in grasping or maintaining control of youth, while that of the young people was that the League had not met any of their real needs and interests.

I—Poland

The ZMP—Union of Polish Youth—was formed in 1948 by merging the four youth organizations of then existing political parties.* Since the March 1954 Congress of the Polish Communist (United Workers') Party, the ZMP has not only in fact but also formally become an organic sec-

tion of the Party, as stated in the two articles of the new Party statutes which read: "The Polish United Workers' Party [PZPR] supervises the activities of the ZMP. . . . Party policy is the directive for the ZMP in all fields of its activity. . . . Party organizations are obligated to help develop a wide initiative of the ZMP."

On January 28, 1955, the Second Congress of the ZMP convened in Warsaw, with 1,113 delegates attending. The opening session was addressed by Boleslaw Bierut, First Secretary of the PZPR Central Committee, who delineated the general role of the ZMP and its link with the Party:

"Problems connected with the education of youth are deemed among the most important in the [many] great endeavors conducted under the leadership of the PZPR. Our Party follows the progress of the ZMP with most careful attention. . . . The ZMP is the Party's comrade-in-arms in educating and organizing the many-million-strong masses of youth to take part in the building of Socialism. The ZMP, under the Party's guidance, has played an important part in the social and political education of its members, thus exerting great influence upon the wide masses of unorganized youth."

According to Communist figures, in the six years since its founding the ZMP has increased its numerical membership fivefold. But neither the size nor the social composition of the ZMP membership are considered satisfactory. The Chairman of the ZMP Central Board, Helena Jaworska, said at the Congress (January 28): "The ZMP's influence over our youth is still too limited. The ZMP now has a membership of 2,018,000. In the last five years we have added nearly 900,000 members; the ZMP thus comprises a little over 37 percent of Polish youth. . . . The tempo of growth is still too slow, particularly in the village sector."

The class representation in the ZMP has regularly been criticized. At the 12th Plenary Session of the ZMP Central Committee in June 1953, the "disquieting fact" was disclosed that "in the ranks of our organization which should be the spearhead of the peasants' and workers' front,

* Union of Young Fighters (Communist Party); Society of Workers' Universities (Socialist); Union of Agrarian Youth (Peasant Party, pro-Communist wing); Union of Democratic Youth (Democratic Party).

only 50 percent of the members are workers and peasants." Out of 160-180,000 young workers in Wroclaw, only 25 percent belong to the ZMP, according to *Nowe Drogi* (Warsaw), August 1953, which further reported that "in the last three years working-class membership in [Wroclaw's] ZMP has fallen by 12 percent." *Sztandar Mlodych* (Warsaw), December 18, 1953, said that "young craftsmen in most cases not only do not belong to the ZMP but are completely outside the range of its influence", while *Poprostu* (Warsaw), December 19, 1954, wrote that the increase in the membership of the ZMP is proportionally lowest in universities. *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), March 18, 1954, wrote: "The class structure [of ZMP membership] has been developing in the wrong direction. The percentage of [industrial] workers has been steadily decreasing in proportion to the total membership, whereas the percentage of employees [office workers] has been increasing." *Zycie Warszawy* (Warsaw), March 18, 1954, charged that "the countryside is the weakest sector . . . more than 2,000,000 young peasants are outside the ranks of the ZMP."

The Polish press has repeatedly accused the ZMP of ever-increasing ineffectuality in its work. On November 22, 1954, Radio Warsaw made the sweeping charge that "the ZMP has failed to mobilize youth . . . failed to marshal youth for important tasks. Tedium and passivity are killing the ZMP." More explicit charges have been that "the ZMP no longer participates in nor influences the cultural and educational work among youth" (*Przegląd Kulturalny* [Warsaw], July 1, 1954); that "ZMP participation in the agricultural cooperative movement is not satisfactory" (*Sztandar Mlodych*, September 15, 1954); that "defiantly and in a spirit of independence, young people are refusing to work in the organization" (*Trybuna Ludu*, December 30, 1954).

Pathology Lesson

The Congress provided the occasion for a thorough probing of the ZMP's weaknesses. Why has the ZMP failed to attract greater numbers of youth and to hold the interest of those who belong? A major reason seemed to lie in organizational "diseases" similar to those often observed in the Party itself: bureaucraticism, rigidity, schematism. Chairman of the Cracow Provincial Board of the ZMP, Wladyslaw Krupa, admitted to the Congress:

"Our ZMP organizations have been penetrated by a serious sickness. We have treated our youth all alike; we have spoken one language to all youth groups; we have treated as the same the needs of students and those of the workers, of the peasant in the collective farm and in an individual peasant commune. We have displayed very little initiative in this connection and because of this hard skin which has grown in the period of our bureaucratic behavior, it is now impossible to carry out many projects and to mobilize many young people for work on these projects. . . ."

The ZMP is afflicted with what Minister of Culture Sokorski in his Congress speech termed "the out-of-touch disease" (*nieczulica*). It seems that our Party, and you, our youth, must wage a general battle against this disease. . . .

At the same time we must be on guard against another disease—the 'exaggerated contacts disease' (*przeczulica*). This means that when we start complaining and criticizing we do nothing to actually change the state of affairs because those directly concerned are unable to take appropriate action, unable to deal on the spot with problems."

Over-centralization and "undemocratic practices" were scored by League officials. Jerzy Wozniak, Secretary of the Warsaw ZMP Board, castigated the ZMP Central Board for "attempting to impose its thinking upon the entire Polish youth," charging that the Central Board propaganda department "issues a fixed set of instructions governing ideological training without any consideration of the individual requirements of groups." He called for "much more independence and freedom of action for the local organizations." Chairman Jaworska of the Central Board declared: "Frequently the ZMP organizations have employed practices which are incompatible with the League



Title: Youth Activist

Szpilki (Warsaw), January 30, 1955

democracy, with the principles of our organization. It has become a universal practice to relieve or transfer persons who have been elected by youth members. Chairmen are appointed from above, whereas they should be elected by members. Lecturing tasks are assigned to persons who interpret them as a 'job of forcing upon their listeners a few unconvincing arguments.' This system destroys in young people independence of thought and causes mental laziness. There are still numerous cases of suppressing and combatting criticism." Secretary of the Central Board Jan Szydlak added to this: "There is no complete democracy unless every member of the organization can influence the decisions on activities undertaken by the organization. The ZMP branches must consult the youth and take into account the opinions and wishes of their members. Only then can we say that democracy within the ZMP has ceased to be a mere phrase frequently repeated at meetings."

In his speech, Bierut warned against bureaucratism and "fossilization" in the ZMP leading to estrangement from the masses: "Activists, including Party workers, ZMP members . . . underestimate in practice the fact that a true link with the masses cannot be achieved when the methods of organizational work are incorrect. If social work assumes dry and schematic forms, if social organizations are unable to influence . . . with their forcefulness and ardent ideological conviction . . . if they stoop to adopting a bureaucratic attitude toward the human being, then they will become estranged from the people. . . . The ZMP, as an organization aiming at exercising educational, social and political influence over the widest masses of youth, . . . must devote special attention to the forms and methods of its organizational work."

Secretary Wozniak criticized "the inadequate contact between the organization and the life of the young people, and the very small attendance at meetings." He saw the causes of this in the fact that ZMP meetings were "frequently boring and schematic, and young people do not expect to be interested by them." He quoted from a letter by a girl student who claimed that ZMP meetings were characterized by a rigid and formal atmosphere, lacking in warmth and friendliness.

The Anatomy of Tedium

Since "meetings are the main feature of our work," a delegate named Frankowna undertook to describe her experience, step by step, at a typical ZMP meeting she had attended. With wry humor she dissected the stupefying tedium of organizational life under Communism:

"In order to do away with shortcomings in our work we must in the first place know what they are. We must discuss them here at our Congress.

"ZMP meetings are the main feature of our work. Thus, I will begin by discussing them. I want to tell you about such a meeting which I attended. The ZMP branch in question had 30 members. The meeting was supposed to be about the reconstruction of Warsaw, and it was to start at 4 o'clock. I arrived at 4 sharp, and naturally found the hall beautifully decorated with a huge table and soft chairs on the presidium.

"What next? We waited and waited for the hall to fill. Slowly, by two's and three's, the members began to assemble. The meeting finally began at 5:30. The chairman made an opening speech lasting 40 minutes. What was his speech about? He spoke about really unimportant things. Out of 20 members present, the chairman called 15 to the rostrum. Then he called a member of the board, who was to make a speech—over 30 typewritten pages—on the reconstruction of Warsaw.

"Now I am going to tell you how interesting that speech was. Two or three facts—about the MDM [Marszalkowska housing project], that the Zeran electric power station had been built, that shortly the Palace of Culture would be completed—were smothered in a spate of words which meant absolutely nothing at all and which caused the audience to lose all interest in the speech.

"The debate—which was item two on an agenda containing 20 items in all—was just as interesting as the speech. Three or four comrades, previously ordered to take part, spoke in the debate. (Perhaps you are surprised that I say that they had been 'ordered' to take part. But we must admit that this practice still prevails in some ZMP branches: the chairman collars three or four members five minutes before the meeting and tells them, 'You know we have a meeting on such-and-such a subject. Somebody might come from the ZMP town board or from some other authority, so the meeting should look good. You understand that we cannot very well do without a debate.') Well, during the debate these comrades take the rostrum and say—what do they say?

"The first speaker says: 'By the efforts of the working people in the towns and country, by the efforts of the whole nation, the MDM and the Zeran power station were built in Warsaw.' Again and again they repeat what was already said in the original speech. What do the rest of those present do?

"Well, those on the presidium cannot really indulge in a snooze, so they only yawn discreetly and hope the meet-



Caption: "Today we *must* take part in the discussion—the district delegate will be present at our meeting. Do you know what to say?"

Swiat (Warsaw), February 6, 1955

ing will soon be over. Those in the auditorium simply take a good nap."

The delegate concluded (amid applause): "... In my opinion, we ought to talk about this sort of thing today, at the Second Congress, instead of summing up our achievements. Indeed our achievements are great, but we must bear in mind our shortcomings. We must eliminate wasted observations such as those of the person who gets up and says: 'Comrades! We must make endeavors and further anticipations, so as to be able to meet in time the possible difficulties.' This is an authentic sentence uttered by one of the chairmen. We ought to fight against such boredom and such poor organization. In my opinion statements made by many Comrades at this Congress fail to advance the purpose of our Congress, and do not convey the fact that this is a gathering of *young people*..."

Refugees from ZMP

The aridity of ZMP life, its lack of camaraderie and color, and its failure to provide for the social needs of young people have led them to take refuge in such proscribed pleasures as jitterbugging, reading "pocket thrillers," and drinking and rowdiness. The rapid spread of "hooliganism"—a term applied to everything "anti-State" from wearing American-style clothes to vandalism—is the measure of the regime's failure to keep youth in line through the authority of the ZMP. Hooliganism is a source of extreme concern to the Communist regimes today. *Express Wieczorny* (Warsaw), April 1, reported that drunkenness is "increasing alarmingly" among young workers. A recent report to the Sejm says that investigation in the Lublin area showed that out of 13,000 school children, "hundreds regularly drink schnapps."

At the Congress, Chairman Jaworska spoke at length on the urgency of humanizing the ZMP so it might assume moral leadership of Polish youth. She declared:

"Comrades, there is a matter of great importance to every young man and young woman and therefore this matter should be one of the basic concerns of our organization. This is the formation of the character and moral attitude of young people. . . . The problem of Socialist morality must become a regular subject in ZMP circles and [must be considered] the most important topic in our discussions with youth outside the ZMP. We are, after all, responsible for the moral nature of all Polish youth.

"If drunkenness and hooliganism, which are spreading dangerously among youth deprived of political guidance, are a matter of concern for the entire community, the main responsibility must be borne by the ZMP. We must find the proper approach to people addicted to hooliganism and drunkenness and use all our forces to persuade them, show them decent forms of enjoyment, drag them out of the dirt or at least wean the majority away from the hard core of the incorrigibles. . . . Members of the ZMP, young people, are made of flesh and blood. We are passionately interested in learning about life, we are sensitive to all things good and beautiful, we hate wrong, exploitation, and lies. But we also love health, happiness and good times; we like sports, travel, and decent entertainment; we like to laugh and dance. These are the natural desires of

youth. The ZMP should become an organization which will give young people the opportunity of satisfying all their healthy requirements; a militant, happy and fascinating organization; in other words, a *youthful* organization in the full sense of the word."

Bierut too in his address charged that there has been insufficient effort to provide youth with cultural entertainment, parties and sports.

The chairman of the Cracow Provincial Board, Wladyslaw Krupa, complained that "six months ago, the young people in Nowa Huta made a proposal for the construction of a park of culture and recreation there. Yet neither the Physical Culture Committee nor the Central Board of the ZMP gave us any help in preparing plans for a stadium and other sports installations or in finding a location for this park. And yet Nowa Huta youth need and must get a place of recreation. . . ."

The criticism was not confined to the ZMP itself. Jaworska denounced certain State organs, particularly the Ministry of Culture and Arts: "We cannot tolerate the failure of the Ministry of Culture and Arts to give sufficient aid to youth in the field of cultural life. It does not purchase enough books, it does not take care to supply the required amount of sport and camping equipment, of musical instruments and community center games. It is high time to recognize these things as being of utmost importance in the influencing of youth."

The Minister of Education, Witold Jarosinski, confirmed that "a number of negative and disturbing phenomena—weak discipline among pupils, an inappropriate attitude toward older people . . . signs of hooliganism and even demoralization among school-age youth" had been observed. He scored the "lack of attention paid to the emotional needs and feelings of youth . . . the underestimation by collective bodies in general, and by the ZMP in particular, of such important factors in community life as trust, friendliness, loyalty, and readiness to give help." "Frequently," he said, "our youth complain of the dryness of our meetings, the formal character of meetings, the lack of a friendly attitude by activists toward the rank and file. . . ." The impersonality of ZMP organizational life was also attacked by Secretary Wozniak, who said that he himself noticed in the work of the Warsaw ZMP "a marked tendency to subject erring or lagging members to general ridicule and censure;" but he knew of no instances of "sincere, fraternal discussions with the erring members, let alone a willingness to extend to them the helping hand of the organization." He called for a determined effort to transform the ZMP circles into "groups of real friends and comrades."

A Family Matter

The ZMP is aware that it competes with family authority and that its demands disrupt family relations. On January 16, Radio Warsaw reported: "Many parents are saying that although young people are receiving more education, this does not necessarily mean that character is likewise improved. . . . There are many instances of a heartless attitude toward parents and old people in general, and a tendency to shirk manual work. Some people are



Caption: "How does your ZMP club combat boredom?"
"Every second day we organize meetings and lectures
on the subject..."

Swiat (Warsaw), February 6, 1955

committing the cardinal error of generalizing on the basis of individual experience, laying the blame on youth as a whole and singling out the ZMP for special censure. This, however, is quite undeserved. The ZMP shares the parents' concern to educate young people so that they may become a source of satisfaction both for the parents and for their native land."

At the Congress, Chairman Jaworska directed ZMP members to conciliate their parents:

"Is not the question of relations with parents of utmost importance to all young people? How often does it happen that a young person, upon joining the ZMP, regards it as his first duty to lecture his parents! He begins to address them as their guide, mocking all that he considers obsolete in their way of life.

"This behavior results only in constant rows at home and parental antagonism to the ZMP, which they think has ruined their child. However, this attitude toward adults, and above all towards parents, is not desired by the ZMP. Let us consider how much confidence and authority would be gained by our organization among adults if a young man or woman joining the ZMP demonstrated at home a more cordial attitude toward parents..."

Down on the Farm

The desire to enrich and expand the ZMP is probably a sincere one on the part of ZMP leaders and functionaries. The regime too wishes to see the ZMP strengthened, for its own purposes. In his speech to the Congress, Bierut called attention to the directive of the Second Congress of the PZPR in regard to "raising the standard of living of the working masses." In order to achieve this, he said, "we must carry out a great mobilization of forces to raise our agricultural production, the increase of which lags inordinately behind that of industry."

The regime's chief tactical objective is contained in this statement, as is one of the chief reasons for concern over the ZMP's failures. The regime intends to use the organizational apparatus of the ZMP for the implementation of its economic plans in the agricultural sector: to put pressure on the farmers and to recruit from the cities battalions of young people (called Pioneers) for work on the land. This explains why, throughout the Congress, so much stress was put on the situation in the rural districts. The chairman of the Wroclaw Provincial ZMP Board, Jan Litera, devoted most of his speech to peasant youth and especially their work in the MTS. He asserted that more attention should be paid to the village youth, "to its living conditions, and to the raising of professional qualifications."

Figures quoted by Chairman Jaworska at the Congress showed that out of 3,150,000 potential members in the villages, only about 450,000—about 14.5 percent—belong to the ZMP. The proportions are even lower in many of the predominantly agricultural districts. In the Bialystok voievodship the percentage is 8.1, in the Warsaw voievodship 11.8; in 460 newly formed rural communes there are no ZMP branches at all. Even more significant, the ZMP's influence is very small in the villages in which farms have been collectivized. It was reported that there are over 100,000 youths in the rural ZMP clubs, of whom 35,000 work regularly or occasionally in the kolkhozes but only 7,000 are actual members of collective farms.

Radio Warsaw, January 16, reported: "Today the ZMP is sharing the concern of the country as a whole in the improvement of agriculture. The success of the ZMP's efforts can be gauged by the enthusiastic response to the call for volunteers for the State farms, State tractor stations, and the reclamation of virgin and fallow lands. There are many ZMP members who work both on their parents' farms and in kolkhozes."

The mobilization of youth for reclamation of virgin and fallow land has long been a project of the regime. But the effort has not so far met with notable success. On August 12, 1954, *Slowo Powszechne* (Warsaw) carried the report: "In the Kobylniki State farm [Bydgoszcz province], the students taking part in the current season's harvest failed completely in the fulfillment of their tasks. They work under the same conditions as seasonal [temporary] farm hands. They earn standard wages and are entitled to eat in the farm cafeteria at a cost of less than nine *zloty* a day. The first team, formed of 20 students from the Warsaw Central School of Agriculture, who worked voluntarily for

a month in the Kobylniki PGR, caused great difficulties to the State farm management because their work was insufficient to cover even the cost of their maintenance. Now the management does not know where to find the funds to cover the losses. The team which followed the first, formed by 74 students from the Lodz Medical Academy and the Gdansk Technical School, was no better."

Despite allegations of equal conditions, there is increasing evidence that the low level of living and working conditions for the voluntary youth brigades on the State farms is causing protest riots and large-scale desertions.

Last summer (1954) the regime organized a campaign for the cultivation of fallow land in the Polish Northeast districts, and appealed to the ZMP for labor reserves. The ZMP, wishing to demonstrate its ability to carry out the regime's orders, not only supplied several hundred volunteers from the ranks of the ZMP but assumed responsibility for the welfare of recruits from the SP (Service for Poland) assigned to farm work. According to reports not yet officially released, the campaign was a complete failure.

The first intimations of trouble reached the Voievodship Committee in Olsztyn early in September. These were followed by warnings of the Committee in Bialystok in October; at the same time the Central Committee of the PZPR sent to the Central Committee of the ZMP some "disquieting data" received from Security Police offices in these two districts. In the middle of November the ZMP and the SP sent a joint commission to investigate the situation and submit a report to Warsaw.

The report consisted of separate observations and investigations by the members of the commission, with the SP and the ZMP putting the blame on each other for the poor state of affairs. Out of these mutual accusations the following picture emerges:

Some 150 young volunteers were assigned to farm work in four of the Elblag district State Farms. Only the Nowakowo State Farm management had prepared quarters for a number of volunteers—in barns. The rest were put in a hotel in Elblag which had had no repairs since 1949. The Pioneers were put in rooms without windows or doors; the stoves had become unusable and there were no water pipes. Every day at 4.30 a.m. the Pioneers were taken to the four State farms and were not brought home till 7 p.m. Only once did the ZMP local committee show any interest in the lot of the young workers. On the day of their arrival, the committee gave them a party; after that, ZMP activity on behalf of the youth came to an end. After three weeks, 94 out of the 120 volunteers living in the hotel deserted. Some of them found work in the Elblag dockyards, some in a brick factory at Debica, and others in the local peat industry. A group of 15 youths organized a dangerous hooligan gang which is still giving trouble to the local militia.

The Pioneers who were sent to the Goldap district (State farms at Ostrowo, Jeziorki, Pawlowka, Wilczewo and Bocwinki), altogether about 200 boys and girls, stayed at work. They got on well for about a month, but sent complaints to the ZMP committee in Bialystok about the inferior food given to them in the State farms. After a month, when no reply had come from Bialystok, rioting

and desertions began. By November only about 25 boys and 35 girls were left.

A group of 100 assigned to the State farms of Track, Maly Elblag and Kortowa in the Olsztyn district were first quartered in tents loaned to the farms by the Olsztyn border guards. When cold weather came, they were transferred to farm buildings, only later to be moved back to tents. That plus the bad food led to riots in which four persons were seriously injured and seven buildings set on fire. Most of the recruits deserted.

Exodus From the Fields

Although this particular scandal has not been made public in Poland, press reports confirm the existence of this situation in State farms: notably a March 18 article in *Glos Pracy* (Warsaw), which declared that "hundreds of youths assigned to agricultural work on the State farms have fled from their jobs because of poor conditions." The newspaper charged ZMP recruiting agents with misrepresenting the conditions to potential volunteers:

"You will earn as much as 900 *zloty* a month; you will be living in palaces formerly owned by big landowners—for free; the community center is there awaiting you and when one of you gets married she may even get a house. . . ." This a member of the ZMP district committee at Mokotow in Warsaw recites in a rather bored tone to the excited girls, interested in going to State farms, candidates for Pioneers. . . .

"Most often, however, the reality was altogether different. The palace was [found to be] deserted and neglected, its roof leaked, and through its glassless windows a cold wind raged mercilessly. It happened that in the first few months, as at Gorzyca Odrzanska, two Pioneers shared one bed. Frequently clean bed-linen had to be fought for. The 'community center' was there or it wasn't. If it was, it was empty: no benches, no books, no newspapers. . . .

"Yes, the winter, although mild, was for the Pioneer a hard test. It was in such conditions that the lack of care on the part of farm managements could be especially felt; consequently many Pioneers left the farm. . . ."

Glos Pracy pointed out that young people who before they went to the country lived in towns where they were accustomed to having community centers, movies, theaters, could not get used to the monotonous life on the farm. "Thus many of them looked for fun in drinking and rioting . . . In January an unpleasant incident took place at Trzcina. The Pioneers got drunk, broke all the furniture in the room and injured one another quite seriously. Three of them were detained. No wonder the situation is so bad on other, more remote farms, when at Trzcina, which is so near the seat of State farm management, the Party organization and the ZMP office, such incidents took place."

The paper said that there are no statistics on how many of the Pioneers assigned to cultivation of fallow lands have managed to stay on the State farms till now: "It is known, however, that those who are 'no longer there' are many hundreds. Out of some groups numbering twenty or more persons, two, three, five or eight have remained." The paper further observed that in March new groups of Pioneers will



Caption: Returning from a threshing (left) and threshing about (right).

Dikobraz (Prague), August 26, 1954

be leaving for the country to cultivate fallow lands, and warned that they should not be told about "palaces," having their own houses, etc. Instead, they "should be shown the burden of their future work, but also the great need, grandeur and beauty of it."

At the ZMP Congress, delegates, while admitting delinquency on the part of some volunteers, accused various State organs of not meeting their responsibilities to the youth. The delegate from Koszalin attacked the Ministry of State Farms, saying that many young volunteers are forced to go home because they are given nowhere to sleep, and that in order to get home they have to sell their watches and clothes. He also criticized the Ministry of Health's failure to issue first-aid kits to the Pioneers and to ensure adequate hygienic facilities on the farms.

Political Tasks

In the political field, one of the most important ZMP tasks is the physical and military training of youth. The ZMP is responsible particularly for recruiting new cadres for the Air Force. Bierut said at the opening of the Congress that "fostering the closest relations between youth and the Armed Forces constitutes one of the most glorious and patriotic tasks of the ZMP." On the third day of the Congress a delegation of the Polish Armed Forces marched into the hall and was "enthusiastically greeted by the ZMP delegates" (according to Radio Warsaw, January 30). The leader of the delegation, Major-General Jan Frey Bielecki, made a speech in which he declared "our soldiers are young, and a considerable proportion of our officers also. Thus our armed forces have the glorious qualities of youth. . . . As long as imperialism exists, we must care about the security of our country; hence our concern for the armed forces and the deepening of ties between the armed forces and youth. The ZMP has been charged with the responsibility for carrying out this task. . . ."

Another ZMP responsibility is the administration of the ZHP. Party control of children up to the age of 15 is exercised through this scouting organization which is under ZMP guidance. In scouting organizations, "chil-

dren are prepared for taking up the new, more difficult tasks within the ranks of the ZMP," according to *Sztandar Młodych*, September 17, 1954. Criticism of the ZHP in this article was similar to that of the ZMP itself; inadequate membership, especially in the villages; sporadic recruitment; lack of vigor and perseverance; "rules and oaths are for them mere formality, like the [scout] sign and the neckerchief." The paper also charged that the ZHP does not "satisfactorily immunize children against the hostile influence of reactionary clergymen, in many cases it is unable to prevent the harmful split caused by religious feelings."

Lack of concern for children's needs, lack of knowledge of children's psychology, and the low caliber of instructors leads to two incorrect practices: 1. the scouting organization restricts its activity to work such as lectures, meetings, interviews with shockworkers, production conferences together with parents, etc. This 'grown-up' activity bores children and keeps others from joining the organization. 2. ZHP meetings become merely an extension of school lessons. Things which the children are taught at school are repeated at scout meetings, and children are even quizzed on their lessons. Listing these erroneous methods, Janina Balcerzak, Secretary of the Central Board of the ZMP, asked at the Congress for a fuller satisfaction of children's interests: "We must make every effort to enrich children's life in the scouting organizations. Excursions, camping, hikes, celebrations, scout meetings, games and contests must become the daily fare of the scout groups. We must increase sport and sightseeing activities and develop gymnastics, athletics, swimming, archery and football."

The ZMP has also a propaganda function. As well as the links with Party and National Front, it is horizontally linked with the Soviet Komsomols—whose delegates made a standard "declaration of friendship and solidarity" at the Congress—and with the Communist international youth organization, World Federation of Democratic Youth. In the first two weeks of August 1955, an International Festival of Youth will be staged in Warsaw under the auspices of

the WFDY. The Congress called upon the young people of Poland and the inhabitants of Warsaw to make intensive preparations for the Festival. (It is estimated that about 30,000 foreign guests and 100,000 Poles will take part.) Polish youth was "invited" to sign production pledges on the occasion of the Festival.

The Congress closed with elections to the Central Board of the ZMP, the drafting of a letter of tribute to the Central Committee of the PZPR, and the reaffirmation of the broad goals of the ZMP: "(a) to train the young people to be worthy members of the community, free of prejudices and superstitions; (b) to strengthen the efforts of youth in the struggle for a rapid increase in industrial and agricultural production; (c) to intensify the struggle for the Socialist transformation of the village; (d) to develop the physical qualifications of youth; and (e) to spare no effort to strengthen the People's rule and the worker-peasant alliance."

II—Czechoslovakia

Immediately following the ZMP Congress, on February 3, the Second Congress of the CSM, Czechoslovakia's Youth League, opened in Prague, and seemed at once to be taking the same line and exhibiting the same temper. If anything, the prevailing attitude was more critical. The pre-Congress period had been characterized by hostile attacks on the League, and it appeared that youth in Czechoslovakia was even more alienated than in Poland.

A statement at the Congress by the First Secretary of the CSM, Miloslav Vecker, revealed that, unlike the ZMP, the CSM has not grown numerically since it was formed in 1950. According to Vecker: "The CSM now has 1,116,428 members enrolled in 20,148 basic organizations. This means that the membership has not increased since the First Congress [1950]. What is the reason that the League has not added hundreds of thousands of young men and women in the past five years? Is the claim of some of our functionaries that young people are not interested in the work of the League correct? Certainly not!" But *Mlada Fronta* (Prague), March 6, countered: "More than half the boys and girls in our Republic are not members of the Youth League. They are not convinced that work in the League would enrich their lives. . . ."

Not only low membership, but inactivity of those nominally on the roll was criticized. As in Poland, the situation in the rural districts was of special concern. Radio Plzen said on January 10: "We have not succeeded in breaking the isolation. . . . Many boys and girls remain outside the ranks of the Youth League organization." The CSM paper *Prace Mladych*, No. 1, 1955, wrote that the district conferences of the CSM showed that in several districts of the Brno region, hardly half of the youth are organized in the Youth League. Furthermore, said the paper, the statistics of the Youth League in the Brno region are misleading. They show that 12,200 new members were acquired during the year, but neglect to mention that more than 11,000 left the organization, so that the actual increase was only one thousand. The delegates of the local

organizations had further charged that only a minority of the organized members actually participate in the activities of the organization. "This indicates," said the newspaper, "that the activity of the Youth League is not attractive for these young people because it does not fulfill their needs and interests. It is not surprising that the youth refuses to join such organizations and that even those who are members ignore the work of the organization. One of the participants of the district conference in Rosice said: 'How do our young people look upon our organization? They see a picture of interminable meetings, reading of reports, paying of dues, etc., etc. Unfortunately they are quite justified. That is just what our organization does.'" The paper concluded: "This is why the local organizations of Male Branice, Nemcice, Rozovice, Siluvsky and many other communities of the Rosice district have not enlisted one single new member since the last district conference." The situation in the Znojmo district is even worse. According to *Prace Mladych*, the Youth League there lost 471 members during the past year. *Mlada Fronta* reported on December 9 that in the Hlubotec district there are 61 communities but only 35 CSM organizations; "and you could count on your fingers the number [of them] which are active." On December 11, *Rude Pravo* (Prague) wrote: "Numerous CSM organizations—even at huge plants and important factories—are feeble and have no hold over the young people." *Prace Mladych* reported that out of 1,500 young workers at the large Klement Gottwald Engineering Works in Kralovo Pole, only 600 are members of the CSM, and that the participation of youth "in dozens of other industrial enterprises in the Youth League is below 50 percent." The December 9 issue of *Mlada Fronta* wrote of the rural situation: "Many CSM organizations have disintegrated." In the agricultural Svitavy district, the number of unorganized youth is considerable, according to *Prace Mladych*: out of 200 young people who were transferred to farm work there last summer, only 22 joined the local CSM unit. In the rural areas "there are many communities where no CSM unit exists at all."

"Altogether Indifferent"

In November, *Host Do Domu* (Prague) carried a letter by one Jan Trefulka passionately denouncing the CSM. According to Trefulka, the CSM is "a paper organization" which maintains no genuine contact with the young. It consists merely of councils and conferences. It exists in an unrealistic atmosphere "in which everything is oversimplified . . . Problems are brushed aside . . . [the functionaries live] in a constant high pitch of enthusiasm . . . and on a high plateau of sensational perspectives. . . ." The propagandizing of the official CSM poet Kohout is "trite talk, clichés, untruthfulness, superficial phrase-making based on shallow thinking. . . ."

This letter set off a chain reaction of attacks on the CSM. One of the most telling was made by a girl high school student, Pavla Vocolkova. "I do not know what a youth organization should be like, but it should definitely not be forced and stereotyped like ours. The CSM has

absolutely nothing to offer young people, absolutely nothing," she wrote. Her letter said, in part:

"I am altogether indifferent to the Youth League . . . tired of the endless talk about how wrong our work is and about future tasks. Without taking the slightest interest I vote every year for the new Committee, and listen, with silent amusement, to the new Plan, the evaluation of the previous Committee's work, the thanks for the vote of confidence—but I don't expect anything at all to come of all this. . . . The Youth League has no attraction for me, no appeal. It is not youthful, but old and weary. It is for old grandmas and grandpas who want more tranquility than I. Something is lacking in the League which I myself can't define. . . . An organization must spring from the will of the young people themselves, not from recruitment drives. If the League had something to offer young people, hardly any of them would stay out of it, even if there were no organized recruiting."

Mlada Fronta published this letter (for full text see NBIC, February 1955) on December 17, and started a daily column in its pages entitled "What Does the CSM Mean To Me?", to which young readers were invited to contribute. Encouraged by Vocolkova, a number of boys and girls gave free rein to their opinions of the League. A letter signed by students of the Higher Industrial Mining School in Kladno complained (*Mlada Fronta*, January 23):

"In our school, the work of the CSM is just as poor. The group gives us nothing, helps us in nothing, but on the contrary makes us think that its main objective is to keep us from any enjoyment of life. That we must study is something we know quite well, and we do not need to be constantly told this. During every meeting there is talk only of 'plans' and similar matters which are presented in an utterly uninteresting way. And yet the plans invariably fail to materialize. And so, instead of being a jolly, youthful group, we are like robots, a group which hears nothing but interminable accounts of what has happened and what is going to happen and which occasionally raises a hand to vote for something without bothering to consider whether

the proposal is worth supporting. . . . We can arrive at only one conclusion: the League at our school exists on paper only. . . ."

Students and League members at Roznov pod Radhostem organized a debate on the subject of the CSM and reported its findings in *Mlada Fronta*, January 11: ". . . We received many interesting comments and examples of how our organization proved uninteresting, boring and tiring. . . . Comrade Uher, for instance, who joined the League at the beginning and has been through the echelons of the CSM hierarchy, said: 'There are several remarks of Comrade Vocolkova that I am forced to agree with, primarily the ones pointing out the monotony of League life. Even we, here, have voted so far for a number of proposals, but after the vote these proposals never materialize. For this reason, our activities have degenerated. Such meetings which focus incessantly on the same matter cannot give anything useful and new to a young man and they do not attract him.'"

Countering all this criticism on the part of the youth, the regime attacked CSM functionaries and young people in general. *Mlada Fronta*, December 8, charged that "CSM leaders and members do not know how to counteract negative whisper-propaganda, they do not indicate the right road, but remain apathetic." The paper complained of the shortage of qualified Youth League workers: "Most of the functionaries do not know how to improve the program of meetings and discussions so as to make them more interesting. It is no rare thing to find cynical if not downright Schweikian indifference." On January 9, in *Mlada Fronta* Jaroslav Boucek (a young writer and critic) proclaimed: "On the eve of the Second Congress of the CSM appears Trefulkism, a mentality smacking of demoralization, indifference and contempt. . . ." He wrote that among the youth there are "neurasthenics—self-pitying melancholics with feelings of emptiness. To them, the pioneer enthusiasm of our people is the hypocrisy of weak spirits deprived of individuality . . . [it is] a monotonous march of people in uniform who all smile alike and have the same reactions. . . . They refuse to subordinate their individualistic 'ego' to the proud and determined 'we.' They consider the collective an unthinking mass which parrots definitions and slogans. . . ."

Pavel Kohout, the poet whom Trefulka had attacked, put an end to this round of barbs with the categorical edict: "There are many voices expressing concern over our youth . . . and frequently they say that the CSM is to blame. *Naturally we do not mean to discuss whether or not we need the CSM. . . .* The fact that our former enemies and present foes have attacked it is proof enough of the necessity for its existence." (Italics added.)

Long Hairs and Lethargy

At the CSM Congress, youth was accused of lethargy and of escaping into hooliganism and *potapkyism* (*potapky* are gaudily dressed young men with long hair and trousers worn well above the ankle). The aforementioned League's First Secretary, Miloslav Vecker, castigated loose



Speaker addressing dozing youngsters: "I declare our friendly youth soiree open and, since we must not forget to maintain high ideological standards, I shall read you a report."

Mlada Fronta (Prague), March 6, 1955

morals among the CSM members. He said:

"Members of the League cannot ignore moral shortcomings such as carelessness, laziness, breaking work discipline, improper attitude toward collective ownership, *potapkyism*, casual affairs between boys and girls, cases of broken marriages. . . .

"The fight against the remnants of the capitalistic past cannot be limited to a fight against mere external expressions of youth's moral shortcomings, against narrow trousers and other extravagances in styles of dressing. We have to fight the causes of these eccentricities and endeavor to reach man's inner self in order to teach him how to live a new, better, richer life. . . . To achieve that we must work through the power of example and through a comradely, friendly collective"



Picture shows castle high up in clouds marked "District Secretariat of Czechoslovak Youth League."

Caption: Youngsters at bottom—"Where, where, where is the path?"

Dikobraz (Prague), February 3, 1955

Agricultural Drive

As in Poland, the regime's immediate interest in the League lies in utilizing its human and organizational resources at the present stage for agricultural labor. Secretary Vecker emphasized at the Congress that "a major task of youth is to help out in agriculture" and deplored the fact that "a large part of our youth underestimates the importance of this work." The agricultural mobilization was first outlined at the Tenth Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party in July 1954, when Premier Vilim Siroky called for an increase of 320,000 agricultural workers in the 1954-57 period, out of which 250,000 were to be young people. *Rude Pravo* said on March 1, 1955, that although 10,000 youths had volunteered for farm work since the Congress (on March 14 the figure quoted had risen to 14,000) many more are needed for cooperatives, State farms and MTS.

At present the campaign is focussed on recruiting farm and tractor station brigades to cultivate the Western border areas formerly occupied by the Sudeten Germans. On March 10, Radio Bratislava quoted a speech made by Jozef Hojc, Slovak Commissioner for Manpower, at a rally in Bratislava to bid farewell to 269 youths leaving for the border areas. Hojc said: "In the present phase the problem of agriculture has become one of the basic questions of our economic life. . . . We believe that none of you will betray the honor of his organization [CSM] . . . the honor of our youth . . . that all of you will stand fast on the front for which you have volunteered."

Radio Prague, March 12, claimed that "the CSM drive to help agriculture in the border areas is successful; in some places, even parents have joined. But some people resist and slander the movement. An 18-year-old girl has written complaining that she would like to go but her parents refuse to let her. Even her father, who is an important functionary and 'talks very progressive,' refuses to let her go."

Propaganda for this drive is injected everywhere. In a talk on "Youth and Romanticism," Radio Prague, March 19, declared: "Young people want to get to know the world. There are among us people who find daily life very humdrum; this [attitude] is *petit-bourgeois*. There is a choice of two kinds of romance: one for the happiness of all and the other the kind one finds in books where the poor girl marries the factory owner. . . . Some young people are already experiencing the new kind of romantic life: those who are working in the border areas. . . ."

Reflections in Other Satellites

The "link" between agriculture and the youth associations is being forged in all the Soviet bloc countries. In Bulgaria, *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia), March 21, declared that "all activities of DUPY (Dimitrov Union of People's Youth) must be joined in a direct effort of our rural youth



Caption: "Two members of the Czechoslovak Youth League inspect their new homeland. They had volunteered to leave their respective professions to come to work in agriculture as part of the government-sponsored drive to get 320,000 workers in the rural sector between 1954-57."

to obtain higher yields and increase farmers' income." The article further directed:

"Our youth must actively assist in the struggle for the Socialist reorganization of agriculture. While in many State farms youth teams and brigades have achieved excellent results . . . in other places local branches of DUPY have permitted a deplorable slackening in labor organization and discipline and in the efforts aimed at improving agriculture in general. The main cause of this is the fact that the Party organizations, People's Councils and other public organizations have failed to give the necessary assistance to DUPY. . . . [Also], in some places young people in the villages have shown an aversion to agricultural work and have become victims of a disparaging attitude toward agriculture—an attitude characteristic of the old bourgeois mentality. . . .

"More youth teams must be organized in the rural areas. Village youth must be persuaded to have the highest regard for agriculture and to enjoy rural work. . . . All DUPY branches must study the agricultural decisions of the Central Committee of the Party, Chervenkov's report to the Fourth [State Farm] Conference, and the Pleven Okoliya Party conference and other documents. . . ."

Attendance at meetings and participation in the activities of DUPY are dropping off rapidly, according to an editorial in *Mladetz* (Sofia), January 1955, which quotes a Bulgarian provincial newspaper. The editorial cited dull programs and a lack of entertainment as the cause:

"Our youth organization in the Burgas District is in the last place on the list of paid-up membership dues. Only 50 to 65 percent are taking part in the youth meetings.

In some villages and cities there are several groups which are built on an unhealthy base and arrange their parties for fun and drink.

"At the Plenum of the District Committee it was emphasized that these failures are due to the fact that the work in many DUPY organizations is dry, the life is boring. Where does this boredom come from? It comes from neglecting mass cultural work and especially the art of independent activity. There are very few DUPY organizations where the life of the young people is interesting, gay, and meaningful; where the boys and girls are not bored; and where they don't want to leave the village. Most of the DUPY organizations constantly discuss the same questions. . . . Instead of being a mass school for the Communist education of youth, the meetings become heavy burdens, unpleasant obligations for the young people. . . ."

The Second Congress of Hungary's DISZ (Union of Working Youth) is scheduled to take place at the end of May. In listing directives for pre-Congress activity *Szabad Nep* (Budapest), January 26, warned officials not to get mired in organizational detail: "During these weeks the Party organizations should direct, assist and supervise the work of the youth with extra care. . . . At present there is the danger that DISZ officials will become absorbed in manifold internal organizational activity and will drift away from reality, from the masses of youth, from the lofty militant aims of the nation. . . ."

A Sisyphean Task

Both in Czechoslovakia and in Poland, the Youth League Congresses uncovered deep wellsprings of resistance to the youth organizations and to the policies for which they are the tools. The young people's disaffection is so great that, in Czechoslovakia, the League's very existence was called into question.

Communist youth organizations are intended to appeal to the group consciousness of young people, while attempting to stifle their equally strong urges for independence and self-expression. In microcosm, this is a conflict between individualism and totalitarian regimentation, and many of the attitudes involved in so-called hooliganism are simply adolescent revolt against coercion and domination.

The Communists know that the youth is their future, and therefore its indoctrination essential. It is from this youth that the Communists must build cadres—for State-Party and managerial positions—and from which it can derive considerable productive economic work. The function of the Youth Leagues throughout the Soviet orbit is to work on these political and economic aspects of regime intentions for youth.

The proposals put forth at the Congresses for improving the organizational methods cannot really be fruitful while the Youth Leagues remain in principle instruments for regimentation and for imposing Soviet policies on other nations. In short, so long as organizations for youth fail to fulfill the legitimate personal and national aspirations of those to whom they are intended to appeal, and for whom they are organized, they can never hold a genuine attraction for young people.

Radio Free Europe: The Voice of Free Czechoslovakia


WHEN the regime views the youth, it apparently cannot make up its mind as to what it sees. It says of the youth on the one hand that it is excellent and, on the other hand, that it is worthless, that it works brilliantly and then again that it deserts work wherever possible, that it is dutiful and then again flighty, both the hope and the shame of the fatherland. *Rude Pravo* writes one day that all youth backs the regime, and next day it says that the influence of the official Youth Association is "very small, indeed minimal," and that the greater part of youth does not participate in it. *Mlada Fronta* writes alternately that the youth is joyous and bewitched. President Zapotocky is alternately pleased and irked. One regimist teacher shouts at his students, "Why don't you let yourselves be irradiated by the sun of Socialism!" But it looks as if the youth were selecting its own rays.

Perhaps it is possible to explain to the government its own difficulties by applying the method it most believes in—by dialectics. Although the government chants the dialectic prayer three times a day, ninety-nine people out of a hundred still don't know what dialectics is. But in the dialectical theory which is older than Communism, there may be more sense and more hope than the government knows. It is, in substance, the theory that each social trend outlives itself, that once it reaches the peak it already contains the seeds of its own destruction because the forces that have been dominated by it awaken to new life. It is the doctrine of life moving in thesis and antithesis and of antithesis winning out in the end. This has happened many times before in history. I regret to have to speak of theory instead of living beings; however, the interrelation of Communism and dialectics is interestingly insincere. Although the regime compels people to believe in dialectics, its entire endeavor is in fact to destroy the dialectic process, to suspend the development between thesis and antithesis, to make Communism the last word in history—the zenith of history, to use Hegel's term—in order to prevent anything new from developing. In truth, the Communist doctrine ought to be called not dialectics but something like monolithics, the doctrine of the termination of movement in history. Communism is the thesis—and never more shall there be an antithesis—so the regime says. In point of fact, Communism is one of the extremes of history against which, according to the genuine dialectic doctrine, other social and human forces must rebel and must win in the end. But the government says no, not this time; it says: this one extreme is forever, it is the end.

If, however, we look at youth, everywhere we see the dialectical forces on the move. We have some very pretty dialectic examples at hand. The government papers are overjoyed at the eagerness which Czechoslovak children show in playing military games. The press is overjoyed because it does not investigate the children's psychology. One couple escaped with an eight-year-old boy, one of those who gave such pleasure to the government press. Whenever he had been able to, he went with other boys

to the woods to play soldiers. This tyke said, "We read the word PEACE at every corner and we were sick of it. That is why we played soldiers." This is—a dialectic boy, a living example of pressure eliciting counter-pressure, the example of the perfect peace campaign containing the seed of its own destruction, the example of the more talking done, the more disgust provoked. The government has had and will continue to have difficulties with that group of youths who dress to be different from others, who take hour-long train rides to other cities to buy a colorful tie, some better suiting or striped socks; who swear by narrow breeches, have a photograph of the American film *Three Men of Texas* on the wall of their bedroom and when they sing, sing "I Roamed Through Old Colorado." Personally, I do not fancy American painted ties and should not like to see a friend wearing them, and I almost shudder lest our boys back home learn that here on Broadway you may get ties featuring a young lady to whose eyes real eyeglasses are glued. But contemplated impersonally, not as a matter of good taste but sociologically, that tie is a dialectical tie—if worn by somebody in Prague or in Kladno. The more the government decrees for men and women to dress gray in gray, the more it arouses a yen for gay colors. And because the government abuses America too much, the youngster determinedly smokes a thick American cigar. It may make him ill, but no matter, a rebellion carries its risks. This boy, smoking that cigar, feels as if he had mounted the barricade.

The thing that is now happening among the youth is that the dialectic urge for freedom against unfreedom rises to the surface. The government wanted the young people organized in the Youth League, and it has got them there. But how are they there? Not meekly, but with their own ideas. One report from the homeland says, "The resistance among the youth against the instructions issued is perhaps the widest cumulative resistance of all at home. The young people refuse to be robbed of every opportunity of their own way of recreation after work, they refuse to live constantly and exclusively under the supervision of the regime and the Party." And these young people have lived their conscious life under two dictatorships; they have not read theoretical books on freedom because both dictatorships burned and confiscated them. Without books they found the urge in themselves, and thus there are on the government side decrees, and on our side nature. Another news item from home says, "The young people believe in the Western concept that everyone should be allowed to follow without impediment and without pressure the interests which he enjoys and for which his abilities are suited." In substance, the government is powerless because it acts like somebody treating burns with fire. The system of government decrees evoked this mood among the youth—therefore it cannot be cured by more decrees. This opposition is provoked, not cured by pressure. Youth must ask itself: are there in ascendancy in our national life, decent or indecent facts? Do I feel myself developing as a human being, or am I being trained as Pavlov's dog?



Radio Free Europe

Tonight, in the countries behind the Iron Curtain, men, women and children will gather around radios tuned to the voices of their countrymen in the West, bringing them the news of the free world, the knowledge that they are not forgotten, and the hope of their future liberation. Radio Free Europe, operating as a home service from abroad, broadcasts over a network of 29 transmitters to Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania, competing directly with all Satellite Communist stations.

This is the Voice of Free Czechoslovakia . . .


The People, A Factor

We come back, of course, again and again to the government change in Russia. The important thing is—*is it a change of government or a change of the regime?* For two and a half years following Stalin's death, Russia moved along a road which seemed to promise a certain return to normalcy. The tight fist of the secret police relaxed; the consumer was wooed to an extent which made it appear almost as if the Russian government had recognized the claim of the citizens to a decent life; further, it seemed as if the Russian Communists had ceased to play around with the horrors of an atom-hydrogen- and now even cobalt-war. This took place under Malenkov's leadership. Now Malenkov is relieved by Khrushchev, who looks rather like Stalin's shadow on the wall, and the question is whether or not Russia will return to her original untamed demonism.

For you, for your daily life, the important thing is whether the concessions which, we hope, eased your life and added a slice of meat to your plates, will fall prey to a renewed demonism. The tree was small, yet it yielded some fruit for you. I am certain that if the populations of the Communist states could, they would align themselves in one row and would defend the concessions in the streets and on the squares. Since they cannot do so—because it would exact innumerable victims—what will happen? To see through all the intentions of the Communist government—is like wanting to behold the face of a man wearing ten masks. We dare surmise that, if the new Russian government were able to do with ease everything it wanted

to do, it would repudiate every compromise. . . . We do not assume for one moment that humanitarian feelings would hold it in check. The question therefore is *whether the government simply can do everything it wants to do.* Observing the caution necessary in dealing with conditions so anxiously concealed as are those in Russia, let us say this: not even this new Russian government will be able to act as if the last two and a half years had not happened; it cannot erase them from memory; the two and a half

years became a historic factor. Memory has bearing on history. The claims of the people were acknowledged. Who will refute them suddenly—and who will refute them without repercussions? Had Russia not changed at all since the time of the Stalin dictatorship, had no change whatever occurred in the awareness, in the education and in the self-assertion of the Russian people, then it would be easy to re-establish Stalinism in its original form. But if



a change did occur, if the foundations of the Russian society did move ahead, if the body onto which Stalin's mantle fitted snugly grew and became stronger, then it will be difficult to restore everything and make it as it was before. In spite of Stalin's shadow again moving along the wall, in spite of dictatorship and of the secret police which persevere, we think that the time of absolute despotism has passed even in Russia, and with it the ease whereby the Politburo could turn every one of its ideas and whims into deeds. Of course, Russian dictatorship has not changed to the extent of recoiling in the face of an organized movement; an open political opposition would be persecuted by Khrushchev's government just as it would have been by Stalin's government. But the Russian dictatorship has become, as it were, more sensitive to the silent and anonymous

movement and to the lasting pressure of people's molecules. It still defeats every individual antagonist, it still holds the writers in servitude, but it does not know what to do with the particles emanating from the people's atmosphere. That this development did take place in Russia we have not only implications but proofs: two such crafty politicians as Beria and Malenkov would never have put forth the more "popular" policy had the pressure of the people's molecules not been palpable and had it not promised success to him who would head it. Neither Beria nor Malenkov would have acted as they did because they have read the humanistic writings of Nikolayevich Tolstoy.

Therefore we can speak frankly even of concessions, even though we know the Prague government is lying in wait for every one of our words, in order to make exactly the opposite out of what we say. In the first place, the Czechoslovak Communists are so insignificant in the overall picture that it is superfluous to conceal anything from them. The decision as to whether concessions are to be continued or to be abolished in Czechoslovakia will arrive in a sealed envelope from Moscow. In the second place, the concessions were not, nor will be, the resultants of good will; they were the resultant of existing and operating social forces. If these forces are strong enough, then the opinion of the government that closets itself in a room to deliberate is not alone what counts.

The Russian Communist Party evidently subjected the policy of making concessions to criticism and in consequence Khrushchev assumed the leading position until then held by Malenkov. The Russian Communist Party became convinced that concessions weakened the dictatorship, impaired discipline, and bolstered the democratic self-assurance of the citizens. . . . We admit that the Russian Communist Party is correct there: yes, concessions do weaken the dictatorship, but it is also true that the stubborn resistance which sets in when concessions do not exist also weakens the dictatorship and maybe does so even more at the present time. The Communist governments therefore do not have the choice of two methods of remaining strong, they have only the choice of two methods of weakening themselves. . . .

Political concessions will always hold danger for the dictatorial government, since another name for concessions is recoil, and where the dictator recoils, he does not dictate and, to some extent, abolishes himself. In people civilly and possibly also materially not sated, a minor concession whets the appetite for a major concession, a fraudulent concession whets the longing for a real concession. If the dictator decides to grant a fraction of freedom, he must expect the question of complete freedom to be broached. If he sanctions false elections, the people will want genuine elections. If, cunningly and fraudulently, he promises the farmers they may leave the collective farms, they will indeed do so, and then they must be stalked back in some other way. When he tells the workers the factories are theirs, they want to run them and the Party emissaries must try to dissuade them. When he utters the word equality, the people will draw a straight line in their souls

and will want to be truly equal. As a mere strategem the policy of concessions is no good, for willy-nilly it releases the forces which the dictatorship has shackled. The crisis in the Russian government has been unavoidable because the policy of concessions in a totalitarian state is full of contradictions. It has been introduced in order to bolster the dictatorship, but it can easily be seen that, while it may strengthen the state, it weakens the dictatorship. Whenever the dictatorship grants the people the right to negotiate better living conditions for themselves, if only by mute and anonymous pressure, the dictatorial principle is damaged, and who knows what may come in through the open door. . . .

Some people criticize the concessions on the grounds that they provide only material relaxation and therefore allegedly lead to materialism. Well then, first: we wish our people back home would get material relaxations, they need them. Second: to compel the dictatorship to retreat, if first in the economic sphere, is not alone a material but also a political success. A retreat is a retreat, whether it is accomplished by the left or the right foot. To scruple to defeat the foe economically is like hesitating to defeat him by cannon fire and to insist he must be defeated by swords. . . .

I spoke of social forces and of their irresistibility, but I did not want to imply that the social forces work for the individual to such an extent as to make it possible for him to fold his hands idly in his lap. Yes, a certain automatic drive of social dynamics does exist, but that is not all. Social forces crystallize around determined individuals. I cannot consider anybody's comfort to such extent as to declare that in order to defeat the dictatorial government no personal effort whatever is necessary.

Spot

The official's wife looked at her watch, and said to the worker's wife: I have to go now, we eat lunch at one o'clock. When do you eat?—We eat every Tuesday and Friday.

Paralysis in Literature

We are familiar with every catastrophe brought about by the Communist regime. The catastrophe in literature is the gravest of them all. In politics as in literature, Communism suppresses man and his qualities. So we discuss what is really always the same topic. In politics it is sometimes enough, or at least it is thought to be enough, simply to prohibit something, but in literature Communism faces an insoluble problem: it prohibits the writer from expressing himself as he is, yet it wants the writer to express himself. It is like wanting steam not to be hot, but still to run the engine. Every Communist setback in this field arises from the attempts to cultivate literary men as plants are cultivated or animals bred. Let us say the writer is melancholy. It happens. The government orders him to shake this off, his own frame of mind, immediately, and to be merry. It is unbearable and cannot produce good results.

... About a year ago, the government conceived the idea of fostering satire. A state commission for satire has already been established; a contest for satire has already been all mapped out; it has already been resolved at a joint meeting of writers and members of State Security to put a stop to the nuisance that no satire existed—but the refractory and stubborn satire still does not come, although any and all counselled the prospective satirists about how it was to be done. We read of the valuable counsel tendered by Minister Nejedly. He said, "The satirist must not be afraid." This is as useful as telling the man who broke his leg that he shouldn't have done so. One thing we know for certain and no error is possible: all writers would love to get it off their chests and their fingers fairly itch to write a satire on Minister Nejedly. They won't write it for the simple reason that Mr. Nejedly himself hinted at: fear. Since Mr. Nejedly is protected by the government, satire is robbed of its best and tastiest prey. "Don't be affeared, proud satirist," says Mr. Nejedly, the Minister; but everybody else advises the satirists they should be affeared. Says Minister Kopecky, "In no instance must a shadow of derision fall upon our glorious native Party." *Lidove Noviny* says, "Of course, it is the duty of the satirist's political awareness to have his judgment harmonize with the basic trend of the Party." And the magazine *Cultural Life* made exactly one stride forward and one back and avoided the whole predicament by stating, "What the Party exacts from the writers is greater courage and combativeness; but of course, never letting the arrows hit its own ranks." In other words: speak, but remain dumb.

... The mortal disease of this satire and of this literature is called—insincerity. The government places many orders for insincerity: give us reckless satire—but don't let it bite us; write realistic novels—but be wary of describing real conditions and real people; write lyric poems of love—but see that you end them with a eulogy of the Five-Year Plan; walk in nature—but weave Stalin into it; learn to know life, but once you do, hide your knowledge from us. It is peculiar: in every other sphere of life one may possibly be insincere, but once you are insincere in literature, the vigor oozes away through every pore. Karel Capek once said, "If you want to be a great artist you must undertake to suffer the torment of a great man." Dictatorship makes a man small and in consequence, literature bad. It squeezes the writers with iron pincers and—most sinful in art—it takes away their soul. ... Communism indulges in the most thorough freezing experiments ever undertaken in literature. It severs literature from emotions and bases it on several political theorems. This regime may yet overcome the crisis in the fields; it may overcome the crisis in the mines; it will never overcome the crisis in art. It is impossible to drive feeling and ardor from literature with impunity. It has been said that hearts live by being wounded. But the Communists say that the pen is but another form of the bayonet, and they demand that the writer go about armed against emotion and feeling as little as the member of the State security police and being as fervent as the state prosecutor. Communism has tried to erase the difference between the writer,

the State prosecutor and the political secretary. The result is what we now see and what everybody avoids.

What do you read? Let us know what you read.

Spot

The law stands on the side of the people. The decrees of the regime are unlawful. Opposition without violence is the true law.

The Use of Conferences

The new conference between East and West seems to be in the offing. ... Prime Minister Bulganin of Russia was almost cordial in bestowing his blessing upon the prospect. It is easy for him. The West has to cope with a certain embarrassing circumstance: ought it to participate in a new conference in view of the publication of the Yalta papers at this time, the documents of 1945, from which emerges the sole fact that the democratic states have been deceived, from east to west, from north to south? A leading American magazine summarized its impression thus: "The chief value deriving from publication of the Yalta papers lies in that it will educate Congress and the country and make them see the danger of such conferences." Should the Russians again come with intentions of deceiving, their task will not be as easy as in the past. After some hesitation, the democratic West has finally recognized that he who having been deceived once, does not learn his lesson, is condemned to be deceived a second time.

Rude Pravo has written that my main theme is that coexistence is impossible, and it notices my having repeated this several times. Pity, *Rude Pravo* does not ask me how I came to conceive that idea.

I conceived it having found out that in the past fifteen years Russia has violated twenty-eight treaties she had signed. If anything happens twenty-eight times in a row an almost supernatural optimism is required to make one believe it will not happen the twenty-ninth time. Something exists which is usually termed the law of probability. In keeping with this law, it seems as futile to attempt the conclusion of the twenty-ninth treaty since twenty-eight were not honored, as it does to hit a nail with one's fist for the twenty-ninth time and expect it not to stab.

When the documents of the Yalta Conference were published, some people felt an urge to accuse this or that democratic leader, chiefly of lack of caution. Possibly not as much caution was observed as should have been—as the man attacked possibly should have armed himself with two pistols instead of one. But a discussion of the minor offenses of the democratic leaders only conceals the major lesson and the major guilt: the Russian treason—and the major fact: the Russian system of deception. The Yalta Conference did not turn into a tragedy because of what was agreed there, but because Russia violated the agreements made there. This naturally leads to a situation in which everyone, hearing the present talk of a new conference with Russia, says to himself: well, have fun.

Why, if the futility of conferences in our times has been proven, do they still take place? The character of con-

ferences has changed since 1945: they take place not when somebody wants to come to terms on something, but rather when the Russians want *not* to come to terms, when they ready themselves for a diplomatic and psychological assault. From the West—and of this we may be quite sure—sober, wise and skeptical men will come to the conference. The real, the pre-determined objective, is not to conclude an agreement, but to mount the dais to capture the attention of the world on behalf of one's adopted viewpoint, to unmask the intentions of the antagonist and at most to avert the minor evils, while the great evils, as everybody knows, remain unchanged. The present conferences are but a form of the cold war: two antagonists are bound to the same table for several days, but they do not cease to be antagonists. It is strange that the world meets at conferences of which one side knows and the other side expects that nothing will be accomplished; yet it is so. Beyond the walls of the conference rooms, matters will take their own course. Everybody knows the agreements do not count, since so many treaties already have been swept along like dry leaves by the wind, and that what really matters is how the situation will shape up, and the power balance, and a favorable opportunity. And the Russians wait to see who will be afraid, possibly so very much afraid as to recoil without a fight. Can anything change, can conferences and their results again become what they used to be? We view the long series of deceits foisted upon us and we know that nothing will change as long as the Communist belief in the efficacy of trickery does not subside, as long as they remember that ruse used to net them success. Prior to this, the Communists would have to cease believing in the teachings of forefather Lenin, who said that the aims of Communism were so hallowed and so inevitable that, compared to them, the question of truth loses its significance and every Communist therefore has the right to help himself to untruth and to perfidy. If such conviction is introduced into a conference, the conference is worthless as a business is worthless if a false draft is introduced into

it. We consider what the Communists did to long-established words like democracy, independence, national pride, peace, voluntary action, elections, trade unions, the eight-hour working day; how they reversed the meaning of the concepts of honor and treason. We cannot avoid war against untruth. . . .

Ten years ago, a hundred German divisions were not able to conquer Russia. But at the future international conference Russia will guilefully demand a resolution about what to do against the danger that twelve German divisions might conquer Russia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary—countries that have three hundred divisions among themselves. Russia will demand that West Germany should not arm, although Communist East Germany has been armed for a long time. Russia will protest against the Western democratic allies having a joint general staff with Germany, although the joint general staff of Russia with the Satellite states is functioning even now. Russia will demand that the concept of a European federation be relinquished, although the eastern "federation" is a thing accomplished a long time ago. In actual fact, Russia is little concerned about the twelve German divisions, she is concerned with West Europe being in chaos, she wants one partner to deny the other in order that a vacuum may exist at Russia's western frontier, in order that the only strong and organized force in Europe be Russia, in order that her preponderance be eternal, in order that hope for liberation be vain.

All this, if in different words, Russia will make the subject of the future international conference. What she will say and what the others will answer matters less than the situation when the conference meets. No logic will decide, nor oratorical feats, nor conglomeration of reasons. The balance of power will decide and this time nobody is allowed to be weak. Today, after Fascism and Nazism and Communism, nothing seems more ignoble and disgusting than defenseless truth, than an excellent representative at a conference, not backed by power.

The Rewards of Self-Criticism

A Czechoslovak factory official explained (in *Svet Prace*, December 16, 1954) how he had learned to handle the thorny problem of "socialist" criticism at factory meetings. First he criticized a fellow comrade; this pleased the other workers, but the comrade refused to talk to him afterwards. At the next meeting he praised the same comrade, whose friendship was regained, but he then found himself ostracized by the other workers. Finally, he got up at a factory meeting and criticized himself, and the whole audience gave him a standing ovation. In conclusion he recommended his readers "neither to criticize nor praise, but indulge thoroughly in self-criticism, and you will become a hero, as I have."

The Girls

They Left Behind

*A Polish woman in her early twenties who fled to the West in September 1954 tells a story of tragic discrimination against herself and her sister-in-law left in Poland after their husbands had chosen freedom.**



"The two brothers have gone to town together. . . ."

ON A COLD evening in December 1953, Janina conquers her fear of the snowstorm raging outside and puts her coat on to go buy some groceries in the little town of Z. before the store closes for the night. She is surprised, but happy, when her husband offers to go for her. She is not so agile any more since she is expecting a baby and prefers the warmth of the stove to the winter cold. She makes herself comfortable by the stove to wait for her husband's return.

She waits half an hour, an hour, but she is not worried. Perhaps he met a friend on the way or dropped in to see his brother. But when more than two hours have passed, she becomes anxious. She puts her four-year-old son to bed, throws a coat over her shoulders and goes next door where her husband's married brother lives. She's prepared to give her husband a piece of her mind when he returns. He probably didn't go shopping at all and is sitting in a bar somewhere. She wants to find out if his brother is with him. And sure enough, Irena, her sister-in-law, is waiting irritably too. The two brothers have gone to town together.

The situation is plain. They just can't pull themselves away from beer—the good-for-nothings. But if they dare to show up without the herrings—which after all aren't on sale at the cooperative every day—there'll be a reckoning. The sisters-in-law sit together and plan their retaliation. It looks like there will be a good storm when the two return. But they don't come. When it is eleven o'clock, and finally twelve, the women realize that something must have happened. Oblivious to the snowstorm, they hurry to town to

look for their husbands. The town has long been asleep. Not a single light to be seen. They return home not knowing what to think.

Suddenly Irena jumps up and flings open the wardrobe closet. She had just had the same thought as Janina. Could they actually have done it—what her husband had mentioned now and then. . . ? But all of his clothes are there. He went just as he was, not taking anything along. Now Janina jumps up, realizing where she must look. Where is the razor? When they see the shaving equipment and toothbrushes are missing, they grasp what has happened. The two brothers have left Poland.

Until the early hours of the morning, the two women sit, straining to hear every sound outside. Maybe they will decide to turn back. . . . Janina still refuses to believe it. Her husband knew that she was expecting a child—how could he leave her alone? She knows too that her husband had recently been in very difficult straits with the political police and the Party, and God only knows how things would have ended, but at the moment she refuses to think of this. She only knows she is alone, forsaken and terribly unhappy. During the long hours of the night—a night that seems never to end—the women weep and pray: may God protect their men. . . .

The next morning—hard as it is—the two women have to pull themselves together. They must take certain steps. Janina discovers to her horror that her husband had carried her police registration document with him when he went—the only official document she had. She has to report the loss of the document and thereby explain how it happened. Thus the flight of the two brothers became known. Janina was not bothered by officials as her husband had only had a job clearing away rubble. But her brother-in-law had been working at the electro-technical

* She was interviewed by Radio Free Europe correspondents in Berlin. The names of persons and places have been changed to safeguard the informant and those who remained behind.

works in P. He was needed there and so the Militia was interested in tracing him and kept his wife under constant surveillance until Irena finally lost her nerve and demanded screaming that they leave her in peace.

There is no money at home. Irena has two children aged seven and nine. Janina has her four-year-old son and must begin to plan for the baby she expects in three months. They write to Janina's brother and sister but how are they to manage until some kind of help comes? It is doubtful whether the relatives will be able to help anyway, since they earn so little themselves and have to feed their own families. Irena has no relatives at all in Poland. Her mother and sister have been living abroad for some time: one in the United States and the other in Canada.

Soon one of the frequent packages arrives from America. Irena is in despair and Janina can do nothing to help. A duty of over 1000 *zloty* is demanded for the package. The women imagine what the parcel contains and how the contents would help them in their plight, but the duty is an astronomical figure. There is no chance to redeem the package. Therefore, Irena is forced to go to the post office and say that she wishes to reject the parcel.

Janina has two small rooms and a kitchen, well furnished. The furnishings were her dowry and at the same time her inheritance after the death of her parents. Each piece has been a friend for years and she hates to part with them. But she has no chance to think of this when her child is hungry. When she finds a buyer, she gives him almost everything for a mere 700 *zloty*. She moves out of her apartment and goes to live with Irena. The two women keep only the barest necessities and sell the rest. But after three months, all of the money is spent.

They receive no word from their husbands. The women are inclined to believe that they fell into the hands of the *Wojsko Ochrony Pogranicza* [the Frontier Guards]. Discouraged and depressed they see no other choice than to go back to their husbands' home town, B. Irena moves in with her husband's parents; Janina goes to live with a sister of her husband. It is Spring 1954.

About the middle of the month, they receive news which makes up for all the desperate months. Their husbands are free in the West. They had even spoken on the radio. The women breathe a sigh of relief, but their happiness is short-lived. B. is a small town. Everyone knows everyone else. The Militia in particular knows everything there is to know about everybody. Soon Janina notices the poisonous looks of the Militiamen when she goes shopping. Once she hears a Militiaman say: "American dame!" She pays no attention and acts as if the remark were not intended for her. However, one day when she passes the Militia station, she is called inside. "Where is your husband? Surely you know." No, she does not know. She lies and they know that she lies. "You have received two letters from him!" "No. . . ." The Commander smiles as if to say he knows better and Janina is unnerved because, as a matter of fact, she has already received a letter from her husband addressed to her parents-in-law. A few days later as she slowly walks down the street with her son, she is stopped again.

"Just a minute," one of the Militiamen says and takes her son by the hand. When she is about to make an angry protest, he silences her. "Now don't get excited, he'll be right back. The Commander only wants to talk to him."

She must wait outside. A few minutes later the boy comes out beaming. He feels very important and is sucking on a candy. "What did they want with you?" she asks him breathlessly.

"Nothing much," the boy answers, "they only asked where Papa is."

"And what did you say?"

"Papa is in America," the little boy reports, very pleased with himself. From then on the whole town knows that the two brothers are "in America."

At the end of the month, Janina is standing barefoot at the washtub, scrubbing clothes, when her father-in-law bursts into the room. "Janina, come quickly, the boys are speaking on the radio!" Just as she is, and as fast as her condition allows, she runs across the yard and hears the last few words of her husband's talk. She recognizes the voice in spite of the roar of the jamming station and, embracing the radio, she weeps for joy.

Her baby arrives the next month. But with this new joy, her worries double. Her brother-in-law, who took her into his home, works in a factory near the town. There he receives an almost ridiculous wage, not more than 380



"Where is your husband? Surely you know."

zloty. This is supposed to feed three adults and two children. Is it any wonder that the newborn is given water and flour rather than milk, and that the older child has to beg for every piece of dry bread? Janina herself has become very familiar with the pangs of hunger during these months. Immediately after her delivery she tries to get a job in the same factory where she had worked some years before and where her brother-in-law was now working. However, the personnel manager explains to her that the Party had forbidden him to give work to anyone who bears the name of the men who fled. He himself had nothing against taking her, but at the moment could do nothing for her. "Perhaps later, when the whole story has been somewhat forgotten," he says.

Thus she has only to wait and hope that when the new season began she, as a specialist for one of the important production machines, would be lucky and get a job in spite of the "scandal." But the season would not begin before Fall and the whole summer was before Janina—a summer during which she despaired and helplessly looked on as her children hungered.

Still, before Janina was successful in obtaining the job she so longed for, it happened that her father-in-law, an invalid, who had worked as a handyman for the town administration for nearly thirty years, was fired. The whole family could hardly believe it. The father was a quiet man and never argued with anybody. Of course, they knew he had often been jeered at in the office of the town council because of his sons' action, and now he was a victim because of it. Yet no one thought for a minute it would

take such a serious form. He was bitter because all of the premiums and allowances which the other two administration employees received were disregarded in his case, just as if he had not been there at all. When a wood allotment was given to all the employees, the father was again by-passed and he went to the Mayor and demanded his rights.

"Let Janek give it to you," the Mayor replied, referring to one of the sons. The father probably raised his voice at this provocation. The next day (it was the middle of summer) he received a written notice of his discharge. As of the first of the following month, he did not have to report to work—after thirty years of service.

After Irena had returned to the town with Janina, she lived with her husband's parents. She too could not find work in the town and was dismayed at having to accept the hospitality of the old people, who had so little themselves. Therefore, shortly after she had come to the town, she left it and moved to the city with her children. The rest of the family heard little of her activities, but the children, who came to visit their grandparents, said their mother sold everything to buy bread for them. Finally, the grandparents had the children move in with them because Irena seemed to have fallen into serious personal as well as financial difficulties.

At the end of August, the family suddenly received the news that Irena was dead. She had been murdered by a Party Secretary and Secret Service [UB-political police] informer with whom she had allegedly been on intimate terms. In September, Janina fled to the west.



Current Developments

"Politics cannot but have precedence over economics. To argue differently means forgetting the ABC of Marxism."

V. I. Lenin

Area

Warsaw Conference

A conference of Soviet bloc countries, officially entitled the Warsaw Conference of European States on Insuring Peace and Security in Europe, was held in Warsaw on May 11-14. Its stated purpose was to set up a formal Eastern military alliance (which had, in fact, already existed since Soviet occupation of the area) to counterbalance NATO, to provide a legal justification for the maintenance of Soviet troops in Romania and Hungary after the Austrian treaty, and particularly to protest German rearmament and inclusion in NATO. The conference was attended by top regime leaders from the USSR (Bulganin, Molotov, Zhukov, Konev), Albania (Shehu), Bulgaria (Chervenkov), Czechoslovakia (Siroky), East Germany (Grotewohl), Hungary (Hegedus), Poland (Cyrankiewicz), and Romania (Gheorghiu-Dej); General Peng Ten-Huei was present as observer for Communist China.

A treaty of "friendship, cooperation and mutual aid" was signed on the final day of the conference, embodying a military alliance among the signatories. The coordinated military organization arising out of this alliance is to be commanded by Soviet Marshal Konev.

Hungary

More Collectivization Pressure

A new Council of Ministers resolution, published in *Szabad Nep* (Budapest), May 12, embodies current regime determination to increase collectivization in agriculture. The resolution stated that because of various mistakes "the political, organizational and economic development of the kolkhozes has not been steady," and that grave shortcomings occurred because State agencies failed fully to carry out the resolutions aiming at developing agricultural production and strengthening the kolkhoz movement, but instead left the weak kolkhozes to manage themselves. It was stated that:

"In order to put an end to these difficulties the . . . resolution makes it the duty of all State agencies to give increased support to the agricultural collectives as well as the agricultural associations. The Council of Ministers makes



Title: Spring in the Village.

This cartoon was reduced from its very large original size (10" by 10") in which it appeared on the first page of the Bulgarian satirical magazine *Sturshel* (Sofia), March 25, 1955. It shows an old peasant with a little boy looking up at the sky where some bureaucrats, like birds coming back after the winter, are flying in with briefcases and suitcases. The old peasant says: "Do you see them, my child? They are coming back from their warm places."

the chairmen of the executive committees of the local councils responsible for the improvement in the management of the kolkhozes."

The resolution called for substantial increases in fodder crop yields. It stipulated that the common practice of permitting kolkhoz members to graze or grow fodder for their personal livestock on kolkhoz land in return for a percentage of the selling price must be abolished, and instead bonuses will be given for overfulfilling the kolkhoz Plan. It further stressed that steps must be taken to prevent the "unhealthy growth of household plots."

An added provision acts to increase the livestock herds or financial resources of the kolkhozes at the expense of new members:

"Draft animals and other livestock exceeding the quota permitted on household plots and not pooled at the time of joining must later be delivered to the common herd. Members who sold their livestock or equipment just before joining . . . must pay 20 to 35 percent of the amount gained into the indivisible kolkhoz fund within one year."

The resolution concludes by instructing "State authorities [to] take more resolute action against the class enemy's anti-kolkhoz activities; they must prevent the kulaks and other class-alien elements from infiltrating the kolkhozes."

In response to this resolution, a decree was issued by the Ministries of Agriculture, Farm Produce Collection, and Finance, published in *Szabad Nep*, May 13, providing that

kolkhoz members must transfer to the kolkhoz all personally-farmed land in excess of the legal one cadastral acre household plot. Kolkhoz farmers are permitted one private cow, any others must be sold. The kolkhoz has first option on purchasing this excess livestock, and if it does not choose to buy, the farmer must sell elsewhere and deliver 20 to 35 percent of the selling price to the kolkhoz.

Kolkhoz members who do not comply with the regulations limiting household plots will be given compulsory delivery quotas on all of the land farmed at the assessment rates for *independent* farmers, and these quotas will be *retroactive to 1954*.

National Assembly Meets

From April 18 to 22 the National Assembly met in Budapest to provide a forum for enunciating the policies of the post-Nagy period. It was attended by major government and Party leaders and, in deference to the presently accepted "collective leadership" theory, their names were carefully arranged alphabetically, from Antal Apro to Bela Veg, with Matyas Rakosi's name demurely placed in the middle. The major speech was delivered by the new Premier, Andras Hegedus, and was clearly firmer in tone and intent than the policies previous to Imre Nagy's ouster.

Hungary's Communist leadership was still seeking the middle way between "rightist" and "leftist" deviations, but its chief present concern was the former. As Hegedus phrased it (Radio Budapest, April 18, 1955): "The realization of the Party's aims . . . are hampered by those right-wing opportunist mistakes to which the March Resolution of the Central Committee of our Party drew attention. These appeared in almost every sphere of the national economy." The signs that had appeared were: neglect of heavy industry, relaxation of work discipline, insufficient production and productivity, and rising production costs and waste. Hegedus called for attention to all these problems by greater concern for heavy industry as an essential preliminary to improving living standards. He laid particular stress on the inadequate raw materials base and called for greater production of coal, iron, bauxite, electricity and water power, as well as an improved engineering industry, as the two keys for increasing heavy industrial capacity. In each of these cases he called for building or expanding specific constructions—the Sztalinvaros coking plant, the Rudabanya ore-purifying plant, the Tiszapalkonya power plant—to further their development.

Janos Csergo, Minister of Metallurgy and Machine Industry, also spoke (Radio Budapest, April 20) and said that "rightist" deviation tended to discredit the entire policy of Hungarian industrialization instead of putting an end to the disparities apparent in the national economy.

"The right-wing opportunists spoke of Sztalinvaros and the Stalin plant, those splendid examples of the creative power of our people, not as a source of augmentation of, but as an obstacle in the way of, the well-being of our people. They proclaimed that heavy industrial development was not a prerequisite and guarantee of augmenting consumer goods supplies, but a brake."

A *Szabad Nep* editorial under the title "The Liquidation of Rightist Anti-Party Policy" (April 18) attacked Nagy



Caption: "In many collective farms, vital economic questions are decided only by the administrative council." [From the decisions of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party.]

A man with a battle ax guards the road to the castle on the peak. The road sign reads: "To the administrative council." He says to the three peasants: "You take care of your own work. There's someone up there to think for you."

Sturshel (Sofia), February 11, 1955

as the fountainhead of these "rightist deviations" which were directed against the "basic pillars of Socialism": the leading role of the Party and the working class, the prime development of heavy industry, and the "Socialist transformation" of agriculture.

"Comrade Nagy strove to apply the brakes to Socialist construction—on Socialist industrialization and especially on the development of heavy industry. By exaggerating the resolution adopted in June 1953, which had correctly provided for transitory slowing-down of heavy industry's rate of development, Imre Nagy attempted to justify in theory and to enforce in practice the reduction of the development of heavy industry to a smaller scale. As chairman of the Council of Ministers he issued instructions last year to stop work on such investment projects . . . as the Sztalinvaros coking and ore processing plant, the Rudabanya metal processing plant and the Labatlan cement works. The development of these projects is decisive for the country's economic growth."

At the National Assembly discussions, Arpad Hazi, President of the State Control Center, spoke (Radio Budapest, April 21) of how these "rightist deviations" had infected the country and how "State and civil discipline deteriorated." Hegedus, too, recognizing this, called for:


" . . . a firmer stand against those who undermine work discipline, so that we can make a better use of the working time at our disposal. . . . Industrial and enlightened workers, that is, the overwhelming majority of our working class, rightly demand that the state should use sterner measures against those who undermine work discipline and that it should better organize industrial production."

Hegedus then turned to the field of agriculture, pointing out that during the past 18 months "attempts were made to relegate the collectives to the background, to reduce their importance," but that the Party and government continue to give their full support to the collective farm movement. Although individual farmers will be aided so that their latent reserves can be exploited, the limitations of individual farms are based on their inability fully to utilize mechanization and advanced agronomy: this is only possible on kolkhozes and sovkhozes, and therefore, "for the working peasantry, the road of the future is that of the collective."

An even broader hint that the regime plans to increase pressure for collectivization in the Fall was given by *Szabad Nep*, April 29, in an editorial entitled "Going Ahead on the Road to Make Agriculture Prosper":

"The Party and the Government will give every support [to kolkhozes]. This is shown above all by the fact that the greater part of this year's [agricultural] budget is to be spent on the development of collective farms. It is a happy thing that during the first months of the year the camp of collective farmers has increased by 15,000 new members. It is beyond any doubt that during the coming months, but especially at the end of harvesting and threshing, the number of new members will grow even more."

Hegedus also talked of "strengthening produce collection discipline, which became slack last year," of refusing to tol-



Upper part of shoe (marked "first quality") to sole: "Don't leave me, we have to stick together at least until we reach the retail shop."

Krokodil (Moscow), March 10, 1955

erate the "enrichment of kulaks and other speculators," and of compliance with the entire produce collection and taxation system "without fail" and "in all circumstances."

Janos Matolcsi, Secretary of the Central Committee, also attacked "kulak profiteering," and collection discipline and said (Radio Budapest, April 20) that:

"Our working peasants are now all the more in need of protection against kulak exploitation in view of the fact that in the past 18 months kulaks have grown increasingly impertinent. . . . This is why our small and medium peasants approve of the more energetic steps resorted to by our Party and State organs to repel the brazen kulaks. They approve of the implementation of the necessary policy of restraining kulaks which has proved effective in the past year."

"By restricting the kulaks, increasing the protection of small peasants and the large amount of aid to the individual farmers, the latter must realize that our Party and government in building Socialism rely firmly not only on the collectives but also on the small and poor peasants. They want to strengthen their ties with the medium peasantry. Our working peasants must, on the other hand, conscientiously comply with their civic duties of produce delivery and tax payment."

Force of Habit



Caption: "Dad, Grandma is waiting for you."
"Tell her to come and see me at the end of the month."

Krokodil (Moscow), January 10, 1955

Hegedus carefully pointed out Nagy's further "distortions" of the June 1953 resolutions. Nagy, he stated, wished to turn the PPF (Patriotic People's Front) into a political organization which would have predominance over the local councils, the Union of Working Youth, the trade unions and the Communist Party itself.

The new Premier took the occasion to warn that the "case of Comrade Nagy" should point a moral and teach a serious lesson:

"... We must intensify our vigilance . . . enforce our Party's organizational statutes . . . to watch over the ideological and organizational unity of the Party . . . and to protect the Party against every enemy. *Do not let us forget that the enemy's ideological influence has made its impact felt as far as the supreme leaders of the Party, as has happened in the present case.*" (Italics added.)

Hegedus then called for disciplined behavior, ideological firmness, and unceasing resistance to every deviation from Party policy and every wavering and hesitation in its implementation.

1955 Budget

At the April 19-20 session of the National Assembly Finance Minister Karoly Olt presented the 1955 budget and gave the final report on the 1954 budget, according to Radio Budapest of those dates. Discussing 1954 results, Olt stated that "implementation of the budget remained 8 to 9 percent below the estimates . . . primarily due to the

regrouping of the national economy, as a result of the modification decided upon during the year, and the failure to carry out certain investments." Total 1954 revenue was 45,286,639,000 *forints*, approximately 4.5 billion less than originally scheduled; total expenditure was 43,980,136,000 *forints*, approximately 4 billion less than scheduled.

The 1955 budget provides for total revenues of 47,011,362,000 *forints*, total expenditures of 45,502,017,000 *forints* (final revision, *Szabad Nep*, April 22). Of the total expenditures, 55.5 percent will go to the "development of the national economy and for other economic purposes," or approximately 5 percent less than in 1953 and 1954; 22.9 percent will go for "social welfare and cultural purposes"; 12.5 percent for military expenses; 4.6 percent "for the maintenance of law and order," i.e., the police; 4.5 percent for administrative expenses. These allocations are roughly the same as in the previous two years, although it is somewhat surprising that despite the considerable official agitation for a decrease in the administrative apparatus, administrative expenses for 1955 are to be .5 percent higher than in 1954, .7 percent higher than in 1953.

Of the expenditures for the national economy, 9 billion *forints* will be applied for new investments. Heavy industry will receive 35 percent of the investment, consumer goods industry 8.7 percent, agriculture 26.2 percent, transportation 8.9 percent, residential construction 9 percent, loans for residential construction 4.7 percent.

The budget reports also mentioned a "renovation fund" of 4.8 billion *forints* as a supplement to the above invest-

ments. The source of this sum is not clear; it seems probable that it is to come from the funds of enterprises and is to be applied for repair, maintenance and modernization, rather than for new investments proper.

The 9 billion *forints* allocated to investments is a decrease of 2 billion from 1954, of 7 billion from 1953. The percentage going to heavy industry is 5 percent more of the total than that originally planned for 1954 (although over a billion *forints* less), but no information is available on how it compares with the revised 1954 investment figure. The 1955 investment in heavy industry is less than half of that in 1953, and 6 percent less of the total investment sum.

Despite the current regime propaganda stressing heavy industry, there is as yet no marked upsurge in investments allocated to this sector. In addition, a number of statements have stressed the contribution to be made by heavy industry toward consumer goods and production of agricultural machinery rather than capital goods proper. Among these was the statement by Radio Budapest, April 28, that in 1955 the metallurgy and machine industry will produce 13 percent more agricultural machinery, 87 percent more consumer goods than in 1954. In discussing the relative weight of investments and production in heavy and consumer goods industries, Lajos Acs, Politburo member and Secretary of the Party Central Committee, said to the National Assembly on April 19:

"Consequently, investments will serve mainly to develop the most essential branches of industry: metallurgy, coal mining, the non-ferrous metals and chemical industries, and the engineering and electric power industries. The overwhelmingly large part of investments, therefore, will go to heavy industry. In spite of this, in order to restore correct proportions to the people's economy, production in the heavy industries will this year continue to develop at a slower pace than will the light and food industries. However, the comparatively slower degree of development in heavy industry as compared with the industries producing consumer goods cannot remain a lasting feature in our people's economy. In the first few years of the Second Five Year Plan we shall have to assert, by shaping the correct proportions of the people's economy, the principle that

the heavy industries must take precedence over the other branches of the people's economy, and that they must undergo the most rapid development within our resources and possibilities. Only in this way shall we be able to ensure a sound development of our people's economy, the development of agriculture and the light and food industries, the increasing strength of national defense, and the constant raising of the people's well-being and culture." (Italics added.)

Agriculture

It is agriculture that is to receive the notable increase in investments over pre-New Course years. The 1955 agricultural investments have almost twice as large a share in the budget as in 1953, and are a slightly larger percentage than last year. A number of speakers in the National Assembly budget discussion stressed the degree to which agriculture has lagged behind industry. Acs stated that, "Our Party and government unalterably consider it their primary task to continue the fight for the liquidation of the backwardness of agriculture." Acs also stressed the importance of the independent peasants, and stated that they would be guaranteed "... all those facilities and benefits which are designed to make their work easier and increase their desire for production and income." He repeated the familiar 1955 Plan figures on production increases: agriculture, 7.3 percent; industry 5.7 percent.

Szabad Nep, April 29, stressed the agricultural aspect of heavy industry:

In examining the relationship of the development of heavy industry to the development of agriculture, we must first of all consider the help given by Socialist industry, above all by heavy industry, to agriculture in the past and increasingly in the future. Those right-wing opportunists who wanted to make heavy industry decline, defrauded the working peasantry and wanted to deprive the village population of the mechanization which would make their work easier and more profitable."

Although Olt also emphasized the importance of the independent peasants, he stated that collectivization was to increase and kolkhozes were to improve:

"The possessions belonging to kolkhozes have to be protected very strictly. Our Party is counting on an increase in the number of kolkhozes this year. For the carrying out of the resolutions concerning the further development of agricultural production our Party and our government are launching a new campaign. Concerning the kolkhoz movement they have set as their aim for this year that most of the kolkhozes in every county reach that level which has already been reached by the majority of kolkhozes in that county."

Olt stated that a 5.5 percent increase in State store and retail cooperatives turnover is also planned for this year. It is, he said, "The development of the consumer goods industry and the increase of agricultural production" which make this possible.

The residential construction investment percentage is somewhat higher than in 1953, somewhat lower than the original *unfulfilled* percentage planned for 1954.

A number of speakers reiterated the importance of increasing productivity and reducing costs in industry. Olt



Caption: Engineer passing by—"Well, fellows, anything wrong with the machines?"

"Nothing. We're just waiting. By the time we get to be the laziest shop in the plant a Socialist Competition (to see who can be laziest) will be announced and the plant will give us 20,000 *koruny*."

Mlada Fronta (Prague), February 25, 1955

stated that the budget revenue estimates are based on the expectation that production costs in industry will be reduced 3 percent in 1955. He particularly complained about the productivity record in coal mining last year, which fell 8.4 percent below 1953.

Independent Artisans

A new decree establishes certain restrictions on independent artisans and handicraftsmen, according to *Szabad Nep*, April 29. It stipulates that, "in the future trade licenses will be issued only in localities where it is necessary to meet the population's needs," and lists a number of trades for which no licenses will be issued except by special permission of the Minister concerned. There are 33 of these trades out of a total of 91; among them are iron and metal working, electrical work and construction. Licenses will not be issued to craftsmen without a master's certificate of proficiency, except in villages of less than 3,000 population.

At fairs and in public market places the artisan may sell only products made in his own shop. To what extent he may sell artifacts he buys already made is to be determined for each trade by the Minister concerned.

"Trade licenses will be withdrawn from artisans who have been . . . sentenced for crimes against the People's Republic or the people's economy, or who have misled the authorities in order to obtain a trade license, or who fail to pursue their trade to the satisfaction of the population, or who strive to make impermissible profits, . . . or repeatedly and knowingly violate the rules pertaining to the practice of their trade. . . ."

The decree represents the first check to the progressive expansion of private artisans in the economy in the past two years. By the middle of 1953 the number of artisans (including employees) had dropped from a prewar figure of 404,681 to 44,000. Under New Course encouragement this figure was raised to 100,000 by the beginning of this year. The new decree probably indicates that there will be no cut-back in this number, but that no significant increase will be permitted. The present number of private artisans, together with about an equal number of handicraftsmen in State cooperatives, are probably able to maintain the minimal level of consumer services now deemed necessary by the regime.

There has also been a new decree on income taxes for private artisans, according to Radio Budapest, May 10. This stipulates that the private artisan with employees must pay, in addition to the general income tax, 400 *forints* per month for the first employee, 800 for the second, and 1,000 for every additional employee. No information is available on previous taxation rates, but there are reports that the new decree imposes a sizable increase.

Trials

Following the current regime emphasis on combating "rightist deviation," particularly in agriculture, there has been a very notable increase in the number of reported trials of "kulaks" and others accused of opposing collec-

The Bungling Artisan



Caption: "It isn't easy, sir, particularly since I'm really a cabinet maker."

Ludas Matyi (Budapest), March 17, 1955

tivization and violating agricultural regulations. The major such trial was also given wider political implications, with accusations of counter-revolution and espionage "under the sponsorship of the United States." In this trial, announced by Radio Budapest, April 12, eleven persons, led by Jozsef Fiala, and including 5 "kulaks," a former landowner and a priest, were accused of organizing "a counter-revolutionary gang to overthrow the Hungarian People's Republic and to restore capitalism and the reign of the feudal landowners." In addition to collecting arms and producing "fascist leaflets," the group was accused of "attempting to prevent the Socialist transformation of agriculture and inciting working peasants to disrupt the collectives." To this end, "they set fire to the fodder stocks of the *Uj Elet* collective of Mezonyarad, thereby causing serious damage."

Death sentences were imposed on Fiala and four others. "The sentences have been carried out." The rest of the defendants received prison terms of nine to fourteen years.

By linking opposition to collectivization with counter-revolution and American-inspired espionage, and by the severity of the sentences, the regime apparently intended to frighten peasants who oppose the increasing collectivization pressures, and to establish the seriousness of its intentions to continue to collectivize.

In addition to this major trial, the press reported a great many sentences, many of them remarkably heavy, meted out to minor peasant offenders. In the major Budapest newspapers alone, there were over 100 such reports in the months of March and April; in the same period last year these newspapers carried no such items. Among the reports were: five peasants given sentences of three months to two and a half years for illegal slaughtering, *Magyar Nemzet*, April 13; one peasant sentenced to five years and two

others to two years for black market operations in livestock, *Magyar Nemzet*, April 26; a peasant arrested because he denied possession of five pigs he had, and failed to deliver his quota of fattened pigs, Radio Budapest, April 25. The provincial newspapers, too, carried many such reports: three peasants in Somberek sentenced to one and a half, three and three and a half years for blackmarket operations in livestock, *Dunantuli Naplo* (Pecs), March 17; a woman sentenced to two and a half years for illegal slaughtering and a man to nine years for subversive activities, including opposition to collectives and spreading news of Western radio broadcasts, *Neplap* (Debrecen), March 19.

Decree on Pork

Another decree has been issued establishing further controls on hog breeding, in line with regime attempts to curb the flourishing black market on pork and increase deliveries (see NBIC, April, p. 51). The decree provides for greater penalties to peasants who fail to comply with hog delivery quotas, and stipulates that hog farmers must commence fattening sufficient livestock to comply with delivery obligations four months before the delivery date. Farmers who fail to do so will have their obligations made due immediately. Peasants who "regularly fail to fulfill their delivery obligations" and have no hogs or other farm produce when deliveries are due, must surrender "movables equivalent in value to the delivery arrears." If the peasant fails to fulfill deliveries within five days of the sequestration, the confiscated movables will be sold (*Nepszava* [Budapest], April 24).

Labor Dislocations

A decree, reported in *Szabad Nep*, April 14, provides further benefits for those dismissed from State administration or industrial enterprises in the course of "rationalization." After discharge all such employees will receive one month's salary or a sum equal to that earned during one month's employment in addition to regular severance payments.

Despite this indication that the regime intends to continue mass dismissals of "excess employees," particularly administrative functionaries, there are also indications that labor shortages exist in some industrial sectors. *Nepszava*, April 28, reported that there were more than 30,000 vacancies registered at the State employment agencies throughout the country. "Not only manual laborers are wanted, but administrative employees are needed as well," it was stated. It is probable that these vacancies, particularly the administrative ones, are largely concentrated in mining and construction, where there is a serious shortage of personnel due to the high rate of labor turnover.

Poland

Price Reduction

By an April 22 decision of the Party Central Committee and the Council of Ministers, the retail prices of a number of foodstuffs and manufactured goods and some services were reduced, according to Radio Warsaw, April 23. The announcement stated that the price reduction "will enable the population to save some 4 billion *zloty* annually and



A shepherd holds out the telephone to his sheep. "Hey, now, tell the Doctor how you feel!" A quotation from a provincial newspaper above the cartoon reads: "The veterinarians of Chervenbreg village in Stanko Dimitrov county now examine animals by telephone."

Sturshel (Sofia), March 11, 1955

will undoubtedly become a stimulus in the further full implementation of the tasks of developing industrial and agricultural production and of effecting the planned reduction of production costs."

This is the third general price reduction under the Communists; the previous two were on November 15, 1953 and May 1, 1954. In contrast to these previous reductions, the present one includes very few staple foodstuffs; no meats, major cereals or sweets are included. The range of industrial products in the present reduction is about the same as in the previous ones, though this is the first price reduction for coal. The 4 billion *zloty* saving is smaller than those claimed for the two previous reductions, which were 5.4 billion *zloty* and 6 billion *zloty* respectively. There is reason to believe that these announced total savings figures are exaggerated; the 1954 Plan fulfillment report stated that the combined value of the 1953 and 1954 reductions was 8 billion *zloty*.

Among the edibles included in the reduction are (average percentage reduction given): suet, 2.9; lard, 2.5; rape, soya, peanut and olive oils (all imported), 3.3-10; rice (all imported), 20; marmalades and jams, 12.5-15; fruit wines, 6. Some dairy product prices are reduced for the seasons of full supply only: choice butter, 4; milk, 8; cream, 7. A variety of woolen fabrics was reduced from 6 to 25 percent, cotton fabrics from 10 to 15 percent, silk fabrics 10 to 20 percent, artificial fabrics (dermaleather), 35 percent. Almost all textile products were included in the reduction.

Hard coal and coke was reduced 10 percent. Some brands of cigarettes were reduced 4.75 to 6.25 percent. Leather (pigskin) shoes were reduced 15-18 percent, fabric and rubber shoes 10 percent, luxury footwear 7 percent. Cosmetics for female use were reduced 10 to 30 percent. Certain household goods, sportswear, luggage and dress accessories were reduced, as were some agricultural tools

and utensils. Certain services, such as furniture, watch and toy repairing, bookbinding and upholstering, were reduced 8 to 20 percent.

Discussing the reductions, *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), April 23, stated:

"What made it possible for us to introduce this new price reduction? It was made possible by the success of the 1954 economic Plan. The industrial production Plan was fulfilled by 102 percent. The increase in production was 11 percent. . . . Does the price reduction cover all industrial goods? No. We are still unable to afford it. . . . One cannot reduce prices on articles which are produced in insufficient quantities or which are expensive to produce . . . the present price reduction could have been even more extensive if we had fully carried out the task of decreasing our production costs in 1954. . . . One cannot produce dearly and sell cheaply. . . . Last year's deficits, due to our failure to decrease production costs, amounted to 4 billion *zloty*. . . . During the current year we should save . . . 7.5 billion *zloty*. This is the task which is vital to all of us.

" . . . The present price reduction covers certain agricultural articles, among them fats, rice, processed fruit, etc. And what about bread, meat, sausages, sugar? Why is it that the prices on these articles have not been changed? We all know that in agriculture, despite considerable State aid, a basic improvement did not take place last year, that we still have to import considerable quantities of grain, and that from time to time we encounter difficulties in the planned purchase of livestock. The sugar beet production was also low. The present agricultural production is definitely insufficient for our needs. . . . Our country needs more grain, meat, fats and other agricultural products. Our agriculture can fulfill this task. . . . Let us not think, however, that the problem is so simple. To raise grain production and extend livestock breeding requires daily, penetrating and sincere work by Party organizations and national councils. It requires great efforts on the part of individual peasants and collective farms, agricultural workers, agrotechnicians and scientists. Only by increasing the volume of agricultural products shall we create the conditions for future price reductions on these products."

Personnel Changes

Roman Zambrowski has been appointed Minister of State Control, according to Radio Warsaw, April 17. He replaces Franciszek Jozwiak-Witold, who has been made a Vice Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Zambrowski, a member of the Politburo since its inception, was formerly head of the Special Commission for Combating Economic Abuses and Sabotage, dissolved in December, 1954.

Radio Warsaw, April 9, announced that Jan Izydorczyk has been released from his post as head of the Office for Religious Affairs "in connection with his transfer to other work." Marian Zygmanski has been named to succeed him.

Czechoslovakia

Slovak Party Congress

A Congress of the Communist Party of Slovakia was held in Bratislava on April 22-24. Major speakers were Karel Bacilek (Radio Prague, April 23), First Secretary of the



Caption: "We are not going to propose any nomination committee. Nor can we suggest the names of candidates for the shop committee. . . ."

"But we still can propose the name of our meeting's chairman."

"Yes, thank God, there is still one thing we can do."

The sign on the wall reads: "If you want to have a good shop committee, take an active part in it."

Szpilki (Warsaw), March 6, 1955

Slovak section of the Party and Politburo member of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, and Premier Viliam Siroky (Radio Prague, April 25).

Both speeches stressed advances in Slovak industrialization made under Communism, but warned of dangerous lags in agricultural production. Bacilek stated that:

"Modern life in Slovakia is developing speedily. Industrial production has risen 467 percent compared with 1937. Within this industrial production there has been a very significant rise of heavy industry, the base of every development of national economy. Compared to 1937, heavy industry in Slovakia has grown 769 percent. . . . Compared with the development of our industry, on the whole our agriculture has lagged. This has caused a disproportion between agricultural and industrial production. Whereas our industrial production . . . increased . . . to 467 percent compared with the prewar level, in the same period our agricultural production increased only 16 percent—vegetable production 13 percent and animal production 22 percent."

Bacilek stated that, at a February 1 meeting of the CPCS Central Committee, "Comrade Siroky gave a thorough analysis of the political shortcomings in the attitude toward the agricultural question," pillorying the following "errors":

"In the practical implementations of the Party directives, the importance of the alliance between the working class and the small and medium farmers for building Socialism and for considerably increasing agricultural production continues to be underestimated. This has its ideological and political roots in Social Democracy."

"The alliance of the workers with all small and medium peasants has been equated with the alliance of the working class with the collective farmers [alone]; this has its roots in left-wing sectarianism."

In other words, the regime is again maintaining the necessity for the middle course in agriculture against pressures of deviation both to the "left" and "right." Deviation of the "left" consists of underestimating the importance for production of the independent peasants, and placing strong pressures for collectivization upon them. That to the right aims at improving the well-being of the peasants without increasing their production for the benefit of the urban workers. The middle course of the regime envisages pressures sufficient to increase production but not so great as to arouse production-lessening resistance among the peasants.

Siroky spoke to much the same point. He said:

"We must make sure that we use all possibilities for increased productivity. . . . This question is particularly urgent in agriculture. . . . The need for a proportional development of the national economy according to plan demands that its individual branches, and particularly industry and agriculture, should be a planned organic unit. . . . If we stress that the basis of the development of all branches of the national economy is the priority of heavy industry, the production of the means of production, this does not and cannot mean that we can slacken in our care for the growth of agricultural production. This would be a grave error and a mechanical understanding of the economic laws."

On the subject of collectivization, Siroky again maintained the middle-road position of encouraging production by independent peasants, while advocating increasing collectivization: "We must considerably increase our whole agricultural production and, at the same time, we must continue with the building of agricultural collectives." He called for "full-scale aid" to be given to "all farmers, including small and medium independent farmers." He stressed that the means for increasing collectivization must be persuasion and "political work" among independent farmers, and the improvement of the kolkhozes to make them more attractive.

Siroky listed four major faults in kolkhoz management. These are: poor organization, violation of the "principles of just rewards," and pilfering of collective property; the excessive size of private plots of kolkhoz members and the

excessive number of privately owned livestock maintained on these plots; penetration of the kolkhozes by "kulaks"; the lack of adequate leadership on many collectives.

Both speakers castigated trends toward Slovak separatism. Siroky stated that ". . . we are still frequently faced with dangerous expressions of bourgeois nationalism in the shape of populist separatism, originally deliberately implanted and maintained in Slovakia by the church hierarchy."

Slovak Party Personnel Changes

On the last day of the Slovak Party Congress, it elected a new Central Committee of 60 members, one fewer than the previous Committee, according to *Pravda* (Bratislava), April 24. Thirty-four full members and 7 candidate members of the previous CC were re-elected as full members; 19 new men were elected. Among the 24 living members of the previous CC not elected, four are members of the CC of the "parent" Czechoslovak Party. This seems to be a reflection of a tendency to reduce the number of men holding positions in both the Slovak and the national Party.

The new CC in turn elected four new CC Secretaries, and a nine-man Bureau (corresponding to the Politburo of the CPCS). Three of the former Bureau members were not re-elected, including Premier Vilam Siroky, acting Central Trade Union Council Chairman Frantisek Zupka and former Slovak Agriculture Commissioner Marek Culen, the first two of whom are also CC members of the Czechoslovak Party. Four new Bureau members were elected.

The new Secretariat is headed by First Secretary Karol Bacilek. No new Party Control Commission was elected this year.

The Congress also elected a Central Auditing Commission. No such election was reported at the previous Congress in 1953.

Amnesty

As part of the celebration of the "tenth anniversary of the liberation of our nation by the glorious Soviet Army," a decree of amnesty was promulgated on May 9, according

Bureaucrat's



He collected the tools.

He cut down the crops.

He threshed.

to Radio Prague of that date. The last previous amnesty was in April 1953, after the death of Klement Gottwald; the present one is somewhat more liberal.

Those serving sentences for political offenses—high treason, espionage, sabotage—are not affected by the amnesty, nor are murderers and those sentenced to more than five years imprisonment for looting or damaging “national property.” In other categories, all “punishments of corrective nature” (generally reductions in work and wage status without imprisonment) are remitted. Prison sentences not exceeding two years, or three years in the case of “young offenders,” are remitted; the terms were one and two years in the previous amnesty. Prison sentences not exceeding three years of pregnant women or women who have a child not older than 14 in their care were remitted; the age of the child was 10 in the previous amnesty.

For longer sentences, one third, or at least two years (three years in the case of “young persons”), was remitted. The whole sentence is remitted if the offender is over 60 (55 if a woman), or is suffering from a “severe, incurable disease.” Some terms of life imprisonment were commuted to 20 years.

A clause not in the previous amnesty provides for remission of penalties “legally imposed in respect of the criminal act of fleeing the country . . . on persons who left the territory of the Republic without permission under the influence of hostile propaganda, if they return to the Republic within six months of the day of this decision.” No mention is made of an amnesty for political “crimes” committed by such persons before their flight.

New Trade Union Statutes

The Central Trade Union Council has drafted new Statutes for the Trade Union Organization, to be approved by the Third General Trade Union Congress on May 19, according to Radio Prague, April 15. The major change in the new Statutes is to bring the organization of Czechoslovak unions into conformity with those in the other Satellites, and to enable the Party-dominated unions to exercise

increased pressure for higher production.

Previously, Czechoslovak trade union members, unlike those in other Satellite union organizations, belonged directly to the General Trade Union Organization, although there was also a parallel structure of industrial unions. Now this parallelism is abolished, and members will belong to an industrial union only, which in turn is part of the General Trade Union Organization. The industrial unions are to be coordinated with the relevant government ministry.

Discussing the proposed changes, Jaroslav Kolar, Secretary of the Central Trade Union Council, stated that:

“The proposed new rules . . . aim at improving and strengthening the activity of the individual trade union organizations, at supporting . . . each member and official in the fulfillment of daily trade union tasks. The first and foremost task of the trade union organizations is to provide for the development of Socialist competitions, for carrying out all the provisions of the collective contracts, for the steady day-by-day fulfillment of production tasks, for the steady increase of labor productivity, and the correct application of the Socialist principle of reward according to work accomplished. Trade union organizations should encourage their members and all of the working people to carry out fully the economic tasks set them, as the living standard of the people depends on it. Therefore, when the trade union organizations actively see to the development of the economy, they are, at the same time, fulfilling their basic task—insuring the maximum possible satisfaction of the material and cultural needs of the working people.” (Radio Prague, April 15.)

The new Statutes make Party control of the unions explicit: “The Trade Union Organization works under the leadership of the Communist Party, the leading power of our new society.” The chief Communist theoretician of the trade unions, Viliam Kun, discussed the need for increased “discipline” among the workers:

“In previous social orders, workers were forced to produce as much as possible under the threat of the master’s whip, and their only choice was between the knout of the bailiff and the fate of the unemployed. Today, workers are no longer endangered by such a whip. However, production, which has achieved enormous development, and

Harvest



He stacked it.

In vain, he looked for the grain.

He handed out the weeds [circulars].

Dikobraz (Prague), July 22, 1954

the great division of labor, both demand an even greater working discipline than ever before. It is the task of the trade union to help create this discipline in every sector of work, in the soul of every worker and employee." (*Prace* [Prague], April 22.)

Romania

Price Reduction

On April 23, a decree reduced retail prices on a number of industrial products and foodstuffs, according to Radio Bucharest of that date. It is the first such general reduction since 1950. The announcement stated that the decrease was made possible by, among other things, the overfulfillment of the production Plan for the first quarter of 1955, the stimulus given to industrial and agricultural production by the abolition of rationing in December and the development of the "Socialist sector" of agriculture.

The only staple foods affected by the decree were all forms of pasta—spaghetti, macaroni, etc.—which were reduced 22 percent in price. The other food items involved were canned goods or luxuries. E.g. (figures denote average percentage reductions): canned pork, poultry, big horned cattle meat and game, 15; smoked fish, herring, 20; salted fish, 25; peppers stuffed or in oil, 15; fruit syrups, 15.

A wide range of textiles and clothing was included: men's woolen suits and coats, 6 to 30; women's jackets and light coats, 4 to 30; light footwear, and footwear with linen cloth uppers, 7 to 12; hand-made footwear, 5, etc.

A variety of household goods, including wooden furniture, and metal kitchenware and furniture was reduced 7 to 10 percent. School supplies for children were reduced 10 to 15 percent, and many toys 18 percent. Soap was reduced approximately 10 percent.

Selling prices at public catering units, it was stated, will be recalculated in a manner corresponding to the new reduced prices." Admission prices to films were reduced an average of 12 percent, to "artistic performances" an average of 10 percent.

In most of these cases prices are probably above the non-rationed State prices which prevailed before the December abolition of rationing, and far above the low rationed prices. The general rise in price level in December was partially compensated for by a system of cash payments from the government, and the level is now further rolled back for those items included in the decree. As elsewhere in the area, the price reduction was much more general for manufactured goods than for foodstuffs, although Romania is the only country in the area to have a recent reduction for a staple food, pasta products.

Farm Policy

In celebrating the birth of Lenin, Premier Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej wrote an article for the Cominform journal, *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy!*, which was also broadcast over the Romanian Home Service on April 16, 1955. Like recent speeches in Hungary, the article indicated a stiffening of Communist policy in the countryside, and reiterated the line that heavy industry and

its development was the focal point, particularly the development of the machine-building industry. More important, Dej called for the continued "Socialist transformation" of the countryside, for "strengthening the Socialist sector of agriculture," and the "worker-peasant alliance." Dej gave the following brief background to the present problems facing the regime:

"An important role in strengthening the alliance between the working class and the working peasantry was played by the decisions adopted during the past two years by the Party and government to liquidate the lagging of agriculture and to insure a new upsurge in agricultural production. The analysis of the economic policy . . . made by the Central Committee . . . at a plenary session in August brought to light certain disproportions created in our economy, particularly the lagging of agriculture behind the development of industry, behind the growth of population in general, and of urban population in particular, and behind the needs of the working people in towns and villages.

"Our Party and government, basing themselves on the requirements of the law of proportioned development of the national economy, have reduced the total volume of investments which were in excess of the provisions of the Five Year Plan. They increased investments allocated to lagging branches—agriculture and industry producing mass consumer goods. At the same time as they decided to raise the lagging branches in the national economy, the plenary session of the Central Committee stressed again that heavy industry constitutes the foundation for the development of the entire economy and the building of Socialism."

Dej promised that attention would continue to be paid to "liquidating the lagging of agriculture and [to] the task of increasing marketable agricultural production." He called for an increase of productivity, both in per hectare yield and in animal husbandry, and for a total annual grain harvest of 10 million tons.

The Kulak

Dej repeated the Leninist slogan—"Base yourself on the poor farmer, create a close alliance with the medium farmer, and do not for a moment stop the fight against the kulak"—and called for a "determined fight . . . against any modification of the Party policy as it is expressed in this slogan." At the same time, he called for fighting any tendencies to "replace the policy of retrenchment of kulaks by a policy of eradicating kulakism, which does not suit the present phase of Socialist building." (*Italics added.*) Dej advised more vigilance by Party organs and people's councils in the countryside for carrying out "political isolation of the kulak" and strengthening the worker-peasant alliance.

While calling for more collective farms and joint tilling associations, Dej reminded his audience that "the largest part of marketable agriculture production is supplied by individual peasants, [and] our Party is applying, *without deviation*, the line of helping the individual peasantry with an eye toward raising the productivity of the individual farms, increasing production, and raising their standard of living." (*Italics added.*)

Rules of Etiquette, or How We Should Not Behave



"What are you looking at, old man? Ladies have priority."



On a Budapest Street—Be brave, old lady!

Ludas Matyi (Budapest), October 7, 1954

It was apparent from the Dej article and a *Scinteia* (Bucharest) article of April 15, as well as other broadcasts and comment, that the Romanian regime was hardening its policy in the rural sector. There was still the stress on free consent and persuasion in collectivization, on utilizing to the full the resources of individual farmers, on proportional development of heavy and light industry and agriculture, but the tone had changed to a "post-Nagy" tenor. Perhaps Dej went to the heart of the Communists' doctrinal dilemma when he pointed up the Leninist thesis that "the building of Socialism cannot in the long run be based on two differing foundations—on Socialist industry and on agriculture based on small production." Whether or not this is economically true, it is obvious that the Communists will insist, for political reasons, on its being the Party line.

First Quarter Plan Report

The report on the first quarter Plan results, Radio Bucharest, April 22, claimed that the overall production Plan for industry was fulfilled by 106.2 percent. It was stated that all Ministries overfulfilled their Plan, from light industry at 101.1 percent to the electrical and electro-technical industries at 110.4 percent.

The production of most items was in excess of that planned, although the Plan was not fulfilled for cotton fabrics, leather footwear, meat, fish and milk. The report gave a long list of enterprises which have fulfilled their Five Year Plan and are now working "in the account of 1956."

The report also stated that a Martin steel furnace, a 20,000 kilowatt electric generator, the Bucharest-Ploesti liquid gas pipeline and part of the Bucharest natural gas

bottling plant had been put into operation. (The sale of food products by State stores increased 10 percent, according to Radio Bucharest, April 20.)

It was stated that 2,000 agricultural centers to advise peasants were established, "the majority of them endowed with the necessary technical personnel." The number of tractors of the Agricultural and Forestry Ministry was increased by 227 (15 h.p. conventional units), by 549 self-propelled combines, "and other farm machines and equipment," and 2,000 engineers and specialists were sent to rural areas to repair agricultural machinery. 65,000 families of workers and employees were assigned garden plots totalling 1,950 hectares, an increase in plots assigned of 50 percent over 1954. "Publicly owned" livestock in collective farms were said to have increased over the same period in 1954 by 7.2 percent for bulls, 31.6 percent for sheep and 26.6 percent for hogs. According to the report, the number of kolkhozes and simple peasant associations is now 5,150, an increase of approximately 150 during the period. No information was given on the proportion of the two types in this increase.

Bulgaria

Price Reduction

A retail price reduction for a large number of manufactured goods and foodstuffs was announced by Radio Sofia, April 24, the fifth since 1952, the last reduction having been in March 1954.

Among the foodstuffs included, the following were reduced the given percentages: rice, 10; beans, 10; lard, 15; sheep's milk and butter, 10; mutton, 10; fat pork, 15; lean pork, 10; meat products, 9 to 17; canned meat, 10; canned fish, 15; fruits, 27 to 33; tea, 40; coffee, 11; sweets, 7 to

10; spices, 10 to 29. Beans are a semi-staple. Rice, however, is not one of the most common foods, and the most common meat, lamb, was not included in the reduction. All listed fruits were imported luxuries. In discussing the reduction, *Otechestven Front* (Sofia), April 27, stated:

"This year prices on pork and lard have been reduced. But the prices on other kinds of meat, of milk and dairy products, have not been reduced, because our stockbreeding lags behind in the development of our national economy. Insufficient production is the reason for keeping up the prices of such basic items as bread and flour. The price of bread cannot be reduced because the plan for the average grain yields, as well as the plan for compulsory State deliveries, were not fulfilled last year, and now we have to supply part of our needs in bread and bread products from the State reserves."

A wide range of textiles was included, among them cotton underwear fabric, 15; cotton clothing fabrics, 10 to 20; "woolen-type fabrics made of 100 percent cotton," 28; various types of woolens, 10 to 25; silks, 4 to 45; knitted goods, 10 to 25; hosiery, 10 to 30; men's shoes, 20 to 30; women's 8 to 30; men's shirts, 10; overcoats, 12; men's suits, 10; women's dresses, 10; women's overcoats, 12.

A number of other items were also included, such as laundry soap, 7 to 32; face soap, 8; agricultural implements, 12 to 17; brooms, 20; irons, 10; other household goods, 7 to 30; toys, 15 to 25.

The prices of food in restaurants, bars and enterprise messes are to be reduced in correspondence with the listed food price reductions. Books, graphic publications and music scores published after January 1, 1950 are to be reduced 15 to 20 percent.

The announcement stated that the reduction "will result in a saving of more than 650 million leva per year" for the consumer, approximately the same total savings claimed for the last price reduction.

First Quarter Plan Results

Results of the Plan for the first quarter of the year were released in *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia), April 28. It was stated that the total production plan was fulfilled by 106 percent, and that all Ministries overfulfilled their plans. No figures on increase of total production or production of the most important goods over the same period last year were announced, however, as has heretofore been the practice. There were some complaints that, despite the general overfulfillment, certain enterprises are lagging in production and, particularly, are permitting waste of raw materials and increases of the workers' wage fund, and are failing to raise productivity and lower costs.

In agriculture, it was stated that spring field work began earlier than last year, and "as a result, by March 31 sowing was carried out in an area three times larger than in 1954 for the same period." Nevertheless, it was stated, "damp and cool weather delayed the sowing tempo." The number of livestock in State farms and kolkhozes was alleged to be larger on April 1 this year than last. An expansion of the report on Radio Sofia, April 27, gave percentage increases; these were much higher for State farms than for kolkhozes. The Plan report added that "the tempo with which the



"You know what, Comrade Director, one of these days, we'll get up a bit earlier, and make a check on whether all employees arrive at work on time."

The clock in the background reads 9:25. Work begins at 8:00. *Dikobraz* (Prague), January 20, 1955

number of livestock on kolkhozes is growing is still unsatisfactory." It was claimed, however, that kolkhoz milk productivity increased 28.8 percent over the same period last year.

Claims for very large increases in retail sales were made. Sales of meat were said to have gone up 31.5 percent, of milk 40.7 percent, of cotton textiles 20.3 percent, of footwear 37.1 percent.

It was also stated that the capital investment plan was fulfilled only 85.5 percent. Labor productivity in "republican industry" allegedly overfulfilled the plan by 4.1 percent.

Front Absorbs Reading Rooms

The National Reading Room Union has been absorbed by the Fatherland Front, the Party-controlled union of mass organizations, according to *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia), April 29. The National Reading Room Union is an association of about ten thousand reading rooms, largely in villages. They are supplied with Communist books and periodicals, and serve as indoctrination centers in the countryside. The merger probably reflects regime determination to maintain Party control over the Reading Room Union to prevent it from becoming a center of anti-regime feeling in the countryside, as happened, for example, with the Farmers' Circles in Hungary.

Premier Vulko Chervenkov, speaking at the meeting that arranged the merger, stated that:

"... that which previously was done by the National Reading Room Union can and must be taken over by the Fatherland Front . . . The work for the further development of the reading rooms will be intensified. The reading rooms will not be merged. Now they will have a greater opportunity than in the past to develop as self-governing cultural-educational Fatherland Front organizations. By doing this [the Party] aims at intensifying the work of the reading rooms and creating better conditions so that they can develop still further as our self-governing cultural-educational organization."

Recent and Related

Satellite Generals: A Study of Military Elites in the Soviet Sphere, by Ithiel de Sola Pool (*Stanford: \$1.75*). The role of the Satellite armies in the Soviet military scheme and the elements which make up their leadership, are examined in this Hoover Institute study. The process by which the Satellite armies were taken over by the Communists and the resultant changes in the kinds of men wielding military power are described. Detailed biographical data on a representative group of generals, during 1951-52, in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, Hungary and China, form the basis for the study. The present information seems to indicate that the Soviet intention is not to absorb the Satellite armed forces into the Russian army, but to develop the Satellite armies as strong and separate offensive forces. The author suggests uses to which this study can be put in psychological warfare directed at the military elite.

The Public Philosophy, by Walter Lippman (*Atlantic-Little, Brown: \$3.50*). Can "both liberty and democracy be preserved before the one destroys the other?" The author sees this as the most important question of our time. He attributes the decline of Western strength partly to a mechanical malfunctioning of democratic government in which the executive function is paralyzed by the excessive power of legislatures dominated by popular passions. The deeper cause lies in the disappearance of the unwritten but once commonly-held "public philosophy" without which political freedom degenerates into public disorder. Mr. Lippman believes it essential to "re-establish confidence in the validity of public standards . . . common and binding principles . . . the convictions from which our [liberal democratic] morality springs."

The United States As A World Power, by Samuel Flagg Bemis (*Holt: \$6.95*). This diplomatic history traces the guiding principles of American foreign policy during the first half of the century. The author shows how "the majority of those principles persist . . . subject to the diplomatic revolution of our times: the shift from isolation to alliance as the basis of our security."

The Evolution of Diplomatic Method, by Harold Nicolson (*Macmillan: \$2.25*), charts the theory and conduct of international diplomacy from Greek and Roman antiquity through the Italian Renaissance to modern times. Citing 17th and 18th century French methods as the most highly perfected, the author points out the weaknesses and advances of each era; and, deploring cumbersome current practices, such as the international conference, calls for a return to the method of secret negotiation, based on integrity and mutuality of purpose, and an end to both idealism and cynicism in diplomatic psychology.

Reflections on the Failure of Socialism, by Max Eastman (*Devin-Adair: \$2.75*). This is a case—chiefly on pragmatic grounds—against all Socialist ideologies, utopian or "scientific." The author describes how Socialist societies, whatever their form, time or location, have always failed; he argues that political liberty depends upon a democratic competitive market and price system. The most logical formula for a better future: more goods and fewer people.

The Mind of Modern Russia, edited by Hans Kohn (*Rutgers: \$5.50*). A cross-section of Russian thought in the period 1825-1917, when Russia's place in the world and particularly her relationship to Europe were being vigorously argued by the Russian intelligentsia. The Slavophile, pro-Western, and radical viewpoints in this debate are represented here in selections from, among others, Chaadaev, Pogodin, Koomyakov, Belinsky, Herzen, Lenin; introductions and commentary by the editor.

My Nine Lives in the Red Army, by Mikhail Soloviev (*McKay: \$3.75*). As *Izvestia's* military correspondent from 1932 through World War II, the author did a stint as history instructor at the Soviet War College, was at the front during the Finnish war, and took an active part in the defense of Moscow. This is the story of these experiences, without generalized conclusions, but with a wealth of firsthand detail on the face and form of the world's largest army.

Institutes and Their Publics (*Carnegie Endowment: \$1.50*). A record of the

proceedings of the International Conference of Institutes of International Affairs, held in New York in October 1953. The three themes taken up at the Conference were (1) the evolution of the United Nations (2) the forces that shape foreign policy in democracies and (3) the purposes, policies, programs and problems of the Institutes. The booklet provides text of the addresses and commentaries, plus appendices on the agenda and participants at the Conference, and the Institutes' sources of income.

The Origin of Russia, by Henryk Paszkiewicz (*Philosophical Library: \$10.00*). A study of the ethnical and political conditions which developed in the regions of the Dnieper and the Volga, from the ninth to the end of the fourteenth century. The author's research sheds new light on the past of the Eastern Slavs and the Finns on the Volga by linking it with the history of the Norsemen, of Great Moravia, Poland, Lithuania, Byzantium, and the Tartar Golden Horde.

The Seizure of Power, by Czeslaw Milosz (*Criterion: \$3.50*). The background of this novel by the author of *The Captive Mind* is Warsaw during the 1944 Rising against the Nazis. Through the thoughts and experiences of four Polish intellectuals are dramatized the conflicting ideals and loyalties on the anti-Nazi side, which resolved themselves politically in the struggle between the democratic government-in-exile in London and the Moscow-formed Lublin Committee.

Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties, by Samuel A. Stouffer (*Double-day: \$4.00*). The climate of feeling in America on the issues of the Communist threat, conformity, and civil liberty, is the subject of this study. It is based on a nationwide survey in which more than 6,000 Americans were interviewed during the summer of 1954 to determine their principal worries and concerns, personal and otherwise; the degree of private interest in public issues; willingness to tolerate dissent; and the degree to which the internal Communist threat is regarded as a pressing danger. The author is Professor of Sociology at Harvard University and director of the Harvard Laboratory of Social Relations.



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